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Summary
This thesis is concerned with rigorously formalizing and testing 
a particular model of foreign investment, the so-called 'portfolio 
model'. As such, it is an exercise in positive economics - rigorous 
model specification coupled with direct empirical testing. The 
exercise can be conceptually separated into four stages. In the 
first place, consideration must be given to the reasons for using 
the model and the limitation on its applicability. This is the 
principal subject matter of the first chapter. Having cleared this 
ground, the model must be formulated and tested. It is here that 
previous attempts to test the model have been most disappointing.
In Chapter II, we shall set out the model rigorously and generate an 
estimating technique to deal with the simultaneous equations system 
the model generates. The third step in our examination of the 
portfolio model is the assessment of the results and this merges with 
the final step of taking these results and using them for further 
explorations on multinational firms. As it turns out, the model does 
not command support from the data and the process of assessing the 
reasons for failure involve the last three chapters. However, an 
alternative model emerges directly from examination of the portfolio 
model and some attention is paid to this evolution and the close 
links between the models. Thus, in a sense, the thesis results are a 
purely negative affair - i.e. after a reasonably close examination, the 
portfolio model is put on one side. The reasons for failure and the 
beginnings of an alternative model are the positive results which 
emerge but, in the end, we are not left with a full blown rigorous 
model which we can put some confidence in. While not glorious and 
exhilarating, it is still progress.
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(i) Introduction
The task which we set ourselves in this thesis is relatively 
straightforward and easily described. We wish to predict the invest­
ment flows directed by multinational firms to various host countries.
Two interrelated problems are involved: to predict the firm's 
global investment total and, intertwined with this, to predict the 
allocation of that global total amongst the host countries involved.
For reasons which will be developed in Chapter II, we shall concentrate 
here on predicting the allocation of investments by multinational 
firms.
The need for such an investigation is self-evident and, as it 
has been the subject of many inquiries, one wonders why yet more 
work is needed on the topic*. Three reasons can be given for the 
rethinking and reworking presented here. The first is that much has 
passed as germane to "the theory of direct investment" and there is a 
need to be precise about what in particular one is concentrating on.
In Section (ii) below, we shall distinguish new from expansionary 
investment and these two form (what we shall come to call) characteristics 
analysis. This three part distinction will assist us in nailing down 
precisely what we want to predict and what variables are relevant to 
the problem.
A second reason for reworking the subject matter is that not 
enough attention has been paid to the type of firm whose behaviour is
I do not intend to develop this polemic in the text. Our argument 
will be set out and developed on its own merits. In the first 
Appendix to this Chapter, the important empirical work done on 
predicting direct investment will be briefly surveyed and a mild 
polemic developed there.
being investigated. In particular, the fact that a multinational 
firm is a diversified firm operating interdependent subsidiaries located 
in different host nations has not been fully appreciated. In Section (iii) , 
we shall briefly discuss the operations of such a firm and show why 
its diversification of production activities makes a difference. The 
implications of this discussion go a long way towards explaining the 
particular model we intend to employ in this study.
Finally, very few investment models explicitly acknowledge 
uncertainty and, clearly, it is of no little importance to build this 
into whatever model is being considered if possible. Whether or not 
one believes that home investment is riskless, international invest­
ment is clearly a rather risky business if only because of the 
unfamiliar environment decision-makers find themselves in. In 
Section (iv), we shall briefly discuss the nature of the risks of 
international investment and its role in the initial diversification 
as well as subsequent expansion of multinational firms. The principal 
empirical results of our study centre (perhaps somewhat controversially) 
around the role of risk in the international investment decision.
These three strands of the argument are brought together in 
Section (v). Our discussion will lead to the adoption of a particular 
model (to be developed in detail in Chapter II) which corresponds to 
a precise set of hypotheses about the determinants of the allocation 
of international investment. In Section (v) we shall state this 
hypothesis and consider the null hypothesis in some detail. This 
examination is doubly necessary because rejection of the null 
hypothesis (should it occur) does not imply return to the sort of 
investment models surveyed in the first Appendix. Rather, it involves 
examination of the internal workings of firms unable to control and 
effectively co-ordinate their multifarious activities.
It appears to be the case that many theories have come under 
the rubric of "the theory of direct investment" and frequently one 
does not know quite what phenomena is under discussion*. It will be 
helpful to use a three part distinction in considering this literature 
and our place in it; we intend to concentrate solely on one of the 
three types of analysis. Thus we shall distinguish expansionary 
investment analysis, new investment analysis and characteristics 
analysis.
Quite often one encounters a discussion of the types of firm 
which go abroad, the motive for internationalization, and the ability 
of the firm to 'go international'. This is 'characteristics analysis'.
It commences properly with a discussion of the motives for diversification 
and provides sufficient conditions on the types of firm which go, the 
reasons why, and so on. The method of analysis is to deduce these 
characteristics from a discussion of the conditions under which 
international diversification will be profitable. It is a long way, 
however, from profitability to investment flows (which involve the 
construction of plant and equipment), the size of such construction, 
its timing, location and so on. Here we distinguish characteristics 
analysis fi.om investment, and, within the latter, new from expansionary 
investment. The former concerns a once over flow, centring attention 
on timing and specific location and somewhat less on size. Expansionary
- 15 -
investment is concerned with a continuing flow, the size of which is 
of more interest than location or timing; location is given by past 
new investment decisions, while timing is embedded in the time unit 
over which the flow is calculated. It should be apparent that the 
three types of exercise concern themselves with rather different 
dependent variables and hence require distinct sets of independent 
variables and perhaps empirical techniques. The remainder of this 
section briefly considers each in turn.
The principal lynchpin in characteristics analysis is a 
consideration of the barriers to entry into foreign markets facing 
the would be multinational*. Chief amongst these is the unfamiliarity 
with the new market and the lack of reliable information which decision­
makers can use. Such ignorance and uncertainty arise from not only 
the usual market uncertainties but, more importantly, from the fact 
that the firm is not familiar with the means available in this 
foreign market to aid it in reducing the problem. That is, it is not 
so much the uncertainty and ignorance per se, but, as it were, the 
uncertainty surrounding (and ignorance of) instruments available 
for hedging.
Given this disadvantage, it is clear that the firm must have 
some compensating assets or advantages with which to meet the 
competitive advantage of indigenous firms. Such assets must be 
easily transportable, preferably at low internal opportunity cost 
(that is, they must take on the character of a public good within 
the firm), and not available to native firms. Of the many possibilities 
which present themselves, product differentiation advantages stand
* Caves (1971; 1974a). Appendix II contains a more detailed discussion 
of such diversification and a summary of the principal empirical 
studies of characteristics analysis. Casson (1977) and Casson and 
Buckley (1976) present a similar analysis centring on internalization
of intermediate product markets by the firm which complements our 
analysis here.
out head and shoulders above the rest (Caves, 1971). It is these 
assets which are the subject of characteristics analysis; the firms 
which have or can obtain them are the relevant subset of firms 
potentially or actually abroad; and, the markets most receptive to 
them or in which they can be most profitably exploited, the presumed 
destinations of these firms. In short, characteristics analysis 
seeks the conditions for profitable operation (and expansion) in 
markets in which the firms suffers relative to competitors in 
knowledge and information about the market.
Such a method of analysis is undoubtedly interesting and valuable, 
yet is is limited in two important respects. On the one hand, it 
establishes only sufficient conditions for profitability; and, on 
the other, it makes no statement about the extent of commitment to 
a foreign market, if any. It is therefore no more than a very necessary 
complement to investment analysis. New investment analysis supplies 
the first deficiency, for it concerns itself with the reasons for 
the firm initially undertaking a foreign commitment; expansionary 
investment, as we remarked earlier, concentrates on the size of the 
continuing commitment.
The distinction between new and expansionary investment is old 
and familiar and, unfortunately, seldom mentioned (exceptions in the 
foreign investment literature are Stevens, 1969a; Richardson, 1971a and 
b) and rarely empirically utilized (typically because of data 
inadequacies). Building on the bed of characteristics analysis and 
retaining our interpretation of it as providing sufficient conditions 
for profitability, it is clear that new investment theory must concern 
itself with the specific factors which transform potential entry into
- 17 -
actual entry. This amounts to identifying the particular signal which 
ultimately impels the firm into motion.
A number of such signals are relevant and interesting and some 
empirical work has established their importance. One signal is a 
change in government policy; in particular, for a firm hitherto 
exporting to the ultimate host nation, the imposition or tightening 
of tariffs or other trade barriers signals the end of profitable 
exporting and the existance of a protected market. Another particularly 
interesting signal is the actions of rivals and competitors*. A 
movement abroad from one of them not only provides information to 
other competitors on a new market, but raises the threat that the 
initiating firm may develop competitive advantages in the new 
market which can be profitably transplanted back to disturb the home 
market oligopolistic equilibrium. The world-wide scramble of the 
oil companies, as well as other resource extractive industries put 
this phenomena into excellent relief (Vernon, 1974). There are of 
course a number of other signals impelling action and much depends 
on the firms strategy (Ansoff, 1965), internal resources and 
opportunity sets (Penrose, 1959) and information gathering procedures 
(e.g. Aharoni, 1966).
When once a firm is established in a market, its expansion and 
continuing growth is the subject matter of expansionary investment 
theory. In rather familiar ways, this depends not so much on the 
current levels of various variables but their expected future -lovement 
and the extent to which such developments depend on current and near
* Classic works in this respect are Vernon (1974) and Knickerbocker
(1973); the empirical findings of the latter are discussed in 
Appendix I.
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future expansionary decisions by the firm. What is relevant is not 
so much a set of attributes possessed by the firm, nor a set of 
signals indicating a large, once over change in market circumstances, 
but rather a time series of principally endogenous indices of 
profitability linked in known ways to current expansionary decisions.
It is iirhaps worth summarizing this discussion and three part 
distinction by considering a number of independent variables frequently 
encountered in the empirical literature and allocating them to their 
appropriate dependent variable*. One variable which has gained some 
popularity is the 'size of the market' (Scaperlanda and Mauer,
1969), as typically measured by the GNP of the host nation. This is 
relevant to characteristics analysis inasfar as the exploitation of 
some particular asset is subject to increasing returns and may 
create a favourable environment for the reception of a signal which will 
induce new investment. It is, however, inappropriate for expansionary 
investment. What is relevant there is the change in the size of that 
market the firm controls, and principally the change which can be 
induced by a combination of marketing initiatives and plant expansion 
(see Goldberg's comments on Scaperlanda and Mauer, 1972, for a discussion 
of this point). Another variable encountered is the change in tariffs 
(e.g. as resulted from the formation of the EEC and EFTA) considered, 
for example, in studies by Scaperlanda and Mauer (1969), Scaperlanda 
(1967), Bandera and Lucken (1972) and many others (see the discussion
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in Appendix I). This, as mentioned, properly pertains to new 
investment for it acts as a signal*; the level of tariffs (e.g. Caves, 
1974c; Horst, 1972b) pertains to characteristics analysis, for it 
forms a crucial part of the environment in which sufficient conditions 
for profitability must be established.
The listing of such variables can be indefinitely continued 
(as it is, to some extent, in Appendix I) but the basic principles 
should be clear. Our principal interest here is in expansionary 
investment; as such, we take the set of existing production locations 
and facilities as given (to be explained if necessary by a backwards 
appeal to new investment theories). Furthermore, the conditions 
of profitability - current levels and to some extent their future 
movements - are also taken as given; again, some explanation can be 
achieved by appeal to characteristics analysis. What cannot be taken 
as given is the overall firm profitability which results from 
pursuing an optimum investment programme. The determinants of that 
programme and its carefully calculated effect on current and future 
profitability are the crux of the problem.
(iii) The Multinational as a Diversified Firm
A diversified firm is one which controls profit generating 
activities in a number of markets, activities involving either the 
production or sale of goods and services**. However, this definition
* Kindleberger (1969), remarks chat the formation of the EEC acted as a 
signal to American foreign investors and that the tariff walls were 
of secondary importance.
** Familiar models such as multi-plant firms (e.g. Henderson and Quandt, 1972) 
and multiproduct firms (e.g. Dhrymes, 1964) isolate two polar possibilities.
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while hardly controversial, is particularly unhelpful, for it is 
plagued by the definitional problems of identifying markets (see, for 
example, the discussion in Penrose, 1959, pp. 110 passim). Markets, 
of course, are defined by product and location (given a temporal 
setting) but this merely pushes the problem back one step. This 
unfortunate difficulty has plagued the investigation of diversified 
firms; as Penrose (1959, pp. 108) has noted: "...because of the 
ambiguity and non-comparability of product classes, one cannot appraise 
the significance of the comparative diversification of different firms". 
In addition, one cannot appraise the breadth of diversification of 
any given firm and this makes the admirable work by Berry (1974),
Utton (1977) and others on the prevalence of conglomerate diversification 
and Schumpeterian competition amongst giant firms difficult to 
interpret.
Fortunately, we can make adequate progress without extensive 
probing of this definitional mire. The important distinction we need 
to make concerns the difference between the operations of a single 
activity firm and those of a diversified firm which controls several 
activities. This feature of control implies that the individual 
plants are operated towards a common purpose and their activities 
correspondingly integrated. One particular manifestation of this is 
the existence of inter-market intra-firms flows of goods which is 
typical especially of vertically integrated structures*. Such flows 
predominate in vertical structures because the linkage between 
vertical markets concerns successive development or distribution of
* Some implications of this argument are developed and applied to 
labour markets in Geroski and Knight (1977). The particularly 
interesting implication is the identification of an important 
causal link between types of firm merger and different patterns of 
union merger.
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a particular good. In horizontal structures, such intra-firm flows 
may be implicit; that is, there may exist an equilibrium in which 
no flows occur but which, when disturbed, occasions such flows as the 
firm performs arbitraging activities.
This integration of plants and possible intra-firm trade can 
be a profitable activity. Not only are arbitrage profits appropriated 
by the firm (perhaps in part), but the firm can price discriminate 
(Henderson and Quandt, 1972; Clemens, 1951), cross-subsidize activities 
to support predatory activities (e.g. Blair, 1974), or otherwise 
manipulate the prices of goods flowing between markets (transfer 
pricing). All of these practices depend on control; ownership is not 
sufficient. Diversification of firms in and out of an industry can 
thus have potentially important effects on industry performance and 
must play a role in the explanation of such profitability (e.g.
Rhoades, 1973; Miller, 1969).
It is easiest to conceptualize the interdependencies between 
plants controlled by a diversified firm by the (potential or actual) 
intra-firm, inter-market flows of goods, technology, finance capital, 
and managerial services. By concentrating on goods flows we can make 
a richer set of distinctions between types of diversification. Thus, 
a horizontally diversified firm controls the flows of a good to 
different locations and similar goods to the same or different 
locations. This can be further sub-classified into geographical or 
product horizontal diversity depending on whether significant differ­
ences in geographical arbitrage and arbitrage over goods space affects 
the particular problem at hand (e.g. Geroski and Knight, 1977).
Vertical diversification is somewhat different; rather than
- 22 -
keying on a basic good, the goods flows are related to the production 
process (including distribution), and different goods flow to markets, 
each being used to produce the next. One particularly interesting 
aspect of this relationship is that the firm faces itself, as it were, 
as buyer and seller in each market and the erection of a vertically 
integrated structure has been closely related to market failure 
(Williamson, 1971, 1975). Conglomerates, in pure form, have absolutely 
no potential or actual goods flows, for their various activities are 
in markets which cannot be spanned by either goods or geographical 
arbitrage.
An interesting subset of diversified firms relates to those who 
control intermarket flows of goods or services which cross national 
boundaries; i.e. multinational firms*. They can be further classified 
as primarily either vertical or horizontal (see immediately below); 
the interesting topic of analysis is the international intra-firm flow 
of goods. While Hymer (1960) was the first economist to bring an 
Industrial Organization perspective to the analysis of multinational 
firms, Caves (1971, 1974a) is responsible for a relatively full 
development of the analysis. He argues that: "...the overwhelming 
portion (by value) of direct investments involve either horizontal 
expansion to produce the same or similar good abroad or vertical
integration.... production diversification across national boundaries
is almost unknown...; (and).... the international corporations'plans to
make vertical and horizontal investment abroad are directly comparable
* Some evidence by Bradshaw (1969) indicates the importance of intra­
firm international transactions. He found that 330 U.S. multinational 
corporations with 3579 affiliates were responsible for a full third 
of U.S. exports, 60% of which were channelled through foreign 
affiliates. Studies by Cohen (1975), Helleiner (1973) and Reuber 
et al (1973) show a growing reliance by some host countries (e.g.
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) on intra-firm trade for boosting 
their exports of industrial products.
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to business decisions opting for familiar forms of domestic expansion",* 
(1971, pp. 268). It is worth explicitly endorsing Caves' view that 
such diversification decisions are similar to purely domestic 
diversification decisions; we shall argue that this is the case with 
expansionary investment and the models which can be used to describe it 
are similar.
Let us turn to consider the investment behaviour of such 
diversified firms. One's instinctive feeling is to employ familiar 
models determining optimal capital stock (Jorgenson, 1963), specify 
an adjustment function and estimate plant and equipment expenditures 
for each subsidiary, or the flows of capital finance from the parent 
to each subsidiary (e.g. Stevens, 1969a; Kwack, 1973; and so on, 
discussed in more detail in Appendix I). A moment's reflection 
suggests that this cannot be right. The distinctive and important 
feature of the operations of diversified firms is the control 
they exert over subsidiaries located in different markets and the 
profitability of co-ordinating these diverse activities. When the firm 
makes an investment decision for one plant, it surely considers the 
alternative and interdependent possibilities presented by the other 
plants it controls. The point is simply that the Jorgenson model 
must, if it is to be used, be extended to simultaneously determine 
all investment in all plants.
Let us consider the proposition that expansionary investment 
decisions are made by scanning over the activities of all existing
* See also Stopford and Wells (1974). The evidence of Stopford 
and Wells and Vernon (1971, Chapter 3) suggests (weakly) the 
possibility that this may be becoming less true over time.
plants*, and, in effect, solving a set of simultaneous equations.
What is crucial here is firm structure and in particular the location 
of the investment decision. Should investment decisions be located 
in plants or subsidiaries, there would be no problem in applying the 
simple investment models. Scanning might occur in the higher 
echelons, but subsidiaries who lack a global perspective are free 
to act independently. Although decentralization of decisions within 
the firm is widespread and subject to sophisticated analysis, there is 
no evidence to suggest that strategic decisions such as investment 
have been so delegated, and this is not surprising. The factors 
which give this common-sense good foundations is that financial 
constraints and interdependencies link these decisions in a way no 
profit maximizing firm can ignore.
Centralization of the investment decision implies that 
investment decisions for various plants will bn part of one overall 
firm wide decision; it underlies the importance of explicitly including 
scanning mechanisms in one's model; and it suggests that rather than 
predicting the investment in each plant separately, one should predict
* Were the firm to scan over all existing plants and possible new 
projects, it would face an immensely complicated problem known as 
the 'wharehouse problem' (Baumol and Wolfe, 1958; Cooper, 1963). 
The problem is complicated because, given the current size and 
activity of existing plants, a new plant must not only be located, 
but its size chosen, but then all existing plants must be altered 
in size. The computational difficulties are formidable. This 
aside, there is a further reason for suspecting that new invest­
ment is essentially a separate decision; the time horizon (life 
of plant rather than life of machine) and various strategic 
considerations (emphasized by Richardson, 1971a and b) differ 
between the two.
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the pattern of investment in all plants simultaneously*. To 
reinforce this point, consider how the centralization of a distri­
bution network within the firm weakens the link between optimum 
capital stock in a particular plant and the change in sales in a 
particular market - the key relation in single equation, single 
plant models. The weakening comes about because the supply network 
between plants and sales outlets gives the firm an extra degree of 
freedom of choice. When circumstances change so that, say, demand 
increases 'permanently' in one market, the plants principally 
involved in supplying that market can expand production (and expand 
in different proportions), or supply networks can be rearranged so 
that output from another plant is called forth. In the extreme, if 
there is surplus capacity in this second plant, no investment may 
occur anywhere at all.
The absence of any overall constraints or interdependencies 
between plants would make the case for centralized decision-making 
rather weak. There is one overall constraint of importance and three 
important sources of subsidiary interdependence.
The overall constraint is clearly financial; whether or not it 
is binding depends on whether the investment policy of the firm is 
independent of firm financial structure. It is quite common in 
investment studies to appeal to the Modgliani-Miller Theorem
* A rather interesting illustration of the principles of our 
argument occurred in Chile in 1955, when the so called "Nuero 
Trato" mining legislation in effect gave the large U.S. copper 
producers a windfall gain in profits. This was expected to 
increase local investment- instead, it was siphoned off and 
invested by the firms elsewhere in the world. It is important to 
note that this occurred well before nationalization and expropria­
tion became real concerns for the firms and so cannot be explained 
away by risk aversion. It is the global perspective of the firms 
and the lack of independence of local investment decisions (see 
Moran, 1974, Chapter 4).
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(Modgliani and Miller, 1958) to banish financial variables (e.g. 
Jorgenson, 1971). However, the evidence is against it (Meuller and 
Grabowski, 1972) and even Jorgenson admits that 'outside' financial 
variables make an impact on investment decisions. The evidence 
from direct investment studies surveyed in Appendix I confirms these 
suggestions. However, the financial constraint may take many forms - 
subsidiaries may be financed solely out of retained earnings 
(Penrose, 1956), the home market may be given "the first bite of the 
cherry" and so on. None of these theories (most of which postulate 
a separation of domestic and foreign investment decisions) appears to 
have found support (Stevens, 1974). The precise nature of the 
constraint depends rather crucially on the sources of funds to the 
multinational and the conditions under which finance is obtained. 
Little hard knowledge has emerged despite several intensive 
investigations (Robbins and Stobaugh, 1974). An interesting case 
study which illustrates the problems (and our ignorance) is the 
response of U.S. multinationals to the U.S. Restraint Programme in 
the late 1960’s (Severn, 1972; Stevens, 1972; Brimner, 1966; Willey, 
1970; Shapiro and Deastlov, 1970; and so on). What appears to have 
occurred is that the restriction on outflow of funds did not impede 
plant and equipment expenditure by U.S. multinationals, it merely 
shifted their financing abroad, principally to national capital 
markets in Europe and the Eurodollar market.
The principal interdependencies (the first two of which induce 
the sort of intra-firm flows of goods remarked upon earlier) between 
plants are three. First, for plants supplying each other with 
intermediate goods or supplying similar markets with complementary
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goods, a link is formed which makes investments in these plants 
complementary. The reverse is true for plants supplying overlapping 
sets of markets with the same or similar goods, for then expansion 
of one is at the expense of another plant. Supply networks and new 
investment projects are important ceteris paribus features of these 
functional relations. Finally, pooling of risk arising from relations 
between the "shocks" occurring in various markets allow for the 
possibility of risk pooling by careful choice of an 'expansion 
portfolio'.
In an important sense, covariances* may reflect all three types 
of interdependencies. Any relation between the stochastic forces 
operating in various markets will, of course, be picked up by a 
covariance, but one may expect that substitutability and complementarity 
may also be reflected. This is most clearly seen if we suppose a 
pair of plants and investment possibilities which raise the rate of 
return which we assume would otherwise decline. If the plant) are 
complementary, the investment will occur in both and both rates of 
return will rise; if they are substitutes, then the rate of return in 
one plant will fall while that in the expanded plant will rise. Thus, 
both economic and stochastic factors will arter the covariance 
between the two plants' rates of return.
To sum up this discussion, we have argued that the salient 
characteristic of a diversified firm (which a multinational is) is 
the control over the interdependent activities of its subsidiaries.
* For the moment consider this to be covariances between the rates 
of return earned in various markets.
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In planning an investment programme, this implies that the firm will 
solve a 'simultaneous equation problem' in determining investment 
allocations amongst plants. When we have discussed the effect of 
uncertainty on investment in the next section, we shall move on to 
modelling these ideas into a specific, testable hypothesis in 
Section (v). The model based upon this discussion and hypothesis 
is the subject of Chapter II.
(iv) Risk and Uncertainty in Foreign Operations
It will be recalled that the third reason the reader was 
enticed into this thesis is that we argued that risk and uncertainty 
play a large role in expansion of foreign operations and must be 
explicitly included in whatever model of such expansion is being 
proposed. As Helliwell has remarked: "...the influence of uncertainty 
is likely to remain far larger in the world of affairs than it is in 
the specification of .... investment equations", (1976, pp.16).
We should like to remedy this sad state to some (perhaps limited) 
extent, and so must spend some effort considering just precisely 
what the risks of foreign operation are and how they might differ 
from the risks involved in domestic operations.
We mentioned the risk of foreign operation earlier in our 
discussion of characteristics analysis, such risk and the consequent 
uncertainty forming a crucial step in that argument. Risk arising 
from unfamiliarity of the workings of a new market obviously is most 
acutely felt upon initial entry. Over time, as the firm operates in 
the new market, it gains the knowledge needed to cope with situations
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and the confidence to face unexpected reverses and stumbling blocks 
with relatively more equanimity. It learns not only the character 
and extent of demand in the new market, but how best to estimate 
this; it develops relations with suppliers of raw materials, inter­
mediate products and ancilliary services and learns the full possi­
bilities open to it; the nature of competition and the particular methods 
of collusion and co-ordination amongst rivals are slowly revealed*; 
and, finally, it develops a working relationship with the host 
government, slowly mastering the nuances of the laws and regulations 
and how they may be effectively ’dealt with'. Nevertheless, this 
knowledge is only slowly and painfully gained and evidently the 
assets of the firm which ensure successful initial entry must be 
counted upon to sustain competitiveness in the 'foreign' environment 
for some time. At some point in its operations in the foreign host, 
the firm may become 'native' and, using primarily native managers, 
come to feel 'at home'. This possibility can only be realized, 
however, after a long, intensive learning period.
Let us consider specifically the risks of expansionary investment 
in a domestic environment and then, using these principles, extend that 
discussion to deal with the risks of expansion in a foreign country.
The most conceptually straightforward means of approaching this subject 
is to imagine (not implausibly) that the firm formulates an expected 
return from an expansion of a given size, expressed as a rate of 
return. The risk of that expansion is clearly the probability of
Caves (1974b) speculates that the multinational will, nevertheless, 
remain a force disrupting these collusive patterns and that inter­
national oligopolistic co-ordination is still very much of the 
future.
various deviations from that expected return, conveniently expressed 
as a variance*. Any number of factors can be expected to create 
such a deviation: a poor guess, the reaction of rivals, unanticipated 
policy changes by the government, and so on. However, these factors 
create only the possibility of a deviation, for the firm has some 
limited means of reacting to each and rectifying the situation.
Thus, suppose that the expansion involves extending the facilities 
of a plant producing green toothpaste and the expected return is 10%. 
Unanticipated expansion by a rival may lower this by 5% if the firm 
cannot react. If, say, it can switch the new facilities towards 
producing red toothpaste, it may achieve a rate of return of 9%, 
a net deviation of expected returns of 1%. Thus, the risk of expansion 
is the probability of each possible disturbing element times the net 
disturbances (expressed as a deviation from the expected return); 
the net deviation being the total disturbance less the correction 
achieved by the firm.
For a firm with several plants, the variance of each is 
modified by the joint covariances. This arises because the inter­
dependencies between the plants controlled by the firm allow the 
joint resources of both plants to be applied to a problem in either. 
Furthermore, the factors creating disturbances in markets may be 
related, reinforcing each other or cancelling out to some extent 
across the system.
It is important to stress that this view of variances (and 
covariances) as measures of risk is "ex post" in the sense that the 
potential effect of any given disturbance is modified or exacerbated
* Another measure might be the semi-variance, in this case the sum 
of squared deviations below the mean. See Markowitz (1959).
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by the reactions by the firm. Faced with the probability of any 
given disturbance, the firm asks first, what that disturbance will 
do to the expected return; second, what the firm can do; and then 
deduces the net effect. It should be pretty evident by now what 
the problem with foreign investment is. In the first place, 
because of ignorance about the market it is involved in, the firm 
has a much less clear idea of precisely what probability is to be 
attached to particular disturbances and the gross deviation likely 
to be induced by each. It can of course either under- or over­
estimate each of these components but it would appear likely that 
it would over-estimate both the probability of an event with a 
negative deviation and the gross extent of that deviation. This 
would follow if the firm was risk averse, for risk aversion entering 
into the decision of what probability to use for each event would 
imply over-estimation*. This follows from the fact that the risk 
averse fear the risk of 'overdoing it'; that risk, in the problem 
of choosing what probability to weight a given gross deviation with, 
is the risk of understating the true objective probability of the 
event if that event creates a negative deviation, or overstating 
the probability if the deviation is expected to be positive.
However, the crucial element entering the risk of foreign 
expansion is the adjustment problem identified earlier. Given the 
probabilities eventually chosen and the gross deviations expected, 
the adjustment problems facing the foreign firm result in a larger
* This rather self-evident proposition appears to play no role in 
the uncertainty literature in which subjective probabilities are 
given and not analysed. See Arrow (1971).
s
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expected net deviation, ceteris paribus*. The lack of knowledge 
of the environment means that the firm will be less sure in its 
response, less effective and perhaps in the limit, completely unable 
to react. It faces an uphill struggle in modifying potential gross 
deviations.
To sum up, let us ask what we are to make of a given estimated 
variance to expansion in a foreign as compared to a domestic 
environment. Evidently, the variance the firm attaches to a given 
foreign expansion will be less accurate and it will be less confident 
of it than in the domestic situation, the probabilities used and 
gross deviations applied are calculated amidst relatively more 
ignorance; the net deviations are larger and their precise magnitude 
less certain because the conditions and methods of adjustment are 
less clear to the firm, ceteris paribus. Looking at the other side of 
the coin, a given ex post variance of returns over past operations 
(say, the variance calculated from the rate of return earned over 
the past ten years) is an achievement involving relatively greater 
effort in the foreign country; effort expended in guessing, worrying 
and adjusting. Clearly, it cannot be regarded in the same light as 
the same variance calculated from past home market activities.
These observations are rather important, for the measure of 
risk we shall be forced to adopt (for reasons eventually to be made 
clear) is an ex post calculation of risk. Such ex poste calculations 
will have to be used as proxies for the ex ante variances used by 
the firm in making decisions, but the same problem exists with both.
* There is, of course, one final element of risk which is the fact that 
a number of events may take the firm completely by surprise and one 
might expect that this will be relatively higher for the foreign 
firm. However, cutting aginst this is the vigilance of the 
foreigner acutely aware of his inadequacies.
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That is, the variance conceals the very real ignorance and adjustment 
difficulties facing a firm abroad. Mot only must the variance 
quite properly appear in the investment function, but some provision 
must be made for the asymmetry between home and foreign variances, 
not to mention the asymmetries between the individual foreign 
variances themselves. This is a subject which will move to the 
forefront of Chapter IV and we shall have a number of interesting 
empirical results casting information on the matter.
(v) The Hypothesis
The time has come to sum up our arguments and form them into 
a precise hypothesis to test. This hypothesis will be cast in 
terms of the specific model we intend to adopt and so before 
presenting the hypothesis, it is worth sketching the transition 
between the three strands of argument in this chapter and the model 
of the next. Finally, the arguments of this chapter not only imply 
a particular hypothesis to test but also lead to a set of alternatives 
and we shall briefly point to the path we envisage should be taken.
The discussion and classification of investment models enables 
us to proceed more confidently on our task of estimating and predict­
ing expansionary direct investment. Coupled with the points made 
about scanning over a number of interdependent activities, it implies 
that our model will scan over the expansion possiblities of a given 
set of existing plants. The inclusion of risk and expected return in 
the model of expansionary investment will be facilitated because we
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will be able to use past plant performance to extrapolate future
performance*; with new investment, there is no past performance to
extrapolate from. The fact that we are dealing with a diversified
firm emphasizes the scanning over a number of joint expansion
possibilities and demands the inclusion of plant interdependencies.
It is the centralized decision-making arising from the single control
over these interdependent activities which causes us to focus on
scanning and inter-relations between activities. Finally, the
explicit inclusion of uncertainty suggests that the firm will be
investing in combinations of interdependent risky activities and
that some sort of portfolio choice is involved. An important point
of this portfolio choice is the evaluation of foreign risk.
This portfolio model we will come to use will be constructed
to predict the investments that the firm makes in each of its 'N'
plants around the world. Our concern is consequently with the
pattern or allocation of investment as much as with global total
investment (which we will not, in fact, model). The precise
hypothesis we propose to test is the following:
The multinational firm pursues an integrated global expansionary 
investment policy, reflecting interdependencies between the 
activities of its plants; and, that this centralised decision 
is made on the basis of a portfolio model, or may be so 
described. Such a portfolio model is used to maximise the 
risk adjusted expected rate of return of global investment.
To bring this hypothesis into sharper focus and direct attention
to the crucial arguments it is founded upon, it is worth considering
* This will be discussed more fully below. It is obviously only one 
of a number of ways of overcoming the problem that we cannot observe 
precisely what the firm had in mind when it made its decision.
in some detail the alternative hypotheses. There are two:
(a) that centralized decision-making is not effectively occurring;
(b) that it is occurring, but not by use of a portfolio model*.
Let us briefly consider each in turn.
The factors which bring about a situation in which the firm 
cannot take account of interdependencies and optimise are those 
which create information problems for and overloading of peak 
co-ordinators within the firm. Of these, two stand out in importance. 
Sheer size increases information processing and evaluating requirements 
and allows control loss to develop, isolating, overloading and 
attenuating the power peak co-ordinators have to impose their will 
on middle and lower management (Williamson, 1970). Hand in hand 
with this is the possibility that firm structure has not adapted to 
firm strategy (Chandler, 1962) diversification having proceeded 
to such an extent that required information and control fails to 
diffuse within the firm from peak co-ordinators down and operating 
divisions across to other divisions and up to the head office.
In their study of firm financial policy, Stobaugh and Robbins
(1974) divided up the firms they studi d into three size classes - 
small, medium and large. In considering the financial policies 
typically followed by firms in each size class, a number of interesting 
differences emerged. Small firms tended to neglect their inter­
national operations, leaving them by and large to run themselves,
* There is a third possibility which is that interdependencies are 
trivial and hence do not give rise to centralization of such 
decisions. I find this particularly implausible on a priori 
grounds, and certainly the variance-covariance matrix presented 
in Appendix VII as well as the evidence on intra-firm international 
trade cast doubt empirically on it, albeit indirectly and imperfectly.
the reason being that such operations are too small and the firm 
was too inexperienced in manageing subsidiaries abroad to make 
it economically worthwhile to co-ordinate. Large-firms, on the other 
hand, tended to apply rules of thumb; despite their superior 
knowledge and experience of international affairs, there is simply 
too large an administrative task involved in attempting to optimise. 
Medium sized firms were found by Stobach and Robbins to approach the 
optimum financial policy most closely.
Similar performance effects were found for roughly the same 
sample of firms by Stopford and Wells (1974) when firms were 'mis- 
structured' . They traced the evolution of multinational structures 
from one-off foreign activities to international divisions, from 
thence to world-wide product or area divisions and finally into 
recent 'mixed grid' systems combinine product and area divisionaliz­
ation. An important empirical finding of theirs was that 'misstructured 
firms' suffered a deterioration in growth and (less noticeably) 
profitability relative to firms more appropriately structured.
Firm size and diversity would thus appear to be the biggest 
stumbling blocks to optimisation and are thus starting points in the 
exploration of why firms fail to perform with all the efficiency 
of a maximizer. One suspects that these paths will lead through 
problems of control loss, subgoal pursuit and so on, into the realms 
of rule of thumb decision-making. Hopefully, such exploration will 
be rich enough to generate light on the choice of the particular 
manifestations of the problems outlined here.
It is of course possible that firms optimise, make decisions 
centrally taking into account interdependencies and so on, but do
not use the portfolio model we shall outline in a moment. While 
it is possible, it is highly unlikely. Quite simply, there is no 
alternative model which describes the choice of risky, inter­
dependent assets. What is more likely is that particular specifica­
tions of the portfolio model may incorrectly describe the behaviour 
in question. Rather than forming a null hypothesis, this suggestion 
should guide further research; in other words, our use of the 
portfolio model should be concerned with the extensions which might 
be needed to make the model perform adequately as much as with the 
question of whether 'the model' finds significant support in the 
data. One suspects that the principal extensions needed will 
concern the treatment of risk and foreign risk in particular.

- 39 -
(i) Introduction
After isolating and identifying expansionary investment as the 
subject of our interest in Chapter I, we went on to develop two themes 
which we argued should be at the forefront of model building. These 
were the explicit view of the multinational firm as a diversified firm, 
implying centralized strategic decision making and cognizance of the 
interdependence between activities; and, secondly, the question of 
risk. On the latter score, we developed our discussion by conceptual­
izing the variance of returns expected from a given expansion relative 
to the expected return as a measure of expected risk, and most of our 
efforts were made to develop the precise implications of such a measure 
in the context of foreign activity.
This discussion leads us to the 'portfolio' model and our concern 
in this chapter is to expound the model formally, and prepare it for 
empirical work. It will prove convenient to proceed in four steps. In 
section (ii) below, we shall set out the basic model and discuss one or 
two simplifications we have had to impose on it. The discussion there 
springs immediately from the prior work done in section (iii) of the 
previous chapter. Unfortunately, the model involves 'N' simultaneous 
equations, a number of tedious non-linearities and an unknown parameter 
on which information must be generated before estimation can proceed. 
While our methods are the conceptually familiar ones of OLS, the procedure 
used initially and generalised in later chapters is not well known and 
requires some elaboration. This will be the subject of section (iii).
The discussion of section (ii) in the previous Chapter served to 
distinguish and identify expansionary investment from new investment and 
characteristics analysis. New and expansionary investment are investment
f t ' *
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in real assets (characteristics analysis, we emphasized, contains no pre­
diction about investment at all) and while economists have been long 
familiar with the differences between real investment and equity 
investment (i.e. investment in shares and bonds), the need for re­
emphasizing this distinction arises here. The reason for this is that 
the model we shall employ to predict real investment turns out to be 
deceptively similar to that frequently used in discussions of international 
equity investment. Consequently, a digression in section (iv) is 
necessary to remind us precisely what we are about. This will be rather 
useful, for it will enable us to avoid certain specification errors which 
have plagued previous work in this area.*
One final topic must be discussed before we can proceed in 
Chapter III and commence empirical investigation, and it harkens back to 
our discussion of risk in the previous chapter. Our model works with 
ex ante variables such as expected return and the variance anticipated 
and attached to this expected return. Such data are not available to us
and we must explicitly approximate them from past data, a task made easier 
because of our concern with expansionary investment. However, a number 
of tricky problems and interesting issues arise in such an approximation 
procedure and they relate immediately to the problems of risk in foreign 
environments. In section (iv), we shall discuss this matter explicitly. 
Both sections (iii) and (iv) represent something of a digression on the 
main argument; however, they are necessary preliminaries to meaningful 
work and, indeed, will prove rather helpful in illustrating both the 
strengths and weaknesses of the portfolio model and in suggesting its 
proper specification.
(ii) The Model
We shall assume that the firm maximizes expected returns subject 
to 'an allowance' for risk. The investment decision takes the form of 
allocating a fixed global total of funds amongst the interdependent 
activities of the firm in 'N' countries. The whole problem is set in 
the context of uncertainty about the precise return to be gained from a 
given expansion.
Let us commence with the objective function. We take management 
to be concerned with the rate of return (which, as global total invest­
ment is fixed, is equivalent to profit maximization) which is a natural 
starting point for most problems.* This should not be taken as precluding 
the study of alternative motivations; the Solow (1971) argument that 
alternative motivations lead to only quantitative and not qualitative 
differences in performance, however, reinforce'one's inclination to start 
with profits.
Perhaps somewhat more controversial and certainly more important is 
the assumption that firms maximize expected returns subject to 'an 
allowance' for risk. As we shall formulate this, it implicitly involves 
solving an expected utility problem and then imposing a quadratic functional 
form on the utility function. There are good theoretical reasons for 
being cautious about such a procedure (Feldstein, 1969; Rothschild and 
Stiglitz, 1970), the problem being that the quadratic utility function is
* Quite frequently appeal is made to the Williamson (1970) proposition 
that, in an M-form firm, control procedures based on profitability of 
divisions will ensure the absence of sub-goal pursuit. This, however, 
does not imply profit maximization, for top managers might pursue 
alternatives unimpaired by these devices. Furthermore, the argument 
is a little simple. The great problem with such profit centres is 
that the allocation of overheads and the setting of intra-firm transfer 
prices makes them rather arbitrary accounting yardsticks. The furthest 
one can comfortably go is to argue that they make divisional managers 
cost conscious and hence lead to cost minimization which is compatible 
with most other objectives (J. Williamson, 1966).
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not monotonically increasing throughout. Nevertheless, this form 
has particularly helpful properties which aid the estimation procedure 
immensely; the only other alternative is to impose another functional 
form (say logs) and this seems equally arbitrary. The position taken 
here has been to simplify empirical work at some sacrifice of theoretical 
considerations.
Thus, the firm maximizes expected returns (rate of return to 
expansion of plant and equipment), subject to some appropriate discounting 
for risk. This mean-variance criterion can be written as:
(1) Z " p° - hp*
where p° is expected overall firm rate of return and p* is total firm-wide 
variance of such returns. The particular uncertainty of not being able 
to predict accurately and confidently leads to a discounting of a factor 
proportionate to risk from expected returns; h, the marginal rate of sub­
stitution between expected return and risk, is the factor of proportionality 
and is taken to be constant and positive.
The discounting factor, h, is worth dwelling upon for it will assume 
some importance in later discussions. In slightly more general models, 
h comes to equal one-half the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of 
decision makers within the firm. To see this*, consider the following 
argument:
We seek a risk premium, r, such that (p°-r) is equivalent to the 
random return, p, in some sense. Thus, let r be a number such that:
* This derivation is quite common in the literature; see Malinvaud 
(1972, pp. 290-92), for example.
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(2) U(p° - r) = E {U(p)}
and write p as: p “ p° + e, where e is a random number such that 
2
E(e) = 0 and E(e ) » p*. Expanding both sides of (2) about e «* 0 
and r = 0 in a Maclaurian series, we have, for small e, the following 
local approximation:
(3) r = iU"p*/U'
which is positive for risk averters (Arrow, 1971, Chapter III).
*Clearly, our h = r/p*. The important point to be gathered from this 
discussion is that h, which bears a close relation to absolute risk 
aversion, can be expected to depend, inter alia, on total investor 
wealth. Because we have taken global investment to be given, h can 
then be taken to be constant. We shall come back to this point in a 
moment.
To be helpful, the model must relate the individual markets where 
investment occurs to these overall firm aggregates. We have assumed a 
fixed total of investment funds which we shall denote as F°, and, with 
this simplification, it is particularly easy to work with the shares, 
X^, allocated to each of the 'N' markets (where each market is indexed 
by subscript i). It is then straightforward to rewrite (1) as:
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investment shares, subject to the constraint that the shares sum 
to unity*:
(5) l  -  1
i
This then is the basic model. Its solution is straightforward and 
before we come to the detailed formal analysis it is worth discussing 
two simplifying assumptions which have been imposed. These are the 
assumption (already noted) of taking F° as constant and the assumption 
we shall shortly adopt of stochastic constant returns.
The constraint on the allocation of funds for investment around 
the world is that the shares, X^ , sum to unity; denoting the total 
funds allocated to market i as F1, the constraint is readily rewritten 
as:
(6) l F1 ■= F° 
i
Conceptually, extension of the model so that it determines both the 
allocation of shares to each market and total global investment jointly 
is quite straightforward. Two sets of considerations determine the 
choice of global funds. On the one side, a cost of funds schedule is 
needed to be set against Z. On the other, the effect of F° on Z and
* It would also be natural to constrain the shares to be positive.
As it turns out, most of the data we shall use in the forthcoming 
empirical investigations is not plant and equipment expenditures 
but flows of funds and these latter can be negative, reflecting 
an outflow from the host rather than an inflow. The sceptical 
reader is advised to await the next chapter.
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hence on optimum shaus needs to be specified. This latter is slightly 
complicated, for in this particular model there is no separation 
(Cass & Stiglitz, 1970)*, so that optimum shares will, in general, vary 
with F°. The mechanism determining this relation is the effect F° 
has on h, the marginal rate of substitution between overall expected 
return and overall risk. Should this decline with increases in F° so 
that increases in total investment modify the compensation (in terms of 
expected returns) demanded for shouldering extra risk, then shares will 
increase in those countries which contribute relatively more to overall 
risk, and vice versa should h increase with F°. With Z then a function 
of F°, calculations can proceed by comparing Z with the cost of funds 
schedule and predictions of the N shares and F° can be jointly obtained.
Our real interest is with the allocation of funds and taking F° 
to be constant (which amounts empirically to taking F° to be the actually 
observed global total investment) is a considerable simplification.
This is more so with multinational firms whose sources of supply of funds 
extends around the world. The U.S. Voluntary Restraint Program 
(Brimmer, 1966) demonstrated the flexibility of such firms in seeking 
the funds they need for their expansion and the ease with which they can 
do so without seriously affecting real investment plans (Stevens, 1972;
Willey, 1970; Shapiro and Deastlov, 1970). It is a complicated problem 
to which justice cannot be done here.
The assumption of F° constant is not particularly serious. For 
each level of F° which the firm could conceivably generate, it would 
solve an allocation problem such as we have suggested here. Using a cost 
of funds schedule, it would then select that F° together with the appropriate 
shares which would be its' optimum. Constancy of F° merely implies that
* Essentially because there is no riskless asset. The concept of a
worldwide riskless asset is rather nebulous in any case; see Rugman (1976).
we are considering that problem to have been solved and the correct F° 
to have been chosen. We then describe the shares which helped to 
determine that F°. A far more damaging assumption would have been 
to determine the global F° without consideration of shares, implicitly 
holding them constant.
A second point about the model worth remarking upon is precisely 
how interdependencies enter and the related question of dealing with 
stochastic returns to scale. The later question involves the derivative 
of the random return (in particular its first two moments) with respect 
to the investment shares sent to that market; interdependencies involve 
the cross derivative between the returns in market i and the shares 
allocated to any j. Should two plants be complementary in, say, serving 
a particular market, then this cross derivative will be positive; should 
the plants be substitute sources of supply, then the derivative will be 
negative. The issue is complicated by the fact that returns are random 
and that progress can only come after the full specification of the joint 
density function over all returns as functions of all shares is determined.
For familiar reasons, we can only take derivatives of expected 
returns (and variances), not of the random return itself (Feller, 1950). 
Intuitive reasonings suggest that expected returns will fall when invest­
ment rises, but for risk no obvious a priori guides emerge. Thus, there 
is a sense in which stochastic constant returns is the natural course to 
take short of fully specifying returns schedules in each market. However, 
in empirical investigation, the data do not contain enough richness for 
investigation of diminishing returns, much less interdependencies as 
reflected in cross derivatives. The problem is the familiar one that 
one observation of a point on a return schedule (or any other schedule 
for that matter) does not provide sufficient information to deduce its slope.
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It is germane at this point to ask just how far it is reasonable 
to pursue marginal analysis in problems such as this. To fully 
investigate interdependencies and stochastic returns to scale, the 
full joint distribution of the returns, p^, in all markets i are needed. 
This is quite a staggering informational problem and it is not unreasonable 
to suggest that economic decision makers will economize by adopting 
simplifications. The natural one to make in such circumstances is 
stochastic constant returns, coupled perhaps with some ad hoc adjustment 
for decreasing expected returns from increases in the scale of plant.
A similar adjustment procedure may extend to interdependencies. However, 
in this case, it is possible that co-variances will pick up many more 
important economic forces at work (see Chapter I). By so doing, 
decision makers are not necessarily being irrational or anti-marginalist.
(iii) Empirical Application of the Model
It is now high time that we set down the details of the model, 
and prepare for empirical testing. Recall that the problem is to choose 
the N shares, A., to maximize:’ l*
(7) l A.p? 
i
l p*,, + I l M 4
i in i 3 ij
where A. is the share of total investment F° allocated to market i; i
p°^ is the expected return per unit of funds invested in market i;
p*.. *= p*.. is the variance/co-variance of returns between markets i * i j  K Ji
and j; and h is a constant greater than zero. Z is maximized subject 
to the constraint that:
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(8) I X. - 1
i
To solve this problem, form the Lagrangian:
(9) l - Z + *[l - l xj
i
where ip, the Lagrangian multiplier, bears the interpretation of the 
shadow cost of funds and the dimension of an interest rate. To ensure 
that the first order conditions are sufficient for a maximum, we require 
that the bordered Hessian:
(1 0) |H| -
o -1 . . "I
-1
•
v  n  
•
"  P N1
••
-1
••
•• P * 1
v  IN '• v  NN
must be such that the last (N-l) principal minors are all negative; i.e. 
that the Hessian of Z is negative definite subject to (8). No particularly 
interesting insights emerge from this condition.
The first order conditions solve for the X^ and i|i and are the (N+l) 
equations :
( 11) <l> i-1,
1
, N
One equation from (11) may be eliminated by eliminating <l>, and we can 
consequently write N equations in the N shares; we can solve explicitly 
for these N variables if (11) is sign definite (as opposed to semi-definite) 
for this guarantees that the Jacobian of the system (12) below is

Equations (12), (13) and (14) all equivalently show the equilibrium 
expressed as functions of the unknown h and the known variables, 
p°, and pi.. Actually observed shares will henceforth be denoted 
as X^; estimated shares defined by these equations will be denoted 
Xj. Clearly, to test the model, two steps must be followed. First, 
to construct X^ we need to know h; and, second, the estimates X^ must 
be compared with the actually observed shares X^ to check that the 
model predicts correctly.* The first step involves X^ and requires 
that we generate a value for h. We assume that the firm is allocating 
optimally according to (7) and (8), so that observed shares are derived 
from (14). Then, using these observed shares, we extrapolate what h 
must have been if these X^ were so generated. That is, we seek the h 
which maximizes the likelihood of finding X^ from the population for 
which X is the mean - the maximum likelihood estimate of h.
Denote the ijth element of Si X as e£j • and expand the ith row of (14) 
as:
(16)
A
X.1 ' eii
^  " Pl3 + + c
2h *•* iH
which simplifies to:
(17)
A
Xi
r.i
2h + i=l| • • • » N
where :
(18) r.i
N-l
- 1
3
*ij W  - pjl •
Fortunately, the X^ are linear in h X. Writing:
* After the vast bulk of the empirical work was complete an alternate, 
equivalent estimating technique was suggested to me by Dennis Leech. 
The details are sketched in Appendix IV.
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(19) X£ » i  + vu i-1, N-l 
and assuming that
(20) u -v- N(0, o2),
then the likelihood function, f(h), is:
(21) f (h )  = V- 2.N/2 • exp ■(2iro )
»
I d .  -  x . ) 2 
1
1
2o2
y
which we seek to maximize by choosing h. Assumptions (19) and (20)
are natural to make in the circumstances, but hide some difficulties.
The error term in (19) should be seen as arising from minor errors of
allocation by the firm and minor constraints in the allocation which
we have ignored. As ^  = 1, (19) applies only to (N-l) of the
i
shares and the last is determined as a residual. If (19) applied to 
all N shares, then the error terms u^ would not be independent and 
the use of the likelihood criterion would involve a mis-specification. * 
Taking the log of (21), converting to a minimum problem by 
multiplying through by (-1) and ridding ourselves of inessential terms, 
we seek to minimize L(h):
(22) L(h) = £(X£ - X£)
i
At the minimum, h must satisfy:
(23) &  -  0 -  $
1
and so:
2V i 2hr.1 2eiNri
* I am obliged to Dennis Leech for this observation.
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(24) J.h = lx
which is the maximum likelihood estimate of h and, as such, is both 
a sufficient and an aysmototically minimum variance estimate (Freund, 
1972, pp. 267-70).
Having generated the best possible h, we must check that the 
model predicts correctly or, in this case, that the model is internally 
consistent in the sense that the estimates of h using actual shares 
result in estimated shares sufficiently close to these actual shares.
If these X^ are, as hypothesized, generated from (7) - (8), then by 
estimating h and calculating the X^'s from (23), we should generate a 
set of X^'s which are close (in some sense) to the X^. If they are 
close, we can then say that the data support the model and accept the 
hypothesis of Chapter I.
Our final problem, then, is to develop a criteria for closeness. 
Suppose we estimate:
for (N-l) of the N linearly dependent shares*; clearly we would want 
a ■= 0 and 8 = 1 to find support for the model.
estimates of a and 8 will not be independent. Consider Figure I.
(25) i-1
However, since the OLS line goes through the point (X^,X^)**,
* Linear dependence follows from the constraint £ X^ = 1
i
** That is, mean actual and estimated shares.
53 -
l
—
s
1
, - 1 1
1
Al.FIGURE I
Given that the OLS line goes through point A, inspection of lines 
i and ii shows clearly that the higher the estimated o the lower will be 
the estimated B* Consequently, simply testing that a is insignificantly
that the co-variance of a and 8 is negative. Consequently, the con­
fidence limits are inappropriately large and we must construct a joint 
test.
Following Theil (1971, pp.138-9), we shall compare the sum of square 
of the residuals implied by the hypothesis a - 0 and 8 “ 1:*
different from zero and 8 from unity is incorrect, for it fails to note
(26) SSo - I (A. - A.)
N-l
2
i-1
with the OLS sum of squares
N-l
(27) SS. - l (A. -
1 i-1 1
* The omitted observation is the Nt*1 for notational convenience
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where a and & are the OLS estimates of the two parameters. It can
2be shown -.hat SS^ and SS^ are independent x variates so that:
[SS^ - SSj(N-3)
(28) "2TSS]T
is distributed as F(2,(N-1) - 2). Should the computed F exceed the 
critical F, then we must reject the hypothesis that a = 0 and 6 = 1 .  
Intuitively, the numerator measures the improvement to explanation 
gained by relinquishing the assumption that a = 0 and 6 = 1 ,  and
A A
letting the data determine a and 6. Should this improvement, expressed 
as a percentage of the explanatory power of a = 0 and 6 = 1 be 
sufficiently large, then relinquish it we must.
(iv) Direct and Equity Investment
Portfolio models have usually been applied to equity investment, 
whether it be to describe and predict investment choices in a domestic 
stock market or international 'portfolio' investment. Rather than 
testing the model directly, early researchers contented themselves with 
measuring the possible gains to diversification, and these were usually 
found to be considerable (Grubel, 1968; Levy & Sarnat, 1970 & 1975). 
Rather more positive testing has accompanied the development of the model 
into a full fledged general equilibrium description of the capital asset 
market - the so-called Capital Asset Pricing Model (Cf. Jenkins, 1973). 
This capital market model has been applied internationally with somewhat 
less success (Rugman, 1976; Solnik, 1973 & 1974; Lessard, 1974 & 1976). 
Lacking data on individual investors and their activities in capital 
markets, researchers have been forced into testing a theory centering 
not so much on the behaviour of the individual investor, but on the
behaviour of large numbers of such investors in the capital asset market.
V
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The first apparent difference between this work on international 
(and domestic) capital markets and our model here is that we concentrate 
on the individual investor (or a number of them together) and shall 
empirically test a hypothesis about individual behaviour, not market 
behaviour. The second important difference between these equity 
investment models and a direct investment model is that the latter seeks 
to predict investment in real assets or machines. Despite many formal 
similarities in the two types of model, these two considerations serve 
to mark the differences between the two models in a strong and 
unambiguous manner.
The identity of the investors being described in direct and equity 
investment models is quite different; equity investment is performed 
by individuals and various financial institutions whereas direct 
investment is done by non-financial multinational corporations (Leanor 
S Stern, 1972; Ragazzi, 1973)*, In the terminology of Leanor and 
Stern (but contrary to their assertions), direct investment models are 
"activity" models in which the activity can be attributed to a 
relatively small class of "transactors" who are distinct from the 
transactors relevant to equity investment models. This very close 
link between transactors and activities removes many of the criticisms 
lodged by Learmer and Stern against activity models relating to direct 
investment and allows further development of direct investment portfolio 
models not possible in the case of equity investment.
The first and most obvious extension involves exploring the 
implications of alternative maximands which managers may adopt, and 
testing them. This is a topic we have touched upon before, and we need 
not labour it here. The inportant point to note is that there is 
no reason to limit analysis to maximization of returns’ although this
* Characteristics analysis can, of course, make this distinction far 
more fine by considering the motivations and abilities of the two 
types of investors.
is the only tenable assumption which can be made in an equity 
investment model.
The identity of the investor being unambiguously resolved in 
direct investment models serves to emphasize the particular nature 
of the activity being pursued; i.e. investment in real assets.
This may be contrasted with equity investment in which funds are 
allocated to the purchase of shares and bonds. Evidently, rather 
different sets of variables will guide the two different allocation 
decisions. Investment in fixed assets flows to where the rate of 
return on manufacturing activities is highest; equity investment is 
guided by the rate of return on equities and bonds - that is, fixed 
interest payments, dividends and capital gains. The most obvious 
example of how these two sets of variables lead to different flows is 
the case of the U.S. which receives large inflows of equity capital 
(principally from Europe) and exports massive outflows of direct 
investment (a large share of which goes to Europe).
This raises the question of whether there is any need for corpora­
tions to diversify; whether all the gains from diversification come 
to individual investors diversifying their holdings of stocks and bonds, 
obviating the need for firms to do so. Some recent evidence suggests 
that there are gains to "real" diversification by corporations, 
especially international diversification (Rugman, 1977) and this is 
not surprising. Capital markets are hardly perfect (especially inter­
nationally) and the information problems of an individual investor 
(even a large financial institution) scanning around the world are awesome. 
In contrast to this, the large multinational firm typically engages in 
an industry-specific scan (Caves, 1971; Stopford & Hells, 1974) in 
industries characterized by production and distribution conditions not 
completely unrelated to the firms current (domestic) activities. This
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superior edge in information provides a gain for investors, saving 
them the need to diversify on the basis of less complete stocks of 
knowledge. Furthermore, whatever gains there may be to controlling 
and co-ordinating plants (see Chapter I) can accrue to individual 
investors (however indirectly) only when firm diversification occurs.
This is, of course, the basis of the famous proposition by Kindleberger 
(1969, pp.13) that: "... in a world of perfect competition for goods 
and factors, direct investment cannot exist".
Finally, the fact that direct investment is diversification by 
large firms investing in manufacturing (or distribution) activities 
suggests a rather different dependent variable to be used in the model. 
Direct investment is investment in plant and equipment and is 
irreversible. An equity investor faces a well-functioning market in 
which he can buy and share assets relatively easily and his wealth is 
sufficiently liquid to be reallocated completely each period. A firm 
whose wealth is in the form of machines cannot easily dispose of its 
holdings for second hand markets in used machines are weak, if not 
non-existent.
This observation carries two implications for the difference 
between equity investment models and direct investment models. On the 
one hand, the time horizon for the two models differs. A one period 
model may not be a bad approximation for equity investment, but it is 
definitely much more serious for direct investment. Although a model 
can be constructed to allow a firm to reallocate some of its assets 
(Pfouts, 1961; Dhrymes, 1964), the longer life of machines really does 
require some intertemporal consideration. On the other hand, the fixity 
of assets implies that the wealth variable (that which is being allocated)
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differs as between the two models. For equity investment where it 
is conceivable that the investor can switch all assets from period 
to period, total wealth is clearly appropriate. For direct investment, 
where such capital assets are immobile, the funds that can be allocated 
in each period are marginal increments to wealth; i.e. investment 
funds. The firm invests these funds in fixed assets, given the location 
of past investments, where they prove most profitable.
In short, there are important differences between portfolio models 
describing equity and direct investment. The identity of the investor 
and the particular activity he engages in dictate differences in the 
objective function used, the independent variables which guide his 
decisions, and the wealth (or part of it) which he can allocate. The 
formal similiarities of the two models hide important and real differences 
of both theoretical and empirical importance.
While we are on the subject of risk reduction through diversifica­
tion and the use of equity investment models to describe firm behaviour, it 
is worth digressing somewhat to comment on the premise of diversification 
of risk through merger (Geroski, 1978). It has often been observed that 
control of several activities each yielding streams of risk returns less 
than perfectly positively correlated leads to a reduction in variance as 
compared with an "equivalently sized" control over one activity alone.
Some writers have seen this risk reduction as an important if not a 
primary cause for diversification by merger. Fisher (1963), for 
example, constructed a model to investigate the impact of uncertainty 
in competitive situations where the firm faces a financial constraint.
Using a mean-variance model, he showed varying circumstances under which 
diversification would occur, concluding (pp.309) that the: "... choice 
between diversification and specialization depends on the utility function", 
or, more precisely, the degree of risk avei sion.
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A moments thought should suggest, however, that this cannot be 
completely correct. Diversification involves buying or building 
new plant and equipment, or controlling new outlets for distribution; 
the important aspect of this is control. Control, however, is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for diversification away of risk; in fact, 
it leads to inefficient diversification, for large chunks of funds 
are tied up in relatively few holdings. Portfolio investment, ownership 
of firms through share (but not 100%) purchase on the stock market, 
dominates firm diversification through merger as a method of reducing 
risk. The key to merger lies in the advantages of control and while 
risk reduction is obviously important (see also the discussion in 
Penrose, 1959, pp. 131-9), it is not crucial. It is undoubtedly true 
that diversification reduces the variability of firm profits (although 
its empirical importance has yet to be established; Cf. Meuller, 1977 
and Cable, 1977) and certainly an element of.risk aversion enters the 
decision to diversify. In our view, this factor makes its presence 
felt at an earlier stage in the decision, at a time when the firm adopts 
a strategy leading to diversification and before it considers the 
particular possibilities open to it. Risk makes a firm look for 
opportunities to diversify; the particular new investments it undertakes 
are determined by the more familiar complementaries between operating 
them and the possibilities of enhancing monopoly power through control.
What can be said though (and is in fact hypothesized here) is that 
expansion of facilities already in operation may be dictated by risk 
aversion. That is, the allocation of expansionary investment funds 
is made to reduce the risks of operation, to balance the advantages of 
profitable opportunity with risk. When once a firm is set up producing 
and selling in a number of markets risk aversion should determine expansion 
of these markets; the particular markets which a firm happens to operate
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in are affected, however, by risk aversion only inasfar as it has 
predispos?d the firm to diversify. The advantages of control 
dictate the particular choices.
(v) Ex Ante Variable Approximation
One final set of remarks is worth making before we proceed to the 
empirical testing of the model we have just outlined. The independent 
variables which determine investment shares are expected returns and 
the expected variance of possible outcomes around these expected returns. 
The expected returns and variances relevant to the problem are those 
the firm's decision makers have in mind when they make the investment 
decision and are, unfortunately, unobservable. To the researcher, the 
only option open is to try to generate these-figures from past data, 
from the past performance of the firm. It may well be that this is 
how decision makers within the firm generate the variables they use but 
there is, of course, no guarantee of this. This extrapolation procedure 
forced upon us is subject to several problems and, in this section, we 
should like to outline these particular problems and limitations.
Ex ante variable approximation is, in my opinion, the most serious 
problem that one faces in applying the models;* it shall form the basis 
of the extensions we shall make in Chapters III and IV. The usual measure 
of expected returns is the single arithmetic mean over a number of past 
observations of the variable in question, but we shall argue in the next
* More serious than, for example, the assumption of stochastic returns 
because as argued, the firm probably makes that assumption itself.
Ex ante variables are where the information gap between researchers 
and firms is largest.
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Chapter that this is by no means a theoretically acceptable procedure. 
There are, however, some reasonable ad hoc manipulations which 
alleviate the problems to some extent. Variances and covariances 
turn out to be more crucial and these are rather intractable. Again, 
the obvious first start is to compute the usual variance-covariance 
matrix using a series of past observations of the data in question, 
but this also involves a number of theoretical problems. Ad hoc 
adjustment cannot take us too far in this case and additional information 
on risk may be required.
The directions this will take us are, as far as I can tell, largely 
unexplored.* Recall our discussion in section (iv) of the last Chapter. 
There we argued that the variance the firm expects depends, ceteris 
paribus, on the amount of adjustment it is able to make in the face of 
a given disturbance in a particular market. This is the crucial element 
involved in the risk of foreign operations; it is not deviations from 
expected returns so much as it was the ability of the firm to correct 
such movements. This factor is liable to enter into the calculation 
of risk explicitly per se - it hangs over the entire decision and while 
it enters the calculation of variances, its importance is sufficiently 
large to justify separate inclusion. In Chapter IV we shall come to 
discuss this problem somewhat more fully and will empirically test this 
particular hypothesis.
There is an additional problem with extrapolating ex ante variables 
from ex post data. Let us presume that such an extrapolation is 
precisely how the firm approaches the problem so that our procedure is
* Stevens (1969) and Prachowny (1972) have done some work in this area; 
see Appendix III.
completely correct in this regard. Let us also assume that the 
rates of return which it uses are those earned on its past operations 
in the country in question (we shall come back to this in a moment).
The problem is that the reported rates of return (which we have access 
to) may differ from the actual rates of return (which decision makers 
use). This problem is particularly relevant to multinational firms 
who can (and do - see Vaitsos, 1974) minimize tax loss by transferring 
profits between various countries by transfer prices (Lall, 1973 and 
others). Such behaviour does not affect the principles of the model - 
the ex ante rates of return still form the basis of decisions by 
managers and they are unaffected by a transfer of profits through 
accounting devices. The problem is that ex post data will be distorted 
away from ex ante values by the transfer prices. Thus, use of reported 
data may be subject to serious distortion, the rates of return reported 
for various countries being unwarrantedly high or low.
Nevertheless there are reasons to believe that such distortions 
may cancel out in our study. This is because our study will be an 
aggregate study, covering the investment of all firms in all industries 
in the U.K. (and the U.S.) which invest abroad (see next Chapter for 
a fuller discussion) and transfer prices are subject to important firm 
and industry specific factors. The desirability of a particular 
transfer price depends not only on taxes, but tariffs, fears of 
repatriation, the desire to hide profits from competitors, labour, 
partners and so on. With the exception of profits taxes (to the extent 
that these are not manipulated for particular firms as incentives), 
these factors are all industry and firm specific. Thus, there is no 
reason to expect transference of profits by firms between two or more 
countries to take the same pattern between industries and quite 
possibly within industries. Thus, some cancelling out may occur when
- 63 -
we take all firms as a whole and that distortions may be reasonably 
small and involve only minor distortion.
There is one final problem. Let us suppose that firms do 
construct expected returns and variance-covariance matrices as we haVe 
initially suggested and that we can get any profits data we choose 
without serious distortion. The question now is which rate of return 
series should we use to construct our ex ante proxies; that is, will 
it be the past history of the firm (as we have suggested a number of 
times thus far) or the past history of native firms in the host country 
on the principle that these are what signal and attract the firm to 
diversify into the country. The proper answer is, I think, that we want 
to use the past history of the firm and the reason for this recalls our 
discussion of new and expansionary investment in Chapter I.
For expansionary investment, the firm is expanding from a base 
and from a (admittedly limited) knowledge about the market. Given 
its existing operations and their profitability, working out what will 
happen with an incremental expansion is relatively easy and relies on 
the knowledge and experience embedded in past operations. What is 
happening to local competitors may signal to the firm that the market 
is profitable and that expansion is called for, but the profitability 
it expects from such expansion depends crucially on current and recent 
past operations. For new investment, the firm has no base of knowledge 
or operation and it explicitly seeks a signal to induce it to enter a 
particular market. In this situation, native firms and would-be- 
competitors performance clearly is relevant and probably quite important.
Let us briefly pull together these three threads. Our model 
relies on ex ante variables unobtainable from published data sources.
This raises three particular problems - how to approximate these
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variables, which data to use, and the worth of that data. We have, 
on the basis of this discussion, come to a set of starting points.
We intend to use past performance by firms to calculate, in straight­
forward ways, means and a variance-covariance matrix and we have judged 
that this may not be too distorted. We have also suggested that 
there may be objections to such a procedure (without specifying precisely 
the alternatives open to us); such objections will be the concern of 
the next two chapters. One final point requires mention.
Our concern here is with the allocation of investment and this is 
necessarily a cross-section problem. At a given time, we calculate 
means and a variance-covariance matrix (subject to the qualifications 
just suggested) and compute optimal shares across countries which we 
compare to the shares we have actually observed. A question which we 
shall not discuss but which is worth identifying is the appropriate 
method of updating such ex ante variables scr that the model can be used 
year after year, accounting for variations, over time, of the shares 
allocated across countries.
In the calculation of means and the variance-covariance matrix, we 
shall use rates of return (as it happens) over the past seven years. 
Should we repeat the exercise in the following year, we would of course 
have one more observation to use in such calculations. However, as we 
accumulate information over time, year after year, the ex ante variables 
are going to become rather insensitive to the weight of additional 
variables. In other words, we must face the problem of updating means 
and the variance-covariance matrix (especially the latter). Keeping 
strictly within the framework of the model, this amounts to truncating 
the rate of return series so that the variance-covariance matrix is 
computed using a rate of return series over the past X years. The
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choice of X obviously becomes an extremely iiq>ortant consideration.
However, we have also suggested that we may need to add additional 
information on risk relating to the adjustment problems of the firm, 
and it may be that the particular costs of adjustment and deviations 
the firm expects can be precisely enough specified on a year to 
year basis to account (in part) for year to year variations in shares.
As we have said, this is not a problem which will concern us here.
We shall concentrate on predicting shares for a particular year that 
will turn out to be work enough as it is. Nevertheless, when we come back 
to discuss risk empirically, we shall have more to say about updating 
our ex ante variables. It is a problem worth keeping track of, for 
it limits the extension of the model to time series problems.
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Chapter III
An Empirical Investigation of the Portfolio Model 
of Foreign Investment
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(i) Introduction
This chapter is the first of two in which we will concentrate 
on a detailed discussion of the empirical results gained from applica­
tion of the portfolio model. Chapter IV following deals with the 
extensions of the model centering around the (by now familiar) 
problem of foreign (and domestic) risk; the results presented in this 
chapter are gathered from testing the model in a 'pure' or 'naive' 
form. As we shall see, both theoretical and empirical considerations 
suggest that such a 'pure' or 'naive' model is of limited interest; 
having established this proposition, we can move on to Chapter IV 
and consider appropriate extensions and necessary modifications of 
the model.
The argument of this chapter is structured in three steps. In 
Section (ii) immediately below, the samples ate briefly described*.
As we shall be constrained to aggregate investment flows (e.g. 
investment by all U.K. or U.S. firms in various host countries), this 
must be supplemented by a discussion of aggregation bias and the link 
between the theory as already set out and the aggregate estimating 
equations.
In Section (iii), the first tests are reported and commented 
upon. The particular problem considered there is the application 
of the portfolio model to foreign investment alone (’-e. excluding
* In Appendix V the data sources and samples are scrutinized in
some detail. Appendix VI is devoted to closer examination of the 
dependent variable - shares - while Appendix VII considers expected 
returns and the variance covariance matrices for the samples, 
both comparatively and historically.
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domestic investment); this for reasons bound up in the problem of 
foreign risk which will be made plain as we continue. The particular 
hypothesis corresponding to this test is slightly different to that 
stated in Chapter II, but it is of interest on its own. The restricted 
sample will also enable us to clear up a number of issues concerning 
the data. One particular issue of some interest is the appropriate 
approximation of ex ante variables which proves convenient to 
discuss within the confines of this slightly restricted sample.
This is the subject matter of Section (iv).
(ii) Sample Characteristics and Aggregation
There are three samples which we shall be using in the next 
two chapters, one U.K. sample and two U.S. samples. In all three 
cases, we shall be predicting the total share of the investment by 
all U.K. (U.S.) firms sent to a set of host countries. We shall be 
predicting shares for 1971 for the U.K. sample and for 1972 for the 
two U.S. samples.
The investment data for the U.K. sample (which involves nine­
teen foreign countries) is net capital outflow from the U.K. to a 
given host (hereafter NKO) which is not quite the same as plant and 
equipment expenditures*; the nineteen countries in the sample 
accounted for about 95% of total net capital outflows in 1971. NKO 
is defined as unremitted profits, intra-firm trade credit and share
* Plant and equipment expenditures were unavailable for the U.K. 
sample.
and bond acquisitions by the parent from the subsidiary. The principal 
difference between this figure and plant and equipment expenditures 
(hereafter PE) is local borrowing. For the U.S., both PE and NKO 
figures were available and this forms the difference between the 
two U.S. samples. The hope is that by comparison or results, some 
inferences may be made about the relative merits of these two 
similar specifications of the dependent variable. Both U.S. samples 
cover twenty-six foreign countries. The U.S. and U.K. samples overlap 
more in the set of developed than developing countries much as one 
would expect, and both yield distinctly different sets of share 
allocations from noticeably different means and variance-covariance 
matrices.
The independent variables for the U.K. sample (as well as the 
other two) are means, variances and covariances and these have been 
generated from a series of seven observations of annual average 
post-tax rates of return earned by U.K. multinationals in the host.
A similar series of post-tax annual average rates of return were 
constructed and manipulated for the U.S. samples and both U.S. 
samples are guided by the same rates of return series.
The model to be tested relates to the individual firm and at 
this point as are forced to make something of conceptual leap, for 
testing is constrained (by data unavailability*) to the highest 
level of aggregation. This is a familiar sort of problem and these
* The constraint is the result of unavailability of rates of return 
data below this aggregate level. For the U.K. investment data can 
be gathered at Order Level; for the U.S. investment data can be 
gathered for Manufacturing, Mining and Petroleum.
difficulties plague demand estimation, estimation of aggregate 
production functions and so on. Unfortunately, it is rather 
difficult to detect and evaluate aggregation biases, and this applies 
particularly to our model.
The individual firms within these samples are guided by rather 
different rates of return (and hence means, variances and covariances) - 
rates of return which have important inter-industry and perhaps inter­
firm differences. If one were to use average expected returns as the 
sole dependent variable, it might turn out to be a good predictor for 
the aggregate of investment by these multifarious firms in a given 
host; those firms whose rate of return is higher than average are 
implicitly underestimated but this would be compensated by those 
firms whose rate of return is below average and who are thus implicitly 
underestimated in the aggregate predition. Variances and covariances 
are more difficult however. How an aggregate variance, calculated 
from a series of annual average rates of returns over all firms 
relates to the individual firm variances (much less covariances) is 
not at all clear. It is therefore very hard to gauge how the 
aggregate performance relates to the individual choices made by 
firms. In particular, there is no guarantee that if all individual 
firms behave exactly as hypothesized then the aggregate will behave 
according to the same model- confirmation of the model on the aggregate 
level, by the same token, cannot rigorously be extended back to infer 
that behaviour on the individual level is as hypothesised.
We must thus explicitly argue on an as if basis; that is, we 
shall hypothesise that the aggregate behaves as if it were a single
individual firm. One can possibly imagine this to arise because the
hypothesis 'is true' at the individual level, but one cannot rigorously 
(or at least I cannot) confirm (or deny) this. As a check, in 
Appendix VIII we shall use a fourth sample based upon data supplied 
confidentially by a particular U.K. firm, rerunning some of our equations 
to at least compensate for our ignorance of the aggregation bias.
(iii) The Allocation of Foreign Investment
For reasons which will become evident shortly, the first testing 
of the model to be done on U.S. and U.K. investment will consist of 
looking at the allocation of foreign investment alone, without 
domestic or home investment. This corresponds to a weaker version of 
our hypothesis and implies that a dual decision is made in the 
allocation of funds; first, home and total foreign investment shares 
are chosen, and, then, the foreign share is allocated according to 
our model. Such a distinction between home and foreign investment 
is not new to the literature (Barlow and Wender, 1955; Penrose, 1956). 
The Barlow and Wender "gambler's earnings" hypothesis has enjoyed 
some popularity but has failed to find empirical support (Stevens, 
1974). Their hypothesis is that firms view foreign income as 
essentially transitory and plough it back, whether necessary or not, 
to the subsidiary. Penrose argues along similar lines, but stresses 
the independence of subsidiaries from parents: "... once established, 
a new subsidiary has a life of its own and its growth will continue 
in response to the development of its own internal resources..."
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Our argument in support of the dual decision hypothesis is 
that uncertainty produces an asymmetry between domestic and all foreign 
activities and this produces an attitude on the part of the firm which 
leads to a separation between home and foreign expansion. This is 
a rather extreme assumption and, as it turns out, will not find support 
in the data. At the beginning of Chapter IV a weaker version of this 
hypothesis is used rather more successfully.
Table I shows the results of applying the model to nineteen 
foreign countries alone for the U.K. sample. There are a couple of 
reasonable estimates*; however, the underestimates of Australia, the 
U.S. and Germany together with the overestimates of South Africa,
Canada and the West Indies are rather serious. (Curiously, the 
estimates for South Africa and Germany are rather near their average 
shares for 1967-71). That is, the model views South Africa, Canada 
and the West Indies more favourably than U.K. investors and conversely 
with the U.S., Germany and Australia. With the exception of Canada, 
this can possibly be traced back to the inadequacy of measured risk 
discussed in Appendix VII. That is, one intuitively expects that as 
both South Africa and certain parts of the West Indies are undergoing 
fundamental political change, the measurement of risk that we have 
used is proving rather poor. The rank correlation between actual 
and estimated shares is R ■ .0298 which is low because of the large 
ranking changes induced by these wilder estimates.
• Table II shows the results of the regressions:
* A negative NKO share implies a net outflow from the host.
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for (N-l) countries. We have chosen to exclude countries (since one 
country must be excluded in any case) strategically in order to gain 
maximum information. The troublesome estimates are Australia, the 
U.S., Germany, South Africa, Canada and the West Indies. Somewhat 
arbitrarily, South and Central America was chosen from among the 
remaining countries as an index upon which to base comparisons and the 
results for the exclusion of South/Central America are shown in 
equation (i).
Table I
Actual and Estimated Shares of U.K. Foreign Investment 
in Nineteen Foreign Countries
A
Country actual shares A. estimated shares A^
Australia .1971 (2) .1200 (4)
Irish Republic .0349(11) .0489 (7)
New Zealand .0031(17) .0125(12)
South Africa .0367(10) .2715 (1)
Africa .0417 (8) .0234 (9)
West Indies -.0541(19) .1576 (3)
Hong Kong .0031(16) -.0016(18)
India .0151(14) .0512 (6)
Malaysia .0155(13) .0015(17)
Canada .0458 (7) .1596 (2)
United States .2152 (1) .0367 (8)
Denmark .0056(15) .0147(10)
Switzerland -.0191(18) .0082(13)
Belgium .0958 (4) .0080(14)
France .0553 (6) .0129(11)
Italy .0218(12) .0044(15)
Netherlands .0837 (5) -.0018(19)
Germany .1633 (3) .0026(16)
South/Central
America .0398 (9) .0690 (5)
Numbers in parentheses are rankings
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Table IX
Regression results for the U.K. samples of 
Nineteen Foreign Countries
Regression Ç* B
(i) .0554
(.0216)
-.0413
(.2401)
(ii) .0540
(.0225)
-.0128
(.3443)
(iii) .0444
(.0182)
-.0159
(.2001)
(iv) .0317
(.0196)
.1166
(.3385)
r2 F ( . ) CountriesExcluded
,0019 .0296 South/Central
(1.16) America
,0001 .0013 South Africa
(1,16)
,0004 .0063
(1,16)
United States 
South Africa,
,009 .1187 Canada, United
(1,13) States, Germany
Numbers in parentheses below the estimated co-efficients are 
standard errors; those below the F-statistics give degrees of 
freedom.
The estimates of the constant is high and, tested on its own, 
is significantly different from zero. The slope co-efficient is 
correspondingly low (and remains so when the constant is excluded) 
and the overall explanatory power is weak. Progressive elimination 
of some of the troublesome countries yields the results shown in 
equations (ii) - (iv). No particularly interesting conclusions 
emerge; (iv) is the strongest estimated equation, but is not worth 
dwelling upon.
These descriptions lead strightforwardly to our formal signifi­
cance tests. Recall that, 0, the proportionate reduction in 
explained sum of squares from using OLS estimates of a and ß rather 
than assuming that a = 0 and 8 = 1 is distributed as F(2,(n-l)-2):
(N-3)(SSq - SSp 
2SS^e
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where:
N-l „ . 2SS, = Z (X. - a - 8.)1 £ l i
SS - Z (X. - X)2 o 1
Should 0 exceed the critical F, then we must reject the 
hypothesis that o - 0 and 8 - 1 .  The calculated and computed 
statistics are shown below.
Table III
Calculated and Critical F-Statistics for the U.K. Sample
Equation 6 F SS1 SSo
(i) 3.60 3.63 .1355 .1966
(ii) 9.436 3.63 .0902 .1966
(iii) 25.06 3.63 .0627 .1966
Civ) 17.48 3.81 .0442 .1631
Clearly, for all but equation (i), we must reject the hypothesis 
that o = 0  and 8 = 1. Acceptance of (i) can only be the result of 
the very poor OLS estimates which could hardly be worse; progressive 
and selective elimination of troublesome countries has little effect 
on SSo, absolutely and relatively to SS^, indicating that the OLS 
estimates do improve markedly but in the end appear not to converge 
on the values of a and 8 hypothesised-
Let us turn to the sample containing foreign investment in 
twenty-six foreign countries by all U.S. multinational firms. Recall 
that in this case we have two specifications of the dependent variable.
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Table IV
Actual and Estimated Shares of U.S. Foreign Investment in Twenty-
six Foreign Countries as :Measured by Net Capital Outflow and Plant
and Equipment Shares
NKO Shares PE !Shares
Country Actual Estimated Actual Estimated
Canada .1501 (3) .2965 (1) .2870 (1) .3499 (1)
Mexico .0145(13) .0968 (4) .0157(12) .1073 (3)
Panama .0000(21) .1375 (2) .0022(24) .1082 (2)
Argentina .0025(18) -.0029(23) .0120(13) -.0032(23)
Brazil .0954 (5) .0718 (5) .0477 (7) .0590 (6)
Chile -.0008(22) .0006(22) .0014(25) .0016(20)
Columbia -.0072(24) .0026(19) .0068(20) .0035(17)
Peru .0197(10) .0028(16) .0088(18) .0020(19)
Venezuela -.0027(23) .1282 (3) .0218(10) .0906 (4)
Belgium .0325 (9) -.0052(24) .0374 (8) -.0069(25)
France .1084 (4) -.0056(25) .0826 (4) -.0058(24)
Germany .2455 (1) .0027(18) .1236 (3) .0003(21)
Italy .0517 (7) .0181(12) .0568 (5) .0258 (9)
Netherlands .0331 (8) .0245(10) .0307 (9) .0217(11)
Denmark .0139(14) .0038(20) .0052(21) .0060(16)
Norway .0178(11) -.0167(26) .0095(16) -.0070(26)
Spain -.0092(25) .0072(15) .0172(11) .0084(15)
Sweden .0175(12) .0649 (6) .0091(17) .0843 (5)
Switzerland .0556 (6) .0468 (7) .0117(14) .0329 (8)
United Kingdom .2383 (2) .0164(14) .1246 (2) .0162(13)
Liberia .0042(17) .0378 (8) .0011(26) .0439 (7)
Libya .0092(16) .0011(21) .0079(19) .00009(22)
South Africa .0701(26) .0289 (9) .0113(15) .0237(10)
India .0017(20) .0026(17) .0036(23) .0025(18)
Philippines .0110(15) .0204(11) .0040(22) .0204(12
Australia .0019(19) .0165(13) .0603 (5) .0139(14)
Numbers in parentheses are rankings
Table IV shows actual and estimated shares for the two specifications. 
The first two columns show actual and estimated shares for net 
capital outflows. Again, there are some good and some bad estimates. 
Of somewhat dubious accuracy are the estimates of Canada, Panama, 
France, Germany and the U.K. Canada is inexplicably overestimated -
as with the U.S. and the U.K. on the one hand and South Africa on the 
other, one would expect Canadian risk to be overestimated leading to an 
underestimated share. The rank correlation between estimated and 
actual shares is higher than in the U.K. sample: R = .4503. Notice 
that both the U.K. and the U.S. samples have trouble with the same 
set of countries: Germany, Canada, Australia, the U.S./U.K. and one 
or two of the developing countries. This would suggest that some 
systematic error of ex ante variable measurement has crept into the 
construction of means, variances and covariances for these 
countries.
Turning to the second two columns of Table IV, we find the 
comparison between actual and estimated shares for plant and equip­
ment expenditures. In many ways, they are quite similar to the 
predictions (and errors thereof) found in the first two columns.
In fact, in nineteen of the twenty— six countries, the model either 
underestimates both NKO and PE shares, or overestimates both.
Canada and Mexico are overestimated in the PE shares sanple while 
France and the U.K. are underestimated to name only the most obvious 
errors. The rank correlation between these last two columns of 
Table IV is R = .0646, remarkably lower than for the NKO shares.
Consider first the regression results for NKO shares, presented 
on Table V. Inspection of Table IV reveals that Canada, Germany, the 
U.K., Panama and France are the worst estimates. Selecting India 
from the remainder to use as an index as a country to be excluded in 
the first regression, the results are much as before, a is marginally 
insignificant from zero (when tested alone) and 6 is rather closer 
to zero than unity (suppression of a doubled estimates of B but,
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Table V
Reeression Results for NKO shares of U.S. Foreign
Investment to Twenty-Six Foreign Countries
Regression 01 i R* • )
Countries
Excluded
(i) .0338
(.0177)
.1529
(.3796)
.018 .4404
(1,23)
India
(ii) .0421
(.0176)
-.2895
(.3573)
.027 .656
(1,23)
Canada
(iii) .0099
(.0100)
.2841
(.1274
.184 4.97
(1,22)
Germany,
United Kingdom
(iv) .0184
(.0096)
-.0864
(.1881)
.009 .210
(1,21)
Canada, 
Germany,
United Kingdom
(v) .0110
(.0090
.0459
(.2023)
.002 .021
(1,20)
Canada,
Panama,
France,
Germany,
United Kingdom
Standard errors are in parentheses below estimated co-efficients; 
numbers below F-statistics give degrees of freedom.
nevertheless, 6 remained insignificantly different from zero). 
Experimentation with the exclusion of the various troublesome 
countries failed to improve the results much above the level of 
equation (i) although the F-statistic was significant at the 52 
level in (iii). The formal significance tests in Table VI below 
reflect these insights. Table VII shows the regression 
results for PE shares. Consideration of Table IV suggests that 
Germany, the U.K., France, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Canada are 
troublesome, and from the remainder Peru was selected as an index of 
comparison. Progressive elimination of Mexico, Panama, Venezuela 
and Canada complete the list of equations shown. Until (v), the
«r a m
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Table VI ,
Calculated and Critical F-Statistics for the Ü.S. NKO Sample
Equation e F SS1 sso
(i) .2959 3.42 .1282 .2039
(ii) 6.8048 3.42 .1179 .2039
(iii) 52.39 3.44 .6353 .2038
(iv) 65.65 3.47 .0281 .2038
(v) 146.4 3.49 .0124 .1940
results are quite strong, with F-statistics significant at the 1% 
level. This is a rather new result compared with the last two sets 
of results, and while one would like to believe that the model has 
unambiguously proved itself, inspection of the last equation suggests 
a slightly different answer. The only difference between (IV) and (V)
Table VII
Regression Results for PE shares of UI.S. Foreign Investment
to Twenty-Six Foreign Countries
Regression Cl 8 £ F( . ) CountriesExcluded
(i) .0175
(.0108)
.5612
(.1320)
.440 18.07
(1,23)
Peru
(ii) .0059
(.0085)
.6182
(.1013)
.628 37.18
(1,22)
Germany,
United Kingdom
(iii) .0090
(.0073)
.6956
(.0955)
.746 59
(1,20)
Mexico,
Panama,
Germany,
United Kingdom
(iv) .0082
(.0601)
.7752
(.0601)
.907 165.8
(1,18)
Mexico,
Panama, 
Venezuela, 
France,
Germany,
United Kingdom
(v) .0161
(.0052)
.1838
(2134)
.041 .742
(1,18)
Mexico,
Panama,
Canada,
France,
Germany,
United Kingdom
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is the replacement of Venezuela by Canada on the list of exclusions, 
and this causes a noticeable deterioration of the results. The 
Canadian observation so dominates the rest that the ability to 
predict it even with such a large error provides an immense 
advantage.
Finally, on Table VIII the formal significance test results are 
presented.
Table VIII
Calculated and Critical F-Statistics for the U.S. PE Sample
Equation 6 F SS1 sso
(i) 5.378 3.42 .0512 .0752
(ii) 19.51 3.44 .0270 .0750
(iii) 34.42 3.47 .0175 .0750
(iv) 84.67 3.55 .0070 .0729
(v) 173.2 3.55 .0036 .0729
Again, in every case, we must reject the hypothesis that a ■ 0 
and 8 = 1 .  What appears to have happened is that these results improve 
our predictive ability and that strategic elimination enhances this 
accuracy. The share estimates are, in some sense, as accurate as 
before, but their relation to actual shares are far more systematic. 
Hence, we find improved OLS estimates and a corresponding move 
towards the hypothesis being confirmed.
The improved OLS estimates presented in Table VII appear to 
conflict with the low rank correlation of R = .0646 mentioned earlier 
between actual and estimated PE shares. How can one reconcile these 
differing results? The clue lies on Table IV. The last two columns -
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PE shares - show particularly large rank changes for Panama, France, 
Germany, Liberia and, less spectacularly, Mexico, Argentina, Belgium 
and the Phillipines. These are mirrored in similar rank changes in 
the first two column». When estimating NKO shares, large estimation 
errors for the U.K. and Canada are associated with minor rank differ­
ences; for PE shares, similar rank divergences are coupled with much 
lower estimating errors. Furthermore, the estimates of Germany and 
France are rather more accurate in the second two columns. This 
higher concentration of smaller PE shares than NKO shares induce 
these relatively large rank changes, this despite the relatively 
more accurate set of estimates.
Before we proceed, it will be as well to tie together what we 
have thus far discovered, and in particular assess the differences 
between the PE and NKO U.S. samples. The purpose of introducing the 
two U.S. samples is to look at the possible differences that local 
borrowing makes to the allocation process being described. On the 
basis of the results thus far presented, we have found that although 
neither sample passes the significance tests, the specification using 
PE shares is more nearly correct in predicting actual shares. The 
rank correlation between NKO and PE actual shares is R » .6130 so 
that large PE and large NKO shares go hand in hand by and large.
Recall now the differences between the two: NKO is net capital outflow 
which is retained earnings plus intra-firm credit while PE adds to 
this local borrowing but excludes those funds from NKO not used for 
plant and equipment expenditures. Retained earnings and the important 
component common to both, local borrowing the important difference.
The rank correlation suggests that local borrowing supplements NKO
k-*rww
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although one must be careful for, by and large, investment occurs 
largely in developed countries with well-developed capital markets 
and it may be that funds borrowed there are shipped elsewhere.
Thus, we can only say that inasfar as NKO goes to developed countries 
the bias in not using PE is low for it is in these countries that 
local borrowing is heaviest. NKO complements local borrowing in 
these countries, and supplements it elsewhere and a correspondence 
exists because multinational firms tend to operate more in developed 
countries than developing.
Which variable is theoretically appropriate? Recall that the 
model centres around a large, well-spread firm centrally controlling 
and co-ordinating investment decisions in a number of plants. Of 
the components of NKO, intercompany credits is clearly likely to be 
so allocated for it is near in principle to portfolio investment. 
Retained earnings are controlled through dividend decisions from 
parent to subsidiaries (and thence to shareholders of the parent); 
the control over local borrowing is much weaker and occurs through 
gearing limits. The decision facing managers of the subsidiary, 
given NKO from the parent and an absolute limit to borrowing, is 
how much to finance of what percentage of the projects under 
consideration. To the extent that gearing limits are not binding and 
not set in line with the portfolio model, the model becomes 
relatively inaccurate in predicting PE shares. Our results here 
suggest that the PE specification performs somewhat better and so 
this, following the previous argument, might imply that local 
borrowing limits are binding. The weakness in prediction would then 
arise from measurement errors plus gearing limits not set in accord
with the model.
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This is, of course, generalizing on rather thin evidence of 
a highly indirect nature and one is not inclined to push it too far.
We shall proceed using PE shares in the U.S. sample because the 
estimates are more accurate and are more compatible with the home 
investment data. There do seem to be reasons to suggest that this 
is the correct path to take.
What have we gathered from studying the weak version of the model 
that all foreign investment is allocated by a portfolio model?
The clearest and most direct answer is that the model doesn't work 
and that this weak version of the hypothesis must be emphatically 
rejected. About the only achievement of the model is to predict 
shares which are fractions, which is rather small comfort. However, 
it can (and will be) argued that the model as yet cannot be expected 
to perform well. In particular, it is not clear that the specification 
of the independent variables is correct; their empirical construction 
is weak and lacking theoretically convincing foundations. Further, 
the weak version of the hypothesis that there is dual decision between 
home and foreign investment is rather unconvincing. For a firm 
hypothesised to be sufficiently rational and calculating to use our 
model, it is very difficult to posit behaviour such as this split 
between home and foreign investment decisions.
We shall now proceed to develop the model in more satisfactory 
ways, working both with the specification of ex ante variables and the 
inclusion of home investment. It turns our, however, that we can 
turn our attention primarily to the specification of risk variables - 
that expected returns don't appear to make much of a difference.
This rather surprising finding is the subject of the next section of
this chapter. Chapter IV continues the story, developing the 
measurement of risk and the distinction between home and foreign 
inves tment.
(vi) The Approximation of Ex Ante Expected Returns
The difficulty with ex ante variable approximation is the 
following: we seek the joint distribution of p^(T), i = 1,...,
N for year T or, at least, sufficient information to generate means, 
variances and covariances. The only information we have is a set 
of observations p^T-j), i + 1,..., N and j = 0,...,T. We face the 
problem that one observation p^(T-l) does not give sufficient 
information to generate the entire distribution of p^ in T, nor the 
first two moments. We must push back J years in the past, and assume 
that returns over time are related and use the past observations to 
extrapolate the distribution in T.
These difficulties are common to all portfolio model testing 
and the following tale is usually (implicitly) told. First, the 
firm concentrates on forming estimates of means, variances, and 
covariances rather than attempting to estimate the entire distribution. 
This is harmless, for it is all the information needed for the model 
and all that one can plausibly imagine being used. Second, the first 
two moments are extrapolated from past data - a necessary procedure 
as we have seen. What is crucial is the method of extrapolation and 
what it implies. What is usually done is that the data p.(T-j) 
j ■ 0....T is used straightforwardly to calculate means, variances
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and covariances. One must be careful with this however, for it 
presumes that the distribution of the p^ has remained stable over 
time. The problem is that the process of successively approximating 
and reacting to a stable distribution implies that year to year 
variations in investment result not from changing circumstances 
but from acquisition by the firm of.information on that stable 
distribution. Ultimately investment will settle down to an unchanging 
equilibrium flow. This is hardly an interesting tale to tell. 
Circumstances do change, partly endogenously (which our constant 
returns has ruled out) and partly from exogenous factors (which is 
what that tale ignores). We can certainly improve on this.
The difficulty with means is that they are slow to react to 
recent events and trends, being weighed down by the dead hand of the 
past. Some sort of adaptive mechanism must be added if they are to 
achieve real plausibility. Two other measures present themselves 
as alternatives. Instead of calculating means from all T past years 
observations, we can use some recent sub-set of these to incorporate 
the effect of new events more quickly. Such a mean has been calculated 
here by using the past three years. We shall refer to it as MA.
The extreme version of this approach is to use the naive predictor; 
e.g. the observed value for T-l as a proxy for the expected value in 
T, This we denote as M71 and together with MA and MEAN, we have three 
starting points.
These three measures do not, however, efficiently use all 
the information available to us and it is worth our while to 
explicitly add in trends in the p^t) over the J years of our sample.
If for example, p^(T) were rising sharply, we might expect (ceteris
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paribus) higher expectations - i.e. some adjsutment being made to 
MEAN, M71 or MA. M71 will not reflect such trends at all; MA only 
poorly; and MEAN sluggishly. In any case, it is worth some 
experimentation in this direction. In the first place, a time 
series of the form:
Pj/t) = a., + b.t
was run to isolate the time trend in the data, b., the estimated
1
marginal increase in the rate of return per annum is, when statistically 
significant, clearly one measure of the direction of shift in the 
p^'s. We consider only statistically significant b^'s on the 
presumption that only these are large enough to be 'perceived' and 
'believed' by the firm. Note that a b^ significantly different from 
zero (say positive) does not necessarily imply that the distribution 
of the p^ has been shifting out over time; the set of p^(t) may have 
been generated by movements along a stable distribution over time 
in the direction of larger p^. A correction of this sort - adding 
b^ to MEAN, M71, and MA corresponds to the following story. The 
firm still concerns itself with the first two moments of the 
distribution and it assumes that the shape of the distribution 
has not altered. It does, on the basis of information about these 
trends, relocate this stable distribution. The relocation occurs 
partly through trends picked up by MEAN, but most directly through b^. 
While such a measure will be inaccurate inasfar as the shape of the 
distribution alters and inasfar as b^ picks up movements along the
distribution, it has some intuitive appeal
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We can, of course, consider alternatives to b^. Rather than 
working solely with statistically significant marginal changes, 
we can use average changes:
APj/t) “ PjCt) - p^t-1)
Two in particular - AP71, the most recent average change, and 
AP, the "average" average change - have some intuitive appeal. 
Combinations of MEAN, M71, MA, b, AP and AP71 produced, in total, the 
following ten proxies:
The constituent elements of these proxies are shown on Tables 
IX and X for the U.K. and U.S. samples respectively. Inspection of 
these two tables shows clearly that the difficulties observed in 
earlier tests cannot be laid at this door. On Table IX, South Africa 
clearly shows a recent fall in return and this may account for the 
overestimation in the U.K. sample as it may not be acted upon as 
quickly in our model as by investors. However, the U.S. also shows 
recent deterioration, but was underestimated in the model. Similarly, 
on Table X, Mexico shows recent deterioration as does Libya, but the 
model overestimates the first and understates the second, In fact, 
several countries with large recent changes in returns such as the 
Irish Republic, Africa, Malysia, Italy and the Netherlands in the 
U.K. sample and Chile, Peru, Denmark and Libya in the U.S. sample are
not amongst the extreme problem countries.
MEAN
MEAN + b_ 
MEAN + AP 
MEAN + AP71
M71
M71 + b_ 
M71 + AP 
M71 + AP71
MA
MA + b
Table IX
Proxy Expected Returns for the U.K. Sample
Country MEAN M71 MA
1. Australia 7.43 7.5 7.82. Irish Republic 9.23 11.2 9.83. New Zealand 6.98 5.8 6.84. South Africa 12.06 11 11.65. Africa 9.63 10.6 11.1
6. West Indies 5.1 4.3 4.8
7. Hong Kong 18.85 20.5 20.4
8. India 7.36 7.9 7.8
9. Malaysia 14.86 17.4 17.310. Canada 5.77 5.5 5.1
11. United States 11 7.5 9.3
12. Denmark .52 3.2 .9
13. Switzerland 14.57 19.8 18.6
14. Belgium 7.61 10.9 11.2
15. France 5.26 9.1 7.9
16. Italy 5.52 6.4 8.5
17. Netherlands 8.32 14.3 13.9
18. Germany
South/Central
12.47 14.5 1 .8
19. America 10. 36 10.5 11
Country B AP AP71
1. Australia 0 -.02 0
2. Irish Republic 0 .22 2.5
3. New Zealand 0 -.22 -.6
4. South Africa -.1821 -.15 -.8
5. Africa .4678 .3 -2.0
6. West Indies 0 -.02 -.2
7. Hong Kong 0 -.12 .6
8. India 0 .05 -1.0
9. Malaysia 0 -7.15 -2.1
10. Canada -.2166 -.11 .8
11. United States -.4928 -.51 -1.6
12. Denmark 0 .53 .1
13. Switzerland 1.3404 1.14 -.9
14. Belgium 1.7464 1.38 .8
15. France .9988 .92 .20
16. Italy .9809 .55 -3.3
17. Netherlands 1.8333 1.37 -3.9
18. Germany 1.119 .71 -1.9
19. South/CentralAmerica .4130 .31 -.9
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Ta'.le X
Proxy Expected Returns for the U.S. Sample
Country MEAN M71 MA 1 AP 4P71
1. Canada 8.12 8.67 8.10 0 .0967 1.072. Mexico 8.35 6.42 '7.69 -.3314 -.4250 -1.533. Panama 11.44 11.10 11.83 0 .0317 -.814. Argentina 10.19 6.21 8.68 -.9803 -1.2667 -1.995. Brazil 9.62 10.55 10.12 0 .1450 -.176. Cnile 11.54 -.69 7.82 0 -1.8433 -6.37. Jolumbia 5.07 8.74 6.72 0 .6967 2.298. Peru 14.85 5.93 11.11 -2.0714 -1.9883 -4.79
9. Venezuela 17.82 18.33 17.14 0 .0633 2.5810. Belgium/ 
Luxembourg 9.04 11.74 11.23 .8367 .5300 .75
11. France 6.59 10.34 9.80 1.1857 .9567 .80
12. Germany 9.05 11.44 12.03 1.0567 .5900 -1.68
13. Italy 3.58 3.47 4.82 .6367 .6633 -2.47
14. Netherlands 7.76 11.20 9.43 .8014 .6767 -.74
15. Denmark 2.39 -.84 3.04 0 -.8067 -6.92
16. Norway 1.57 1.37 2.69 0 -.4300 -.87
17. Spain 5.06 4.37 4.20 0 -.7867 -.24
18. Sweden 4.80 5.81 5.54 0 .1217 -.16
19. Switzerland 15.74 16.68 17.32 .6100 .4583 -.54
20. United Kingdom 7.68 8; 80 7.66 0 -.1767 1.32
21. Liberia 9.78 8.72 9.25 0 .0167 .16
22. Libya 62.51 38.71 57.40 0 -2.66 -17.02
23. South Africa 15.85 10.88 13.79 -1.1775 -1.18 -3.98
24. India 6.72 10.64 9.21 0 .0733 1.79
25. Philippines 7.25 7.24 7.52 0 .3033 .54
26. Australia 7.89 10.03 9.81 0 .4400 -.02
This suggests an interesting line of thought. When people 
attempt informally to allow for uncertainty, they proceed along the 
line of: 'firms invest where expected returns are highest, subject 
to an allowance for risk'. It seems that such might not be the case. 
Consider Table XI where correlations between MEAN and the other 
measures are presented, together with correlations between shares 
estimated with MEAN and shares estimates using the other measures.
For both samples, all the measures of expected returns are highly 
positively correlated, with MEAN permutations being rather closer 
and M71 permutations somewhat more distant; all were no lower than 
.85 bar one. These various measures were each used to predict 
shares and the correlations between these are shown on the bottom 
half of the Table. As can be seem, almost no difference in estimated 
shares was produced by the different proxies - even in the M71 + AP71 
case in the U.S. sample.
Thus, it appears that expected returns provide little explanation 
(or a small percentage of what little explanation we have so far 
achieved) of the allocation of investment by multinational firms in 
our samples. This suggests that it may turn out that the argument 
that these firms 'adjust expected returns for risk' will be reversed; 
that is, such firms may allocate investment 'to minimize risk subject 
to an allowance for expected returns'. This line of inquiry will be 
pursued in the next chapter.
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Table XX
Correlations between Various Proxies 
of Expected Returns with MEAN
U.K. Sample Proxy U.S. SampL
.9867 MEAN+B .9982
.8848 M71 .8779
.8356 M71+B .8523
.9272 MA.71 .9870
.8766 MA71+B .9766
.9401 MEAN+DP71 .9538
.9056 MEAN+DP .9975
.7719 M71+DP .8163
.8540 M71+DP71 .5170
Correlations Between Shares Estimated Using MEAN and 
Shares Estimated Using Various Proxies
Proxy U.K. Sample U.S. NKO Sample U.S. PE Sample----Urn
.
MEAN+B .9999 .9998 .9999
M71 .9950 .9998 .9999
M71+B .9956 .9996 .9998
MA71 .9989 .9999 .9999
MA71+B .9992 .9997 .9999
MEAN+DP71 .9981 .9987 .9997
MEAN+DP .9988 .9999 .9999
M71+DP .9972 .9997 .9999
M71+DP71 .9898 .9982 .9723
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We have come some way in this chapter and, as it is apparent 
that much work lies ahead of us, it is worth pausing and taking 
stock of just what we have done and where we should be heading.
The first substantive point is that the dual decision 
hypothesis evidentally finds no support in the data. Initial 
estimates of the portfolio model when applied to foreign investment 
alone were poor and about the only remarkable feature is that the 
estimated shares were fractions. This applied for all three samples. 
The second feature of note was that some but not very much difference 
was found between shares based on NKO and those based on PE for the 
U.S. sample. Finally, it was discovered that expected returns had 
very little impact on estimated shares; most of what little 
explanation was achieved came from the risk terms.
The directions these results point to lie in the further 
consideration of risk. This is hardly surprising for as early as 
Chapter I we have had some misgivings about the quantification of 
this variable; evidentally it requires more work than we have thus 
far given it. In addition, home investment must be introduced to 
the sample for this is an important part of our initial hypothesis 
about multinationals' investment policies. These two points are, 
however, closely intertwined and must be considered simultaneously. 
This we now proceed to do.
(v) Summary
A
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Chapter IV
Risk and Foreign Investment
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The empirical work of the last chapter left us on a relatively 
well defined path and it is left for us here to follow it as long 
as possible. Two issues in particular were left open. The first is 
the role of home investment and the interrelations between home and 
foreign investment. We have found the dual decision hypothesis 
untenable and, as it turns out, in order for home investment to be 
successfully predicted some major extensions of the model are required 
The reason is that home investment is fundamentally safer (without 
being riskless) than all foreign investment, or at least is perceived 
as being so. This question is tackled in Section (ii).
The measurement of risk is the other issue left over from the 
last chapter. We found reason to suspect that whatever explanation of 
shares was being provided was arising from the risk terms; expected 
returns appear to have played only a small role. It seems then that 
the measurement of risk is the area of importance to which attention 
must be directed to make the model serviceable. We shall do this by 
generating additional information on risk in Section (iii) and using 
it to accurately predict shares. Such additional information will 
enable us to measure 'total perceived risk' in the various markets 
the firm operates in. Such total perceived risk must, of course, be 
explained if possible and Section (iv) considers this problem. In 
Sections (v) and (vi), we shall come to an assessment of the portfolio 
model and consider its usefulness as a predictor of foreign
(i) Introduction
investment.
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There is an important sense in which home investment is 
"safer" than all foreign investment. This is, of course, the converse 
of the argument discussed in Chapter I relating to the uncertainty 
of expansion into new foreign markets by the firm. As Caves 
(1974b, pp. 11) has remarked in a similar context: "... why should 
the we/they distinction fail to guide the hand of the entrepreneur 
when its power over other human relations is carved so deeply upon 
the records of history?" It is the notion of a 'home base' which is 
crucial to the argument.
Clearly, home operations are risky and, even if the firm is 
sufficiently diversified at home, such operations are subject to 
"systematic risk" (Sharpe, 1964, pp. 440-442) arising from such 
forces as macroeconomic fluctuations. Such national systematic 
risk can be diversified away in part by international operations 
(Solnik, 1974; Rugman, 1976; and so on) and such risks as remain are 
captured in our measures. Nevertheless, this is not the whole story. 
U.K. multinationals in the U.K. (the same applies, mutatis mutandi, 
to U.S. multinationals in the U.S.) are in a familiar environment, 
are familiar with competitors, suppliers, consumers, unions and 
government ministers and their outlook on policy. To some extent 
they can anticipate (if not postpone) disruptive developments; 
more importantly, they believe that they can adopt more readily to 
them, mitigating the adverse effects of such disturbances. The 
belief and confidence in their ability to "do something about it" 
is justified, quite naturally, by their intimate ties with the home
(ii) Home and Foreign Investment
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base and (at a second order) by cultural (etc.) ties. That is, their 
attitudes to whatever measure of risk they use as an index are liable 
to differ quite markedly as between home and all foreign investment, 
even those with precisely the same measured risk.
Recall Appendix VII where, using Risk (ii), the U.K. had a very 
similar risk to South Africa. No one in his/her right mind would 
suggest that U.K. investors found them equally risky; South Africa 
must be considered far more risky. South Africa is in the process 
of massive political change; it is not clear what will occur, nor to 
what extent, nor the attitude of the new rulers to U.K. multinationals 
and their policies. That change is on the books is clear - what 
it will entail and how to minimize its effects are not. In the U.K. 
change is also due with the forthcoming elections. It is not clear 
when exactly they will occur nor who will win, but firms in the U.K. 
do know the attitudes of a Tory or Labour government and their likely 
policies and how to circumvent them. Even a Liberal government's 
attitudes are known despite the fact that a Liberal victory would be 
unexpected.
This principle can be extended to countries within the foreign 
sample. Our risk measures suggest that Columbia is less risky 
than the U.K. for U.S. investors. No-one in their right mind would 
accept this. Since 1867 when Singer set up in Glasgow (Tugendhat, 1971, 
pp. 33), or 1914 when Ford produced 25% of the cars made in the U.K., 
the U.S. presence in Britain has been large enough for public comment 
(pp. 35-9), despite the host government's attitudes (Gillespie, 1972; 
Dunning, 1958). U.S. presence in Columbia, as in the rest of 
South America, has been of some long standing, but limited in 
form and accompanied by much tension. "During the 1970's...among
Latin American countries, Chile, Mexico and Peru would probably be 
related a little higher on the tension scale than Columbia, but not 
by much; Columbia would, in turn, be rated higher than Argentina 
or Brazil... In the advanced world, there would be very little 
hesitation in placing Japan near the top of the scale, France somewhat 
below, Britain much lower and Belgium lower still". (Vernon, 1971, 
pp. 189-90). According to our measures Brazil and Argentina are 
rated much more risky for U.S. investors than the U.K.
The simple (and by now familiar) point that we are trying to 
establish is that our measure of risk is, of necessity, quite 
imperfect and that it is important to recognize that attitudes to a 
given measured risk in a pair of countries with equal measured risk 
may differ quite markedly due to differences in 'investment climate'; 
such attitudes are not likely to find their way into ex post returns.
Here we shall first consider the simplest version of this 
hypothesis; that is, that home investment is very much safer than all 
foreign investment. Let us commence by testing the model without this 
assumption. Table I sets actual and estimated shares (denoted 
Estimated Share (i)) for the U.K. sample and Table II gives the same 
information for the U.S. PE sample. On Table I it can be seen that 
these estimates are rather poor - poorer than before; the rank 
correlation coefficient between estimated and actual shares is 
R ” .0496. Most importantly, home investment is under-estimated 
by 72 percentage points; South Africa over-estimated by 24 percentage 
points; the West Indies by 16; Canada 14; Australia 7; and so on - all 
not surprising given that the U.K. is so badly over-estimated. What 
effect has adding the U.K. to the list of countries in our sample had
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Table X
Actual and Estimated Shares for U.K. Investment to
Nineteen Foreign Countries and Home
Investment
Country Actual Shares Estimated Shares(i) Estimated Shares
Australia .0487 (3) .1142 (4) .0258 (5)
Irish Republic .0086(11) .0515 (6) .0126 (7)
New Zealand .0007(17) .0168(11) .0035(12)
South Africa .0090(10) .2543 (1) .0633 (2)
Africa .0010(10) .0236(10) .0057(10)
West Indies -.0133(20) .1557 (2) .0342 (4)
Hong Kong .0007(18) -.0015(20) .00002(19)
India .0037(14) .0500 (7) .0119 (8)
Malaysia .0038(13) .0044(16) .0012(16)
Canada .0113 (8) .1498 (3) .0342 (3)
United States .0532 (2) .0284 (9) .0070 (9)
Denmark .0014(15) .0163(12) .0036(11)
Switzerland -.0047(19) .0095(14) .0023(14)
Belgium .0236 (5) .0071(15) .0016(15)
France .0136 (7) .0149(13) .0033(13)
Italy .0054(12) .0043(17) .0007(17)
Netherlands .0207 (6) -.0012(19) -.0002(20)
Germany .0403 (4) .0018(18) .0004(18)
South/Central
America .0096 (9) .0627 (5)' .0151 (6)
United Kingdom .7527 (1) .0366 (8) .7747 (1)
Numbers in parentheses are rankings.
on the rest of the estimates (aside from the slight movement towards 
over-estimation)? The rank correlation between actual and estimated 
shares in nineteen foreign countries is: R = .0150 the rank correlation 
between these remaining nineteen countries and the estimates of the 
last chapter when the U.K. was excluded is: R = .9842. The intro­
duction of the U.K. (home investment) has not altered the ranking of 
foreign investment shares predicted by the model; indeed, except 
for the slight upward bias, it has not altered the estimates very
much at all
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Table XI
Actual and Estimated Shares (PE) for U.S. Investment in Twenty-Six 
"Foreign" Countries and Home Investment
Country Actual Shares Estimated Shares(i) Estimated Shares(ii)
1. Canada .0982 (2) .3697 (1) .1421 (2)
2. Mexico .0054(13) .0781 (5) .0344 (5)
3. Panama .0008(25) .1876 (2) .0095 (9)
4. Argentina .0041(14) -.0042(23) -.0068(25)
5. Brazil .0163 (7) .0908 (3) .0078(10)
6. Chile .0005(26) -.0014(21) .0014(17)
7. Columbia .0023(21) .0014(20) .0048(15)
8. Peru .0030(19) .0024(18) -.0040(22)
9. Venezuela .0075(11) .0162(14) -.0024(20)
10. Bolivia .0128 (8) -.0015(22) .0056(14)
11. France .0283 (5) -.0079(24) .0063(11)
12. Germany .0423 (4) .0023(19) .0058(13)
13. Italy .0194 (9) -.0095(25) .0387 (4)
14. Netherlands .0105(10) .0275 (9) .0062(12)
15. Denmark .0018(22) -.0190(26) .0132 (8)
16. Norway .0033(17) -.0333(27) .0161 (7)
17. Spain .0059(12) .0039(16) -.0062(24)
18. Sweden .0031(18) .0262(11) .0691 (3)
19. Switzerland .0040(15) .0809 (4) -.0050(23)
20. United Kingdom.0426 (3) .0311 (8) -.0111(26)
21. Liberia .0004(27) .0383 (6) .0192 (6)
22. Libya .0027(20) .0025(17) -.0015(19)
23. South Africa .0039(16) .0370 (7) -.0114(27)
24. India .0012(24) .0078(15) .0009(18)
25. Philippines .0014(23) .0267(10) -.0039(21)
26. Australia -.0207 (6) .0199(13) .0046(16)
27. United States .6577 (1) .0259(12) .6664 (1)
Numbers in parentheses are rankings.
turning to Table II, the same state of affairs appears to hold 
for the U.S. PE shares. Home investment is under-estimated by 
63 percentage points. Correspondingly, Canada and Panama are quite 
heavily over-estimated and the rest (barring a few such as Argentina 
and Chile) are over-estimated. In fact, the rank correlation between 
actual and estimated shares including the U.S. is: R = -.0104.
100 -
Removing the U.S., the rank correlation between actual and estimated 
shares for the remaining twenty-six countries is: R = .0607 and 
between these and those estimated in the last chapter: R = .7997.
Running the regression for the U.S. Sample (those for the U.K. 
are similar and are suppressed for brevity), the results presented on 
Table III confirm our observations.• Germany, Canada and the U.S. are 
troublemakers* and India is our bench mark; the results are relatively 
indistinguishable as between the various exclusions and are uniformly 
poor. Excluding the U.S. is the best result, but this is hardly 
surprising.
Table III
Regressions of the Form X. = a i + for the U .S. (PE) Sample
Equation a 8 ÍLÍ F( . )
Countries
Excluded
(i) .0316
(.0295)
.1279
(.3294)
.006 .1507
(1,23)
Germany,
United Kingdom
(ii) .0105
(.0028)
-.0308
(.0554)
.013 .3100
(1,23)
Canada
(iii) .0068
(.0035)
.1689
(.0402)
.423 17.65
(1,24)
United States
(iv) .0338
(.0283)
.1195
(.3217)
.005 .1380
(1,24)
India
* Curiously, the U.S. in the U.K. sample and the U.K. in the U.S. 
sample are predicted rather accurately.
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These results clearly bring us back to the hypothesis that 
domestic investment is safer, somehow, than all foreign investment, and 
fundamentally so. The tests described above were based on the premise 
that, for equal levels of measured risk, countries are judged equally 
risky. To isolate the possibility of different attitudes to a given 
measured risk, we have pursued the following hypothesis: we continue 
to use one overall risk premium, h, but we alter the measured risk 
of the U.K. Since, in our objective function, the risk premium 
enters multiplicatively with measured risk, this is equivalent to 
estimating a second risk premium which relates only to home measured 
risk. In altering measured risk, not only must we alter the variance 
of home investment but the various co-variances between home and all 
other countries must be adjusted. For given interrelations between 
two countries, those which include a safe country with which one is 
familiar are more sure than those those between two foreign countries 
which is liable to be quite tenuous - this for obvious reasons.
Partly, lines of comunication between home country corporate head­
quarters and subsidiaries taken separately are stronger than between 
two foreign subsidiaries, and partly because as the home country is 
familiar, the knowledge of its interactions with various countries 
taken together has an added élément of surety - one half of the 
relationship is on familiar grounds. Consequently, risk is reduced not 
only by reduction of measured risk for the home country but by the 
knowledge of the relations between home countries and all others.
Formally, the model is as follows. Let the nth country be the
home country and, for all t, write pn(t) as cpn (t) for some constant
. 2c. Consequently, the variance of pn over t is c p^* and the
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A
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co-variance with any j is cp^j*. The objective function Z( ) 
then becomes:
(1) Z(.) = NpÏA. - h
i
N-l N-l ,
E A7p*. + Z A.A.p*. + XN c P*
• 1  1 1  • ^  .  „  1  ]  1 J  *TlLTl jfi,N NN
+ 2c Z X„X. p*.
jl*N N j Nj
Using methods similar to those employed above, the first order
A
conditions for a maximum require the NA^ to satisfy the N equations
(2) Ü -  = W _Ki) a x .  axN i = 1..... N-l
EX. - 1.l
which can be written in matrix notation as:
(3) Â = ir_1 *
where
(4) A
A o o
PN * P1
• 4> ■ h
P !
. V
i
(2cp*N - 20^) (cp*N - Pf2> (2c p^  - cp*N)
1 1 1
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There is, however, a short cut which obviates the need for obtaining 
an analytic solution. This is that c is strictly bounded by zero and 
unity; i.e. 0 < c < 1. A negative c will give rise to negative 
co-variances (if they were positive and visa versa) and makes no 
economic sense; c in excess of unity gives rise to more risk than 
before, and c = 0 eliminates risk altogether. Thus the most 
straightforward procedure is to scan over the open interval (0,1), 
using each c to calculate h as given above, and find the minimum of 
L(h,c). Tables IV and V show the results for the U.K. and U.S. 
samples respectively.
On Table IV, there does not appear to be a minimum. L(h,c) 
falls rather substantially as c falls from unity to 0.1, and then 
slowly levels off to a value of L(h,c) = .0115 shortly after c = .01. 
On Table V, a simpler situation prevails. L(h,c) falls monotonically 
as c falls until c = .08 and then rises rather slowly. The value of 
£(h,c) at the minima of «the two samples differs by about .003.
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Having computed h and c, what predictions do we get about foreign 
investment flows? On Tables I and II, estimated shares (Estimated 
Share (ii)) computed using c = .01 and c = .080 for the two samples 
respectively*. Consider Table I first. The most apparent difference 
with the previous estimated shares is that home investment is exactly 
right. However, the allocation of the remainder of the shares 
(i.e. to all foreign countries) does not show any increased accuracy. 
The rank correlation between actual and estimated shares (including 
the U.K.) is R = .1573; the correlation between Estimated Shares (i) 
(when c = 1) and actual shares was .0496 - a marginal improvement. 
Between Estimated Share (i) and Estimated Share (ii), the rank correl­
ation is R = .0530, or R = .9947 when the U.K. is excluded. What 
appears to be happening is that using c = .01 reallocates shares more 
or less proportionately from everywhere - especially from Australia, 
Canada, South Africa and the West Indies. The provision made for 
the 'relative risklessness' of home investment has not improved the 
predictions of individual foreign shares although the foreign total 
is accurately predicted.
Let us consider the regression results for the U.K. sample 
when we assume c = .01. These are presented on Table VI. South and 
Central America is our benchmark but the results are the same regard­
less of whether South and Central America or the U.S. or South Africa 
(and so on) are excluded. What is happening is that the correctness 
of the U.K. estimates is dominating the whole regression and this is 
confirmed by the first two regressions in which the U.K. is
* The value of c = .01 chosen for the U.K. sample was chosen because 
further decreases in c have only marginal effects on shares and the 
likelihood function.
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Table IV
Values of c and the likelihood function for the U.K. Sample
£ L(h,c) £ L(h.c)
.6358 .06 .01231
,9 .61820 .05 .01202
8 .61715 .04 .01182
,7 .60003 .03 .01169
,6 .56965 .02 .01160
,5 .5092 .01 .0115
,4 .3879 .009 .0115396
,3 .2016 .008 .0115345
.2 .05748 .007 .0115296
,19 .04937 .006 .0115249
,18 .04235 .005 .0115202
.17 .03634 .004 .0115157
,16 .03126 .003 .0115113
,15 .02702 .002 .0115069
.14 .02352 .001 .0115027
,13 .02067 .0005 .0115002
.12 .01836 .0001 .0115990
.11 .01658 .00005 .0114988
,1 .01518 .00001 .0114986
,09 .01411 .000009 .0114986
,08 .01331 .000001 .0114986
.07 .01272
Table V
Values of c and the likelihood function for the U.S. Sample
jC L(h.c) JC L(h.c)
1 .4980 .086 .00871
.9 .4945 .085 .008712
.8 .4890 .084 .008707
.7 .4794 .083 .008703
.6 .4604 .082 .008700
.5 .4184 .081 .00869927
.4 .3245 -*■ .080 .0086989
.3 .1644 .079 .008699
.2 .0379 .078 .008701
.19 .03148 .077 .008704
.18 .02604 .070 .008708
.17 .02156 .075 .008716
.16 .01796 .074 .008719
.15 .01512 .073 .00872
.14 .01295 .072 .00873
.13 .01134 .071 .00874
.12 .01020 .07 .00875
.11 .00944 .06 .00887
.1 .00899 .05 .00902
.09 .00876 .04 .00918
.089 .00874 .03 .00933
.088 .00873 .02 .00944
.087 .00872 .01 .00952
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eliminated. There the relation appears negative because of the 
large over-estimation of several countries, principally Australia. 
The formal significance tests reflect these presumptions.
Table VI
Regressions of the form X^ = a + BX^
for the U.K. Sampli
Regression £ B
(i) .0130
(.0052)
-.0496
(.2606)
(ii) .0041
(.0050)
.9626
(.0285)
(iii) -.0011
(.0053)
.9649
(.0301)
(iv) .0039
(.0053)
.9598
(.0299)
(v) .0017
(.0060)
.9609
(.0335)
of Twenty Countries
r2 U .... ).
Countries
Excluded
.002 .0363
(1,17)
United Kingdom
.985 1139
(1,17)
South Africa
.983 1026
(1,17)
United States
.983 1028
(1,17)
West Indies
.979 819.2 South/Central
(1,17) America
Standard errors are in parentheses below estimated co-efficients; 
numbers below F-statistics are degrees of freedom.
Clearly the hypothesis that a = 0 and S = 1 is supported when 
we use the accurate estimate of the U.K. in our tests (with the exception 
of (ii), where it is marginal).
Turning briefly to the U.S. sample, a similar pattern emerges. 
Again, domestic investment is quite close while the rest remain rather 
inaccurate. The rank correlation between Estimated Share (ii) and 
actual shares is: R = .1453 which falls to R = .0626 when we remove 
the U.S. from both ranks. Again, the presumption to over-estimate 
disappears, with large reallocations from Canada, Panama and Switzerland
- 107
Table VII
Calculàted and Critical F-■Statistics
Equation 6 F( . ) SS1 sso
(i) 7.9079 3.59 (2,17) .0057 .0110
(ii) 3.7132 3.59 (2,17) .0076 .0110
(iii) 2.5182 3.59 (3,17) .0085 .0110
(iv) 2.5784 3.59 (2,17) .0084 .0110
(v) .3509 3.59 (2,17) .0106 .0110
to the U.S. in the new estimates. However, the two sets of estimated 
shares bear only a weak relation to each other: R = .0433 and R = .1679 
with and without the U.S. included in the rankings.
Turning to the regression on Table VIII, the same patterns emerge 
as before. Eliminating Canada, Germany, the U.K., or the benchmark India, 
all produce good results. Eliminating the U.S., however, causes some 
deterioration, but not as much as before. The formal significance tests 
show the same pattern of confirmation as with the U.K. sample.
Table VIII
Regressions for the U.S. Sample of Twenty-Seven Countries
Equation cc 1 RÌ F( . ) CountriesExcluded
(i) .0061
(.0033)
.5724
(.1192)
.498 23.03
(1,24)
United States
(ii) .0025
(.0036)
.9461
(.0269)
.981 1262.35
(1,24)
Canada
(iii) .0002
(.0034)
.9544
(.0250)
.983 1455.57
(1,24)
Germany
(iv) .0001
(.0033)
.9546
(.0247)
.984 1481.89
(1,24)
United Kingdom
(v) .0019
(.0037)
.9512
(.0276)
.980 1185.22
(1,24)
India
Numbers below estimated co-efficients are standard errors; degrees 
of freedom are given below the F-statistics.
Table IX
Calculated and Critical F--Statistics
Equation e F( . ) SS1 sso
(i) 2.8197 3.40 (2,24) .01132 .01398
(ii) 12.8906 3.40 (2,24) .00674 .01398
(iii) 2.66 3.40 (2,24) .01144 .01398
(iv) 4.83 3.40 (2,24) .00996 .01398
(v) 1.1615 3.40 (2,24) .01274 .01398
As can be seen at a glance, the hypothesis is confirmed for all 
but the regressions excluding Canada and the U.K.
Thus, we have found reason to suspect that home investment is 
relatively safer than all foreign investment, and by means of a 
simple exercise, have demonstrated the proposition. The clear course 
open now is to extend this procedure to all countries.
(iii) Attitudes to Risk*
In the model we are using, risk and 'attitudes to risk' enter 
multiplicatively and we shall seek to generate further information 
on these attitudes to improve the model's performance. In the previous 
exercise, we did this to home investment by altering measured risk.
Here we shall attempt to extend this by generating information on 
the attitudes to risk in each country, using this information to
* For brevity, we continue now with only the U.K. sample
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improve prediction. This turns the model on its head, for we are using 
observed behaviour (observed investment shares) to generate the 
attitudes to risk which, for the most part, determine the actions of 
our economic actors, and hence the observed shares.
Formally, the problem is the following. Choose X^, i = 1.....N
to maximize:
subject to
These form (N+l) equations in the N X^, the N h^ and \p - 
evidentally an over-determined system. Knowledge of the X^'s or lu's 
will, of course, set things to rights. There are two approaches to 
solving this problem.
(8) £X. = 1
i
The optimum X^ satisfy
32
3X x - 1 . N
(9) l
I X. - 1l
where
- h.l
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As a first approach, we can solve the first order conditions for
A
the X.'s as functions of the h.'s and choose these latter to maximize1 L
the likelihood function.
(11) L = Z (X. - X ^ 2. 
i
After eliminating t|> as before, we can write:
(12) 0A = « 6
where:
(13) Â
A r ° o 1
X1 pn ; pi
•
6 =
A
i
p*i (hi + hj,) - p*. (h. + h.)..... - p*N(h. + 1^ )
The likelihood function is then: 
(15) L = (A - 0-1B)T (A - 06)
_1 AOnly 0 has terms in the h$J 6 and A are known and calculable. The 
first of the N first order conditions for a minimum is:

Ill -
<»> % - (WB) (A■e"B)
but, as:
(17) ae3h. -»■' ft- » - 1 1
we arrive at:
<18> S :  ‘  l 26' 1 %  ! ‘ l  B)  (A - e"  8)
and similarly for the remaining (N-l) conditions. The trouble with 
these conditions - and this approach - is only too obvious. The 
inverse 0  ^which contains all the terms in Ik  make only numerical 
approximation methods feasible for solution. In view of these 
computational difficulties a second, short cut approach has been 
adopted.
A
What we do is to set X. = X. for all i. This eliminates thel i  i
as unknowns altogether and provides an easy means to solve the 
original first order conditions. This would generate the same answer 
if the:
(19) Min L ■= E (X. - X.)2 = 0.. 1 11
The (n+l)St equation, E X. • 1, is now redundant and we are left with N 
i
equations in the N Ik ' s and ip - again over-determined. To overcome 
this, we set:
(20) * V
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and rearrange the system to solve:
(21) i = B ~ t
where
’ h.l ' xipr. | s xip? i .............. V in '
(22) h = <$> 8
. V [ X1P1 N ..............XNPNN + T XiPNi J
For chosen values of if this can easily be solved for h.
What is involved in setting \f> = i|>? Recall that 1(1 bears the
dimension of an interest rate and is a shadow price on funds. It is,
in principle, knowable by adding a supply of funds schedule - i.e.
determining F°. This is, however, beyond our scope and our plan is
to search for that \|i which will minimize (11) .
From the system above, we know h. To calculate and hence h
we insert the h.'s into 0 and solve: l
(24) A - 6-1B •
Table X presents these results. The first column is actual shares, the 
second is the estimated shares generated by this procedure and the 
third contains a variable RISK. The i^1 observation of RISK is:
(25) RISK. = h. [x.p*. ♦ IX.X.p*. ]
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Table X
Actual and Estimated Shares for the U.K. Samplie
Country Actual Estimated h. RISKShare Share 1
Australia .0487 .0535 62.0114 -.2918
Irish Republic .0086 -.0003 8.9786 -.0399
New Zealand .0007 .0098 -8.1859 -.0034
South Africa .0090 .0072 -1.0375 -.0019
Africa .0010 -.0015 7.1722 :-.0035
West Indies -.0133 -.0125 36.381 .1046
Hong Kong .0007 .0045 -2.6011 .0015
India .0037 -.0059 13.9566 -.0232
Malaysia .0038 .0089 .5431 -.0035
Canada .0113 .0143 -46.286 -.0717
United States .0532 .0625 .3314 .0191
Denmark .0014 .0063 10.9198 -.0174
Switzerland -.0047 .0016 .9021 .0089
Belgium .0236 .0298 -1.6948 -.0307
France .0136 .0103 7.0283 -.1130
Italy .0054 .0024 29.8124 -.0423
Netherlands .0207 .0197 3.3978 -.1645
Germany .0403 .0344 -14.238 .0133
South America .0096 .0052 -1.6137 -.0057
United Kingdom .7527 .7490 -1.0315 -.8819
which is the attitude to risk in the ith country times the ith
country's contribution to total firmwide risk. Comparing the first two
columns of the table, the differences between actual and estimated
shares are (not surprisingly) rather small. The U.K. total (i.e. the
home-foreign investment split) is predicted quite accurately while
India and Switzerland are under and over-estimated respectively and
these appear to be the worst estimates. The method we used to generate
these shares is an approximation to the full likelihood method;
ideally, the estimated shares should be such that the likelihood
-4function L = 0 and in this case L is of the order of about 10 
which is quite close and accounts for the minor deviations between 
actual and estimated shares.
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This exercise has turned the model on its head and it is 
important to be quite clear methodogically about precisely what we have 
done. Our dissatisfaction with the measure of risk and the performance 
of the model using that measure has inclined us towards developing 
further information on risk. The particular step taken here has been 
to (roughly) fill in the gaps between actual and estimated shares by 
use of the dummies, h^. That is, we have (in effect) asked what the 
h / s  (and hence, total risk) must be to generate accurate predictions 
of the shares allocated to the countries in the sample. This merely 
postpones the exercise back one step, for as the terms RISK now fully 
explain and determine shares, we must, to explain share allocation, 
explain RISK. This problem we take up next in the next section.
(iv) Explaining RISK
We have determined the h^, terming them attitudes to risk 
and they are hypothesised to represent some subjective reassessment 
of the measured risk made by the firm to account for the difficulties 
of adjusting to disturbances in the host, foreign market. Thus, the 
h. are contingent on the measured risk terms and it would thus seem 
appropriate to explain the two jointly; i.e. explain RISK.
The choice of variables to explain RISK is subject to a number 
of difficulties, the most important of which is lack of data. Many 
variables which we would wish to put in are simply unavailable and 
many others are available only as rather crude summary measures. 
There are really three sets of variables one would like.to use. In
1X5 -
the first place, much of what an executive feels about a country he 
has little experience in is based on crude, casual empiricism and the 
opinions (however informed) of colleagues and associates. There may 
be a good deal of truth in the proposition that the risk an executive 
feels making an investment decision depends on what he has read the 
morning before in the Financial Times on the ride in from Hertfordshire. 
Such transitory, probably ill-expressed prejudices and feelings are 
completely unquantifiable.
A second set of variables are, shall we say, socio-political 
variables reflecting the state of society in the host, its political 
situation and potential changes in both. Such variables may create 
the transitory feelings and prejudices referred to above but they may 
also reflect fundamental social and political change which is germane 
to the firm and its operations in the host country. Such variables 
can occasionally be obtained and we have managed to isolate a few.
As such a study has interest in its own right (c.f. the efforts of 
Stevens, 1969), we postpone it to the next chapter and consider it in 
a somewhat broader perspective.
Finally, there are a set of economic indicators of the host's 
economic performance and potential which are directly germane to the 
expansion decision of the firm. Ideally, one would expect decision 
makers to concentrate (at least consciously) on these and so they will 
form the subject of the empirical study in this section. As the 
investment decision spans a horizon of a number of years, committing 
the firm to relatively illiquid plant and equipment assets in the host, 
one would expect to commence one's search with longer run, 'fundamental' 
economic indicators rather than short run deviations, isolated
incidents and so on.
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Given the data on these variables and given the further problem 
that the variables used must be available for the rather wide 
spectrum of countries represented in our sample, the measurement of 
these indicators will be really rather crude. In what follows, we 
shall constrain our discussion so as to limit data choices to variables 
actually available.
The first and most obvious data choice harks back to our earlier 
discussion of risk and the familiarity the firm feels for the host 
country environment it operates in. The more extensive are the firm's 
operations in the country in question and the longer have such 
operations been going on, the more 'native' the firm will be and feel; 
consequently, the less adjustment constraints it will feel that it 
faces and the lower its perceived risk. An obvious empirical proxy 
for this variable is the cumulative value of direct investment in 
plant and equipment in the country in question. Such a variable 
reflects both time and, more importantly, extent of commitment in the 
host; we denote it as VALDI. Such a measure has been obtained for 
1970 (the year previous to the share estimates) for all twenty countries 
in the sample from the Business Monitor; a comparable home investment 
figure measuring the book value of capital assets in the U.K. was 
obtained from the Census of Production*.
A second variable of some importance will obviously be exchange 
rate variation (e.g. Aliber, 1976). Exchange rate variations affect 
the sterling value of repatriated funds and, given the locations of
* This home investment figure will obviously dominate the rest and we 
shall have to carefully consider the results when the U.K. 
observations are omitted to ensure that the results are not dominated 
by that figure.
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the firm's funds throughout the world, the firm's net worth. One 
would expect that this variable will be positively associated with 
RISK, Denoted EXVAR, we have approximated it by the coefficient of 
variation of mid-point yearly observations of the exchange rate from 
1967 to 1971 from the U.N. Statistical Yearbook. It should be noted 
that the earnings data used to make up means and variances-covariances 
of rates of return are already expressed in sterling so that exchange 
rate variations have already made their impact felt in our measure of 
risk. Hence the lack of significance of EXVAR (should it come to 
pass) cannot be taken to imply that exchange rate variation has no 
effect on risk; rather, this variable corresponds to the hypothesis 
that exchange rate variation per se affects risk in addition to the 
impact it makes on earnings streams when converted into sterling.
EXVAR is available for all countries except Africa and South and 
Central America; the West Indies has been protfied by the Jamaican 
exchange rate.
A third set of variables worth considering are those reflecting 
inflationary conditions in the host country. Inflation complicates 
business forecasting, cost accounting (and hence profitability 
depending on whether historic or current cost accounting is used) 
and so on. To a certain extent such complications may be reflected in 
the rate of return data and in exchange rate movements but it is 
worth considering inflation as an independent force in its own right. 
From the U.N. Statistical Yearbook it proved possible to gather data 
for all countries except Africa and South America (the West Indies is 
again proxied by Jamaica) on both wholesale and consumer price 
indices. For each measure, two permutations of the data were developed:
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first differences between the index in 1971 and 1970 (denoted 
WP71 and CP71) and average first difference between 1965 and 1971 
(WPBAR and CPBAR).
Finally, a fourth set of variables were tried relating to the 
development and growth of the host country. The argument here is 
perhaps somewhat weaker than those which have gone before. A less 
developed country may be considered risky simply because it is less 
developed; the lesser stage of development may imply a lack of various 
ancilliary services which the firm needs access to on a contingency 
basis. This absence restricts the firm's degrees of freedom in 
reacting to disturbances. Similarly, a lack of dynamism or growth in 
an economy may mean a lack of profitable alternatives to a firm 
seeking to diversify within the host to offset risk. The index of 
development used is per capita income (PERCAP), 1970, obtained from 
the U.N. Statistical Yearbook for all countries excluding Africa and 
South and Central America. Two growth variables were used: GI71 and 
GIBAR, being respectively the first difference of the index of industrial 
production between 1971 and 1970 and over the interval 1967-1971 for 
the host country in question. The data were unavailable for Africa, 
the West Indies, Hong Kong, Malyasia, and South and Central America.
Thus, the following variables: VALDI, EXVAR, WP71, CP71, WPBAR, 
CPBAR, PERCAP, GI71 and GIBAR are hypothesised to be possible determinants 
of RISK. Without any guidance on the possible functional forms relevant, 
regressions were run on simple linear combinations of these variables; 
for EXVAR, WP71, CP71, WPBAR and CPBAR we expect, a priori, a positive 
coefficient. Table VI presents correlation matrices for the variables 
for the several sample sizes.
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Table XI
Correlation Matrices for the Various Hypothesized 
Determinants of RISK for various sample sizes
(i) For Full Sample of Twei.ty
VALDI
RISK -.9249
(Ü) For Sample Excluding Africa and South and Central America
RISK VALDI EXVAR PERCAP CP71
RISK 1
VALDI -.9252 1
EXVAR .2308 -.3987 1
PERCAP -.1103 .0219 .3881 1
CP71 -.3607 .3471 -.1592 .0982 1
CP BAR .2116 -.1127 .1157 .0735 .1937
(iii) For Sample Excluding Africa, the West Indies, Hong Kong,
Malaysia and South and Central .America
RISK PERCAP GI71 GIBAR VALDI EXVAR WP71 CP71 WPBAR
RISK 1
PERCAP .0396 1
GI71 3018 .2422 1
GIBAR 4144 -.0814 .6364 1
VALDI 9376 -.0522 -.3296 -.5034 1
EXVAR 3520 .3364 .5903 .6176 -.4601 1
WP71 3552 -.5477 -.2834 -.4860 -.4747 -.5864 1
CP71 3784 -.1476 .1057 -.0315 .3614 -.1876 .3564 1
WPBAR 1940 -.2479 -.0937 -.0198 .2153 -.4698 .4285 .3735 1
CPBAR 2866 -.0651 -.1247 -.2941 -.1431 .0656 .1270 -.2756 t .0931
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Table XI (continued)
(iv) For Sample Excluding Africa, the West Indies, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, South and Central America and the U.K.
RISK VALDI
VALDI -.4674 1
EXVAR -.2472 -.0550
Scanning Table XI, one thing is apparent above all else and that 
is the close negative relation between RISK and VALDI. It is important 
to realize that this is not just the naive predictor: VALDI is the 
book value of assets in the host in 1970 while RISK explains NKO.
VALDI is not even the integral of NKO over the past years for NKO is not 
plant and equipment expenditures however close PE and NKO may be.
Notice however, that a fair amount of this strong negative relation 
between VALDI and RISK is provided by the outlying observation of the 
U.K.; the partial correlation between the two drops from -.9 to just 
under -.5. The other variables are all relatively weak. EXVAR appears 
positively correlated to RISK, as are GI71, GIBAR and CPBAR; CP71,
WP71, and WPBAR tend to be negatively related. In Tables XII and XIII 
regressions are presented although the results involving CPBAR and 
WPBAR are suppressed as they appear little different from results 
using GP71 and WP71. The difference between the two tables is that the 
latter contains equations without a constant.
The first ten estimated equations on both tables strongly reflect 
the information generated in the correlation matrices. The sole and 
dominant explanation of RISK is VALDI and that explanation is quite
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good; it is strong and robust enough to survive sample size changes, 
constants and the additional explanatory variables. Variations in 
VALDI explain about 85% of the variations in RISK. None of the other 
explanatory variables contribute and all are insignificant except for 
EXVAR in Equation 3 of Table XIII and GIBAR in Equation 8 of the same 
table; EXVAR is negatively signed which is against a priori expect­
ations). Equation 11 in both tables contains an estimated equation 
with the U.K. excluded as well as several other countries. The interest
in this particular equation is that explanation is reduced but not so 
. 2terribly dramatically for the R remains above .5 but, in addition,
CP71 takes on significance in Table XIII when the constant is supressed. 
The extreme outlying observation of home capital stock clearly makes 
a difference to the results as Equation 11 shows; nevertheless, the 
importance of VALDI is apparent and is sustained albeit at a less 
dramatic level.
It thus appears that VALDI is the prime and important determinant 
of risk, of that risk a firm feels when it allocates investment shares 
to particular host countries. VALDI represents the familiarity a firm 
feels in a market which is gained by prolonged and intensive experience 
in operating in that host market and this is very much what we expect.
This testing of the determinants of risk and hence of investment 
shares has been, admittedly, rather rough and ready for the data 
available to us are poor on a cross country basis. While we have 
found good empirical support for the arguments we have been making about 
the risk of foreign operation a residual of dissatisfaction must 
remain. What we have shown is that share allocations tend - for good 
reasons associated with risk - to be made favouring countries where
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the firm's commitments are already rather extensive. Clearly, at a 
somewhat removed level, the determinants of investment lie in these long 
years of steadily expanding operations in hosts; years of failure and 
success and, more important, years of patient information gathering and 
confidence-building. Somehow, the investigation must be pushed back 
even further and one must hope to gather perhaps even more fundamental 
information on RISK, VALDI and consequently, share of investment 
allocated to particular countries. This is a subject we shall briefly 
develop in the next chapter.
(v) Ute Portfolio Model of International Investment: An Assessment
He have come quite some way in the last two chapters and, while- 
some very interesting paths remain to be illuminated, it is important 
to stop and evaluate what we have done. More precisely, we must 
evaluate the hypothesis we set out to examine and draw our conclusions 
about the usefulness of this portfolio model of investment.
The hypothesis was that firms make a centralized decision on 
the allocation of funds for direct investment under conditions of 
uncertainty as described by a portfolio model. To test this proposition 
a sample was constructed in order to predict the aggregate investment 
of all U.K. (and U.S.) multinational firms to 19 (26) foreign countries 
plus home investment. Despite explicit recognition of possible 
aggregation biases, such a sample was taken up to use to test the 
hypothesis. A number of simplifying assumptions were made in order 
to render the model testable: global investment totals were not 
determined but taken as given and stochastic constant returns was
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imposed upon our functions. No explicit correction was made for 
data distortions, especially those arising from transfer pricing for 
this was felt to have but a small impact on aggregate data. Finally, 
the independent variables, means, variances and covariances, were 
calculated in straightforward ways from a series of ex poste rates 
of return earned by all U.K. (U.S.) firms in the host oyer the past 
seven or eight years.
At face level, the model cannot be said to have found support 
in the data. Initial testing on foreign investment alone and foreign 
and domestic investment using the model exactly as originally specified 
generated uniformly poor results. The tests including home investment 
produced particularly shocking results, for home investment was 
notoriously under-estimated. As a predictive tool, the simple 
portfolio model must be rejected out of hand and our hypothesis must 
be resoundingly denied.
Nevertheless, throughout the testing, doubt was raised about the 
appropriate approximation of ex ante variables. The means used are 
theoretically the return the firm expects to gain for a particular 
expansion of a plant, and the variance-covariance matrix reflects the 
net distortions and deviations for this predicted rate of return 
which the firm expects. It is not clear firstly that these variables 
can properly be approximated from past data reflecting ex post 
returns from years previous and secondly, given that we must do this, 
it is not clear what is the appropriate way to use such ex post data 
to approximate the ex ante variables. This latter question is the 
really important one for one is unable to observe the expected 
parameters the firm uses in making its decisions.
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Investigation of this line of thought proved rather productive 
and generated the interesting empirical results of this study. The 
easier variable to deal with is means, for there are a number of 
plausible ad hoc manipulations one can make to generate alternative 
approximations. A number of these were tried with rather surprising 
results. Various proxies had no impact on share estimates. That is, 
the model remained insensitive to various possible specifications of 
expected returns. From this emerged the conclusion that foreign 
investment might be guided primarily by risk and that expected returns 
might play but a minor role in the international allocation of direct 
investment.
Interest accordingly switched to the specification of the risk 
variables. Conceptually, the variance was used as a measure of such 
risk. The firm was taken to construct an expected value of rate of 
return and then consider possible disturbances from that rate of return. 
For each disturbance, a probability was constructed, a gross deviation 
from the expected return was estimated and then the firm considered 
the possible adjustments that it could make in the face of this 
disturbance. This calculation conceptually leads to a net deviation 
from the expected return and the expected value of the square of these 
net deviations then measures risk and its possible expected consequences 
to the firm. The principal problem with foreign operation was identified 
to be the adjustment by the firm to adverse circumstances. That is, 
foreign markets are subject to stochastic disturbances much as the 
home market is and there is no reason to single out particular 
countries as more or less subject to such shocks. What is really 
important is not so much the shock but what the firm feels that it can 
do about it; i.e. the correction to gross deviations it can make.
This hypothesis about foreign risk ultimately found quite good 
support in the data and constitutes the principal and important 
empirical result of the study. It, however, took some time to reach 
this finding, and it is valuable to trace the path followed somewhat 
closely for at one, well-defined point, we left off testing the 
hypothesis directly and, as it were, stood the model on its head.
. Faced with the problem of measuring risk, a number of difficulties
made themselves apparent. The principal problem was that ad hoc 
manipulations, while being straightforward and familiar for means, 
are difficult to perform with variances. A number of possibilities 
such as the semi-variance are open to the researcher in these matters; 
our path, however, took us the first steps away from the model.
Rather than manipulate the variance-covariance matrix blindly hoping 
to be fortunate enough to stumble upon something which worked, we 
chose to introduce additional information into the model. Such 
additional information came from manipulating the risk terms multi- 
plicatively - essentially adding dummies in a rather peculiar fashion.
The first efforts were rather modest. Home investment was 
posited to be fundamentally safer than all foreign investment and a 
search was made for a scalar fraction to be used to modify the home 
investment risk terms. This turned out to be rather successful - 
fractions were found which enabled us to accurately separate <?ut 
home from all foreign investment and predict the split between the 
two rather accurately. Thus, emboldened, a full scale experiment 
was tried. Concentrating on the U.K. sample alone (to minimize costs of 
calculation), a set of twenty dummies was added to the model, each 
pertaining to the risk measured for each country. The product of
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the dummy and the risk term - so called RISK - proved to be powerful 
and complete determinants of shares. That is, the twenty dummies (not 
entirely Surprisingly) enabled us to predict the allocation of invest­
ment as accurately as we cared to approximate the estimation of the 
dummies.
It is important to be clear about the precise methodological 
implications of this step. At this point in the testing, we were 
no longer testing the model so much as doing as much as we could to 
make it work. Put slightly differently, the use of the dummies 
specified our ignorance and the failure of the model. The RISK 
terms are the variables which we needed to have found in the first 
place to make the model work and to find support for it in the data. 
The next step, obviously, was to try to explain these variables. In 
some sense, investment is being made on the basis of information or 
decision rules which the simple portfolio model reflects only 
imperfectly if at all; RISK quantifies this information and its 
explanation is clearly crucial to an understanding of the decision 
rules actually being used.
Explanation of RISK proved to be highly successful and this 
explanation illuminates very clearly just what might be underlying 
the allocation of foreign investment. It turned out that familiarity 
with the host market (as measured by the book value of assets in the 
host country) explained total risk rather well. Including the U.K. 
observation, roughly 85% of the variation is RISK was explained by 
VALDI. This difference or reduced explanation is not really as 
important as it might seem on face value. The U.K. book value of 
assets figure reflects the book value of the assets of all (not just
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multinational) U.K. firms and undoubtedly is far larger than the book 
value of. home assets of the firms in our sample. On that account the 
U.K. observation should be excluded as its dominance clearly 
dramatically improves the results. On the other hand, home markets 
are relatively safe vis-a-vis all foreign markets, and the artificial 
expansion of the U.K. figure resulting from the inclusion of non­
multinationals is really a step in the right direction emphasizing 
this relative risklessness. In short, the explanation of RISK by 
VALDI is large and important despite some data problems involved in 
the test.
This is rather a rich catch. In terms of our hypothesis and 
the alternative hypothesis suggested, it enables us to say a number 
of interesting things. The important point to see, I think, is that 
our findings that firms allocate shares to areas where they have a 
large presence and in which they are familiar with the environment 
can be equally well explained by the following rule of thumb: 
allocate investment shares in proportion to existing presence (as 
measured, say, by the book value of assets) and then make small, 
minor modifications to allow for relatively high or low expected 
returns and perhaps some unusual risks (such as expropriation or 
something similarly drastic). Our empirical results cannot discrimi­
nate between such a rule of thumb hypothesis and the extensions of 
the portfolio model we have described in the last two chapters.
This is crucially important, for it enables us to assess the 
hypothesis we started with and come to a firm set of conclusions 
about investment behaviour.
- 132 -
The hypothesis underlying the model must be rejected. One is 
a little reluctant to be emphatic about it given the data problems and 
the ex ante variable problems we faced, but these empirical problems 
do really weigh against the possibility of the model ever being used 
to predict (on a cross-section basis) share allocations. Having made 
the rejection, we turn to the alternative hypothesis that the firm 
cannot optimize and that it must construct some rule of thumb to 
co-ordinate its activities within the vast empire it owns and controls. 
The rule of thumb it clearly adopts is that stated just above: 
allocate and expand where presence is largest, subject to an allowance 
for unusual and startling changes of circumstances.
But, this is not really the whole story. Such a rule of thumb 
could well have been adopted in the beginning and its importance 
celebrated now. This is where our model has some considerable value. 
The point is simple. Satisficing behaviour and rules of thumb are 
not particularly compelling hypotheses to commence a study with.
Any number of them, each as superficially plausible as the next, can 
be taken as starting points and the real interest is not so much the 
implications of using such a rule (as these are usually pretty 
self-evident from the start) but why such a rule is interesting. I 
think our work with the portfolio model suggests a good answer and 
justification for the particular rule of thumb we have suggested and 
found support for.
The answer evidentally lies in the risk of foreign operation.
The costs of adjusting abroad are great and, in particular, the firm
O
faces the problem of reacting to and adjusting to the effects of 
disturbances. What is more, such adjustment must and can be made
- 133 -
by co-ordinating the activities of plants owned and controlled. 
Adjustment is easier in those markets where the firm's presence 
is large and important and, quite naturally, it expands in these 
markets more readily and quickly than elsewhere.
While this is an interesting and perhaps important set of 
results and further hypotheses, one must feel that the story is 
only just beginning. Valuable groundwork has been made and some real 
foundations have been laid in the understanding of the foreign 
expansionary investment decision process, but the plot is beginning 
to thicken and is worth further speculations and explorations to see 
how the story will run and perhaps how it will ultimately turn out.
(vi) A Brief Exploration of the Alternative Hypothesis
Our hypothesis is that firms expand in markets they are 
familiar with, by and large leaving aside considerations of expected 
returns. Such familiarity we have measured by a variable reflecting 
both time spent in the market and depth of commitment; i.e. VALDI. 
There are thus two issues to explore: why such risk averse behaviour, 
and why is VALDI a good variable to use to capture such phenomena?
The risk of operating in foreign markets is, we suggested
c(Chapter I), the problems of adjustment the firm faces to given 
disturbances. There are any number of events, anticipated with some 
degree of confidence or totally unanticipated, which can disrupt 
production plans or distribution policies and networks. It may be 
that particular economies and particular markets experience more of
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such events than others, but there is no reason to believe that across 
the advanced countries in any given product market substantial 
variations exist, and similarly across less developed countries. It 
is hard to see such a substantial inter-country variation in random 
shocks as would explain the relatively high inter-country variation 
in investment, sales or any other measure of 'presence' by multi­
national firms. The crucial inter-country variation is that the 
structure (political and economic) of such economies differs and, 
consequently, firms must seek out information on these details and 
learn to adapt to their environment.
It is thus not the shocks per se, nor the frequency which account 
for inter-country variation in presence, but the ability, confidence 
and speed of reactions to these shocks by firms operating in these 
markets. Such information and confidence of action comes, of course, 
after a long learning period. The speed of such learning can be taken 
to depend on three factors: length of time of operation, extent of 
operation and diversity of operations. Length of time is obvious, 
but needs to be qualified immediately by considerations of the extent 
of commitment. Partly, firms with small commitments may not notice 
or pay close attention to developments in the market and partly small 
operations may have the flexibility to avoid problems without dealing 
in depth with them. A large operation, however, involves an important 
commitment by the firm and events affecting them are liable to be 
noticed and acted upon. Thus, long standing operations of large size 
should lead to relatively quick learning and consequently, less 
expected risk. Diversity of operation reduces that risk somewhat by 
the usual pooling of risks inherent in a diversified enterprise.
O
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Furthermore, a diversified firm may experience the same shock in a 
number of different markets, getting a better perspective of both 
the problem and the required adjustment. In any event, time, size and 
diversity all determine learning and an accessable and obvious proxy 
is VALDI. t
The observation that large investment goes to areas with large 
extant book values of assets might perhaps be explained by replacement 
investment which might follow that pattern if depreciation was 
roughly proportional (across countries) to the value of assets. This 
competing hypothesis also finds support from the data; it is, however, 
theoretically unacceptable and this is for two reasons.
In the first place, the notion of replacement investment does 
not lie easily in a world of continuing technical advance. As a 
machine wears down, parts begin to deteriorate, requiring replacement 
or servicing to keep the machine at peak efficiency. Presumably, at 
some point the machine becomes so worn down that purchasing a new 
machine becomes more economic. A steady flow of 'replacement 
investment' is thus required to pay off the machine and then maintain 
it at peak efficiency. In a world of technical advance, however, 
such a simple story is not really very accurate. Such a world is 
characterized by new and better machines and maintaining existing 
productive capacity is not simply a matter of maintaining a machine 
until it is too worn out to make it worth continuing. Rather, the 
introduction of new machines speeds up economic obsolescence. For a 
firm growing, replacement investment is part and parcel of expansionary 
investment, for both maintenance of existing capacity and expansion 
of that capacity involve the introduction of new machines. It is
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neither conceptually nor empirically possible to separate out the 
two flows.
Supposing, however, technology and growth are stagnant so that 
the concept of replacement investment has some meaning. It is not 
entirely clear (a) that it should be some proportion of existing 
stock, nor (b) that the firm should actually maintain capacity in 
a particular market. Point (a) follows from the simple observation 
that depreciation (and hence replacement) varies both with utilization 
rates and types of machine; the proportionality assumption is merely 
one of convenience. Point (b) is rather more important. Consider 
again that we are dealing with a diversified firm and that such a 
firm controls and co-ordinates activities between markets, expanding 
and contracting in particular markets to maintain overall profitability.
The amount of replacement investment is thus subject to the 
same kind of economic forces as expansionary investment (see also 
Feldstein and Rothschild, 1974) and it is implausible, a priori, that 
the optimal policy is simply to maintain capacity at each plant.
Rather, profit maximizing strategies (even under uncertainty) can 
be expected to lead to expansion in some areas (i.e. replacement 
investment plus positive net investment) and run down in others, 
exploiting the advantages of unbalanced plant expansion (Beckinstein, 
1976). Thus, replacement investment should be subject to essentially 
the same forces as expansionary investment and these, we have argued, 
are risk aversion and differential risk - in short, the hypothesis 
we have maintained.
Before running a few regressions confirming the hypothesis, 
it is worth examining the VALDI - shares relation in the context of
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the model explored in this chapter. To recount, we developed a set
of dummy variables - the h/s “ and an associated measure of RISK
which completely explained shares. RISK, in turn, was explained
by VALDI. On Table XIV the correlation coefficients between these
variables are set out, both with and without the U.K. observations.
The relations between VALDI and shares is over .9900 with the U.K.
included, dropping to about .7000 when the latter is excluded.
This is the fundamental relation of importance and it is robust
enough to survive the sample re-specification more or less intact.
It is important to notice from both tables that the h's are not simply
dummy variables which thereby fill in the difference between estimated
and actual shares; nor is there any strong relation between errors
of estimation and shares (the large negative relation in Part i of the
table between X. and (X. - X.) is due to the gross under-estimate i l l
of the U.K. share). Finally, it is worth noticing that the relation 
between VALDI and shares is stronger than the two relations between 
VALDI and RISK and RISK and shares. This is prima facie support 
for our view that RISK is a reflection of the underlying relation 
between VALDI and shares.
The hypothesis that VALDI and not expected return explain 
shares should by now be well established, but for the sake of 
completeness we include Tables XV and XVI which show the formal 
regression with and without the U.K. On Table XV, the observations 
run over all shares, only N-l of which are independent. Consequently, 
one observation is superfluous reducing the degrees of freedom and 
increasing standard errors. Consequently, the t-statistics as shown 
are biased upwards. As this cannot conceivably affect the results 
(as can be seen by inspection), no attempt was made to correct this.
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Table XIV
A
Correlation Co-efficients between: H, X^, (X^ - X^), 
VALDI, RISK and MEAN
(i) For Full Sample of Twenty Countries
h X.l (X. - X.)l l VALDI RISK
h 1
Xi -.0503 1
<‘i - V .0696 -.8967 1
VALDI -.0646 .9969 -.9150 1
RISK -.0675 -.9385 .8114 -.9250 1
MEAN -.2388 .0097 .0227 .0124 .0716
(ii) For Sample excluding United Kingdom
h X.l V  v VALDI RISK
h 1
X.l .2002 1
(X. - X.) .0144 .2334 i
VALDI .1741 .6904 -.4113 1
RISK -.3372 -.6024 -.1609 -.4557 1
MEAN -.2385 -.0437 .0857 -.0522 .2155
In no case do any of the three proxies for expected returns 
make an impact on the high explanation of shares by VALDI. Together 
with an insignificant constant, variation in VALDI explains 99% and 
45% of the variation in shares. All of the other proxies tried 
earlier for expected returns were tried but none made any impact and 
frequently the sign-was incorrect.
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The conclusion is that our alternate hypothesis is not rejected. 
The results on Table XVI must be considered somewhat more satisfactory 
as they do not include the extreme observation of the U.K. which 
is subject to upward measurement error of VALDI. Contemplating that 
table, it is clear that this proportionality rule cannot be considered 
fixed - only 45% of the variation of shares is explained. Neverthe­
less, it is also clear that our hypothesis has an important basis 
in reality.
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Table XV
O.L.S. Regressions Explaining Shares for Full Sample
CONSTANT VALDI MEAN M70 MA70 R2
.0049
(1.592)
.0000178
(53.732)
.9935
.0059
(.7708)
.0000178
(52.246)
-.000106
(.1389)
.9931
.0000178
(53.302)
.000432
(1.368)
.9933
.0068
(.9019)
.0000178
(51.4040)
-.000177
(.2712)
.9931
.0000179
(54.147)
.000357
(1.3017)
.9932
.0052
(1.6018)
.0000178
(52.332)
-.0000026
(.3885)
.9931
.00000179
(55.713)
.000000084 
(.0131)
.9935
Table XVI
O.L.S. Regressions Explaining Shares for Sample Excluding U.K.
CONSTANT VALDI MEAN M71 MA70 R2
-.00160
(.3850)
.0000393
(3.9346)
.4458
-.00132
(.1691)
.0000393
(3.8099)
-.0000299
(.0424)
.4113
.0000385
(4.2997)
-.000129
(.3458)
.4452
-.00441
(.5058)
.0000405 
(3.7548)
.000232
(.3690)
.4162
.0000372
(4.4808)
-.0000449
(.1487)
.4437
-.00163
(.3597)
.0000393
(3.7333)
.00000018
(.0184)
.4112
.0000365
(5.3880)
.00000062
(.1054)
.4453
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Chapter V
Risk and the Political Structure of Host Countries
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(i) Introduction
Our study of direct investment has yielded a reasonably 
consistent picture of the foreign investment behaviour of firms. 
Multinational firms (and, in particular, U.K. based multinationls) 
appear to display a certain amount of inertia in their foreign 
expansion policies, investing and growing in economies where their 
operations are already well established. Expected returns appear not 
to play a large role in such allocation decisions, and the obvious 
implication is that risk plays a dominating role in the foreign 
investment decision. This is a matter worth further exploration and 
in the final chapter of this thesis we hope to make some small start 
down this path, identifying some of the salient characteristics of 
the economies which host well-established U.K. multinationals. That 
is, we shall isolate some of the characteristics of host countries 
which appear conducive to the establishment and growth of large U.K. 
multinational subsidiaries.
The extent of integration of foreign firms into a host market 
depends on a complex of factors not easily measured nor often consciously 
in the minds of decision makers themselves. The problem of adjustment 
to disturbances is as much a matter of the limited information of 
decision makers as it is a matter of their confidence, and these are 
not easily explored on either a theoretical or empirical plane. To 
make a start, we must limit the domain of our enquiry, concentrating 
attention on one particular class or subset or variables. We propose 
to classify possible characteristics into one of two groups: variables 
pertaining to host economic structure and those pertaining to the
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political structure of the host country. This distinction is made 
and explored in Section (ii) below.
In this limited exploration, we shall concentrate on those 
elements of political structure which we believe to be germane. In 
Section (ii), we shall argue that such political variables operate by 
affecting (a) the stability of the host government; (b)- external 
relations between the host and all other countries especially the 
parent country; and (c) domestic order within the host. In the last 
of these, domestic order, both outbreaks of domestic disorder as 
well as the government measures taken to limit them must be considered. 
A number of variables have been collected which belong to these 
various classes, and, in Section (iii) , they are presented and 
discussed. These particular variables will add considerable richness 
to the initial analysis of Section (ii), and we shall be able to make 
some firm a priori predictions concerning the joint impact of these 
political variables.
These two theoretical sections lead, finally, to full scale 
multivariate testing of the role of political factors on multinational 
presence in the various hosts. Section (iv) will present the results 
we have obtained and lead us to some conclusions in Section (v) about 
the role of host political structures on the perceived risk and hence 
the international expansion of U.K. multinational firms.
(ii) Economic and Political Structures
The extent of the commitment to a particular host by any multi­
national firm depends on the expected risk it perceives, and hence on
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its confidence in its ability to adjust to the changing circumstances 
of that market. Such adjustment evidentally depends on the particular 
skills, goals and structure of the firm; however, it also depends on 
the characteristics of the environment itself. Two avenues are thus 
open for research. On the one hand, one can inquire into the 
characteristics of the firms who happen to prefer a particular host, 
matching them to the characteristics of that particular market. On 
the other hand, one can ask what are the characteristics of hosts 
which multinational firms, on average, appear to prefer.
Our investigation here will concentrate on the latter, i.e. on 
identifying host country characteristics which U.K. firms on average 
appear attracted to. Evidentally, such markets will be populated with 
relatively large numbers of U.K. firms, at least some of whom will 
have extensive commitments there. Thus, preferred characteristics will 
be revealed by using some measure of foreign presence. Any number of 
characteristics of host markets present themselves for consideration, 
and we shall class them into two broad categories - those parts of the 
economic structure of the host and those pertaining to its political 
structure.
The firm's principal purpose in operating in a particular 
market is production and distribution, and by economic structure we 
refer to the network of interaction between the firm and consumers, 
rivals, suppliers, and the government. Such relationships take on 
particular forms depending on the institutional context in which 
they occur, but they all have the common element of direct interaction 
between two (or more) parties, one of which is the firm. For example, 
interaction with the government involves paying of taxes, sale or 
purchase of goods, regulations in which other transactions occur, and
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so on. Interactions with rivals involve competition or collusion 
in certain transactions with other parties, such as consumers or 
suppliers.
The precise role played by elements of the host political 
structure is rather different from such transactional variables. 
Political variables are primarily outside the control of the firm 
(although perhaps not outside its influence) and so do not reveal 
themselves immediately in the course of transactions. Rather, they 
form the context within which such transactions are conducted, 
remaining in the background and adding additional costs to every 
interaction and aggravating the informational problem of the firm.
They are, in some sense, a cost penalty for operating somewhere other 
than in the U.K. All diversified firms face the problem of entering 
into market transactions outside their home market base; multinational 
firms have the additional penalty of doing so outside of the home 
country as well.
We shall centre our attention on these political variables.
This reflects no a priori judgements concerning relative importance, 
nor even on separability. Rather, it is a recognition that in such 
a large, unexplored territory some partial analysis is necessary, 
and that political factors have been the subject of less analysis 
than economic factors. There are numerous case studies and hypo­
theses about the effects of particular economic environments on 
particular types of firms; political factors, on the other hand, 
have often been thought important but just as often left neglected.
We commence by dividing the elements of political structure 
germane to the problem into four groups: stability of government, 
instruments of law enforcement, domestic disorder, and external
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relations*. Of course, each of the variables in these groups 
interact with those of other groups and particular variables may 
be classed in more than one group; nevertheless, the variables 
pertaining to each group have their own characteristics impact. After 
dealing with each singly in turn, we shall consider the interactions 
between groups.
Stability of government operation affects firms directly through 
its effect on the continuity of economic policy. Economic policy 
itself we have classed as an element of the economic structure of the 
host, but continuity is definitely political by our definitions. The 
important point to grasp here is that firms will be indifferent 
between having policy A or B (or policy A or B under the same set cf 
government ministers) provided they can have either consistently.
That is, while A may be preferred to B, B may be preferred to continually 
switching between A, B, C and D. Rapid turnover of ministers 
(regular or irregular) may bring into office a stream of officials, 
each differing in his/her views about policy, degree of corruptability, 
degree of competence, and political power base. Such a stream of 
redirection involves continual planning and costly information gather­
ing which inhibits the construction of long range plans**. Irregardless 
of particular policies, instability of government increases trans­
actions costs, inflates adjustment problems and increases perceived 
risk.
* Instruments of law enforcement and domestic disorder are evidentally 
very closely related, but must nevertheless initially be distinguished. 
This arises because the signal sent by extensive resort to law 
enforcement is fundamentally ambiguous, whereas that sent by observed 
public disorder is not (see below).
** Nickell (1977) analyses a formal model which captures some of the 
spirit of this analysis. He finds that continual policy change 
inhibits the size and growth of optimal capital stock.
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Domestic order is the second class of variables affecting risk 
and it contains two groups of variables - instruments of enforcement 
and domestic disorder. Let us consider each in turn and then both 
together.
Instruments of enforcement reflect the need and willingness 
of authority to intervene, overtly coercing subjects to follow 
acceptable or peacefull behaviour patterns. Their impact on decision 
makers within the firm is ambiguous and this is the familiar 
'Dictator Problem'; i.e. are dictators good or bad for business? On 
the one hand, a government forced to resort to extensive (physical) 
coercion of subjects is evidently not riding a wave of popularity, 
not governing with the free consent of the masses. Its life is 
therefore, ceteris paribus, expected to be somewhat shorter and 
somewhat less pleasant. Expected discontinuity of rule is perhaps 
less attractive than actual discontinuity, for not only are there 
transactions costs from instability, but, in addition, there is the 
problem of determining when these additional costs will be incurred.
On the other hand, active and wholehearted use of coercive tools 
evinces a desire to rule 'come what may' and a desire to rule with 
little interruption and, provided it is not optimism hopelessly 
misplaced, this cannot be a bad sign. If a government can survive 
and govern decisively, it provides the security and stability of 
rule needed to reduce the firm's perceived risk*.
* In addition, it is possible that a well established dictatorship 
will give the firm some bargaining power inasfar as the firm can be 
used to sustain the tenure of the dictators. This may yield 
appreciable short term benefits but (for reasons to be developed 
shortly in the text) may yield undesirable long run consequences; 
that is, the firm's local existence may come to depend completely 
on the existence of the dictator.
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Domestic disorder is the outward manifestation of citizens' 
dissatisfaction with current aims and methods of rule, reflecting 
the strength and durability of the fabric of the social and political 
structure of the host. Such disorder affects consumers and workers 
(or subsets of these groups), and so may enhance the unpredictability 
of transactions entered into by the firm. In addition, in a clash 
between governed and authority, the firm may be forced to take 
sides or may be given the appearance of having done so. Sitting on 
fences, let alone coming down on one side or the other of them, 
complicates ordinary transactions, and puts the firm directly into 
the arena of of domestic political activity. It is of some importance 
for the firm to operate in an environment of stability and maintain 
aloofness, for foreign firms are just too easy a target. Host countries 
exhibiting substantial disorder therefore discourage presence.
The net effect, domestic order, of instruments of enforcement 
and citizen dissatisfaction thus contains a certain ambiguity arising 
from the Dictators Problem. Obviously, countries suffering from 
substantial disorder are unfavourable to operate in; nevertheless, 
those governments which persuade the firm that they are in full control, 
may well succeed in attracting multinationals. Thus, we hypothesise 
that, for given levels of observed disorder, the adoption of effective 
instruments of enforcement increase the likelihood of multinational 
presence; for given levels of enforcement, the lower the level of 
observed disorder, the less overt conflict exists between rulers and 
ruled and the higher is the efficiency of enforcement, and so the 
greater is the likelihood of foreign presence.
This brings us, finally, to external relations between the host 
government and all others (especially the parent country of the firm).
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Extensive external relations have three effects on the transactions 
the firm engages in. In the first place, external relations which 
are weak or hostile lead to the possibility of external intervention 
(armed or otherwise), disrupting the continuity of government and 
perhaps leading to widespread destruction of property and so on. 
Secondly, good external relations facilitate trading relations between 
the host and other countries; such trade is the life blood of 
intra-firm co-ordination and control, enhancing its ability to react 
everywhere. Finally, good external relations, especially with the 
parent country and other capitalist powers, provides some shelter for 
the firm. Such relations give such outside powers channels through 
which to pressure the host, protecting the firm (to some extent) 
from aggressive and unfavourable policy initiatives by the host.
Thus, stability, domestic order and external relations all
singly and independently affect the risk of foreign operation. How
do they jointly operate on perceived risk? Perhaps the simplest
approach to answering this question is to illustrate the principles
by means of simple illustrative scenarios. Consider a country with
a certain amount of domestic disorder, (i.e. frequent violent
political demonstrations) and a past history of relatively frequent
changes in government. Such a country, on the face of it, is not a
particularly attractive location for foreign investment* . Suppose,
I_________________________ ________________ __________________
* The discussion in this chapter by and large ignores the special 
case where a host country may have some particularly unique 
advantages to the investor, for example, a scarce natural resource. 
In this event, investment will probably occur, but its size will 
be minimized and the firm will extensively monitor and probably 
try to control and internal politcal structure of the host to 
minimize possible disruption.
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however, that the ruling junta runs a relatively tight political 
state, suppressing all but a limited amount of political disorder and 
forcing most of that underground. Furthermore, suppose (possibly as 
a result of a successful policy of this type) that the junta maintains 
good relations with nearby powerful nations and the parent country. 
These constitute powerful counterveiling considerations and may 
encourage foreign presence. If, on the other hand, internal security 
forces were clearly incompetent, inefficient or otherwise particularly 
disagreeable and poor relations between the host and parent countries 
existed, external intervention by neighbours and weak influence by 
the parent on the host conjoin with the strong possibility of dis­
continuity of rule to discourage foreign presence. Similarly, a well 
run country with poor external relations with major capitalist powers 
is a mixed blessing. If that country maintained strict internal 
control inhibiting foreign infiltration and if the government and 
citizens were in close accord, then external intervention and dis­
continuity is less likely and the country more attractive.
Without proliferating examples, it should be clear how these 
general groups of variables singly and jointly make an impact on the 
risk of foreign operation, and hence affect the presence of foreign 
firms. Such broad groups of variables illustrate the general 
principles of the argument, but within each group are a number of 
variables representing particular facets of the general group, and 
further progress cannot really be made without considering these in 
detail. This is the task Ve take up in the next section.
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(iii) Some Characteristics of Host Political Structures
It is time to flesh out the skeleton of the argument and begin 
concentrating our attention on empirical work. We have succeeded in 
collecting a number of variables reflecting facets of host political 
structure for a wide range of countries (43) in which U.K. firms 
operate. We must group them in accord with our previous classifica­
tion, evaluate their precise single and joint impacts and, finally, 
select an appropriate dependent variable.
VALDI (book value of assets controlled by U.K. multinationals 
in the host country, 1970) is the obvious choice of dependent variable, 
following from the work of previous chapters. This proxy, reflecting 
both time spent in the host and extensiveness of operations, is an ex 
poste reflection of the risk felt by U.K. decision makers involved 
in operating in a particular host and is thus a natural starting 
point. There is, however, a slight difficulty which might be 
illustrated by the following simple example. Suppose that (say)
Hong Kong and the U.S. were exactly equally desirable in all respects 
for U.K. multinationals. Would we then expect equal levels of VALDI? 
Hardly. A presence of twenty million pounds in Hong Kong represents 
a dominating position in that market whereas it is merely a drop in 
the ocean in the U.S. A pattern of investment of twenty million 
pounds in each country would thus show, ex post, a high risk for 
the U.S. (hence the low presence relatively) which contradicts the 
premise that they are equally risky. What we evidently need is a 
measure of commitment relative to the size of the host; i.e. relative 
to the maximum commitment that can be made in the host. We have
therefore chosen to scale VALDI by the GNP of the host, generating:
VALGNP VALDIGNP
Let us turn to the independent variables reflecting host 
government stability*. Four variables have been collected: IET 
(irregular executive transfers), RET (regular executive transfers),
ET (= RET + IET, total executive transfers), and PF (an index of 
party fractionalization). The first three variables directly reflect 
instability. Significance of total executive transfers implies 
indifference to the method of transfer; significance of regular and/or 
irregular transfers reflect both instability and sources. Together, 
regular transfer and party fractionalization imply a weakness in the 
structure of domestic political parties, with no one party strong 
enough to dominate the legislative branch much less to ensure 
stability or long-standing tenure in the executive. This weakness 
manifests itself in small majorities or minority governments and 
coalitions leading to high executive turnover, continual compromise 
and discontinuity in rule. Irregular transfers are indicative of 
power passing to parties outside the existing structure and is 
presumably often accompanied by violent upheaval. Thus, a priori, 
irregular transfers should bear a larger negative relation to
* Full presentation of the data and descriptions of the variables
can be found in Appendix IX. In the text we shall content ourselves 
with rough descriptions of the variables. In general, the dependent 
variables relate to 1970 and the independent variables to the 
middle or late 1960's.
VALGNP than regular transfers. Party fractionalization and regular 
transfers should be positively related and perhaps jointly explain 
more than either singly, as they are, to an extent simultaneously 
determined. The relative impact of total transfers (while negatively 
related to VALGNP as with the other three) will be larger the stronger 
the feeling against instability per se and the weaker the attitudes to 
its source.
On Table I, the zero order correlation matrix is presented 
between VALGNP and these four independent variables.
Table I
Government Stability Variables: Correlations
VALGNP IET RET ET
VALGNP 1 . .
IET -.1261 1
RET -.0775 .0660 1
ET -.0980 .2436 .9838 1
PF -.2004 .0547 .2177 .2162
These coefficients confirm a priori expectations concerning 
the single (as opposed to multivariate) impact of these variables; 
correlations between the independent variables are low*.
Four variables were obtained which reflect the mechanisms of 
enforcement; IS (internal security forces per 1000 of the population),
* As ET = RET + IET and as RET tends to be much larger than IET 
(see Appendix IX), the correlation of .9838 between RET and ET is 
not surprising.
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MM (military manpower per 1000), GS (number of government sanctions 
to neutralize threats to the government) and PRF (an index of press 
freedom). The problem with these variables, it will be recalled, 
is the Dictators Problem; nevertheless, these four reflect a range of 
facets of the enforcement mechanism and may allow us some joint sign 
prediction. Military manpower is considered in this group as it is 
just as frequently a tool of internal enforcement as it is of external 
protection and is perhaps a less than accurate indicator of the latter 
as it does not take account of the technological and capital intensive 
aspects of modem warfare. On the face of it, it would appear that 
both internal security forces and military manpower would take the 
same sign (positive or negative) as both types of force appear to play 
the same role. However, this is only superficially convincing. The 
extensive use of military manpower involves, inter alia, an economy 
dominated by and geared to the military and this limits severely the 
scope open to private enterprise. Internal security forces show no 
such obvious bias in national economic goals. Further, extensive use 
of military manpower suggests strong representation of the military 
in government and it is not clear that the military mind is completely 
compatible with business. Internal security forces are far more 
neutral in this respect. One is therefore inclined to suspect that 
internal security forces will be positively related to VALGNP reflect­
ing both their neutral character as well as the fact that they are 
enforcement tools typically employed in advanced capitalist nations; 
military manpower should accordingly bear a negative relation to VALGNP.
Consider now the variables GS and PRF. Both are government 
actions directly suppressing the activity of citizens and, as such, are
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different from internal security forces and military manpower which 
reflect potential action as much as actual action by the government. 
One might then speculate that a combination of high security forces, 
low sanctions and high press freedom is preferable to any other 
combination of the three. The reason is that high security forces 
reflect potential action which can effectively halt any disturbance 
which might errupt and the low levels of sanctions and high press 
freedom indicate that merely the threat is enough to generate domestic 
peace. Low security forces with low sanctions and high press freedom 
appears desirable but the government has no enforcement tools to fall 
back on should trouble appear. Thus, high security forces, pr^ss 
freedom, low sanctions and low military manpower appear conducive to 
high VALGNP. On Table XI, the zero order correlation coefficients 
support this view.
Table II
Internal Security Variables: Correlations
VALGNP IS MM GS
VALGNP 1
IS .2356
MM -.2473 -.0332 1
GS -.1720 .2787 -.0920 1
PRF -.1712 -.0836 .2455 .0864
Domestic order is unambiguously desirable from the point of 
view of foreign firms and, following from previous arguments, low 
levels of observed disorder together with low levels of government
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sanctions, high press freedom, and high levels of internal security 
forces, represent a good combination from the point of view of the 
foreign firm. Four variables were collected which represent very 
similar types of domestic disorder; PD (political demonstrations 
1948-1967), DV (deaths from domestic violence, same years), R (riots, 
same period) and RPD (= PD + R = total domestic public disturbances).
Of the four, political demonstrations should be most negatively
correlated with VALGNP, for these are clearly relatively direct
threats to the existing order of authority and rule. Riots, to the
extent that they are directed at the government and manifestations
of its particular policies, should work along the same lines. Indeed,
»
riots and political demonstrations should be highly correlated and 
the variable RPD may prove stronger than either. Levels of domestic 
violence is a much less straightforward variable. It may, of course, 
move in the same manner as the other three, reflecting general 
political discontent and, hence, strains in the existing social order. 
On the other hand, many advanced Western Capitalist countries have 
severe urban problems, one of whose manifestations is extensive 
street violence and murder - political expressions of an obscure and 
indirect type. Therefore, it is possible that domestic violence may 
not have a strong negative sign, or indeed be positively related. Such 
a relation would be essentially spurious. That is, such violence 
happens (for other reasons) to attract a good deal of U.K. investment. 
Such domestic violence in this case probably has no real impact on 
' the foreign investment decision and should be ignored. As it turns 
out (see Table III), this appears to be the case*.
* As RPD = PD + R, the two correlations of .9632 and .9272 between RPD 
and PD and R respectively together with the correlation of .7923 
between PD and R show that there is little to choose between these 
three variables.
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Table III
Domestic Order Variables: Correlations
VALGNP PD DV R
VALGNP 1
PD -.2299 1
DV .3264 -.0633 1
R -.1990 .7923 .1562 1
RPD -.2288 .9632 .0300 .9272
Domestic violence will hereafter be ignored. Of the remaining
,iJ
three, it is evident that they measure essentially the same phenomena 
and are all negatively related to VALGNP, hereafter, we shall 
concentrate on PD alone.
This brings us finally to the external relations variables and 
there are seven to be considered: AA (armed attacks on the host, 
1948-1967), El (external interventions, same years), TUSA, TSA 
(total U.S. and Soviet Aid respectively), AID (total aid, ■ TUSA + TSA) 
and DR, DS (diplomats received and sent respectively). The two to 
be immediately singled out for attention are external interventions 
and armed attacks which should have similar but by no means identical 
implications for foreign investors. Frequent armed attacks bring 
disruption and destruction and, whatever the beneficial aspects of 
such an intervention, these must be weighed against it. Frequent 
external interventions may be desirable depending on precisely who 
intervenes and why. Intervention by the U.K. to protect U.K. interests 
is clearly desirable while Cuban intervention is probably not. Thus, 
external interventions (and to some extent armed attacks) is a
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rather unsatisfactory variable without further specification (which 
we are unable to give)*.
Soviet and U.S. aid are rather peculiar in their effects as 
well. Aid by the U.S. which serves to prop up the government and which 
leads to lucrative contracts for U.K. companies is rather helpful; 
tied aid benefitting U.S. corporations only is not. Soviet aid has, 
in addition, implications of coming from what might be an unfriendly 
and unsympathetic donor whose local activity might be harmful to the 
firm's interests. If both U.S. and Soviet aid are tied, then total 
aid (AID) should assume a significance larger than each, especially if 
the two are highly correlated.
Exchange of diplomats should, we have argued, bespeak an openess 
in foreign policy favourable to the multinational leading to fewer 
external interventions, more trade and the possibility of intervention 
by the parent. However, former colonial possessions may have few 
external links in addition to those with the U.K. and these are 
desirable investment locations, fewness of links strengthening to 
impact of U.K. intervention on behalf of her multinationals operating 
locally.
The external relations variables remain somewhat unsatisfactory, 
for very much depends on precisely which countries the host maintains 
links with and precisely who intervenes, and we are unable to gather 
information on these points. The correlation matrix on Table IV 
shows that this is a problem.
* The role of these external relations variables will be intertwined 
with the links of older colonial ties; we shall return to this 
point later.
I
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VALGNP AA El TUSA TSA DR
VALGNP 1
AA .2889 1
El .3592 .0591 1
TUSA -.3098 .0678 -.1085 1
TSA -.0878 .1495 -.0337 .8535 1
DR -.5556 -.0037 -.2104 .2172 .1227 1
DS -.3659 .0156 -.1669 .0467 .0400 .9113
AID -.2814 .0823 -.0990 .9962 .8802 .2070
1
.0467
External interventions, armed attacks and both diplomat 
variables have signs which indicate the difficulties facing us, the 
first two being positively related to VALGNP and the latter two 
negatively related. These, by our previous arguments, suggest that 
much will depend precisely who it was who intervened and who maintains 
relations with the host. One expects that this constellation suggests 
that a desirable host is one which has proved accessable to the 
external manipulations by the U.K. and other major capitalist powers 
apd who maintains few external links except with these countries*. The 
three aid variables are all negatively related to VALGNP (and highly 
inter-related) suggesting that aid is used politically by the two 
super-powers to the detriment of U.K. interests.
- 160 -
(iv) Multivariate Results
Thus far we have made a number of partial and joint predictions 
within classes of political variables. A necessary prelude to joint 
testing is a joint hypothesis. Having enunciated such a hypothesis, we 
must take a methodological degression into the complexities of testing 
such a wide range of variables upon the basis of relatively loose 
hypotheses, partial and joint. After examining the results, we shall 
be able to comment on the joint hypothesis and come to some qualified 
conclusions about the effects of political structures on foreign 
investment.
The ideal host country will evidently exhibit some combination 
of potential strength, actual peace, and a tradition or recent history 
of government stability. From what has passed thus far, we have some 
clues about the details of these political structures. One expects 
to observe a low level of irregular (and perhaps regular) executive 
transfers, a recent history free of riots, political demonstrations 
or both, low levels of government sanctions and, perhaps, high levels 
of internal security enforcement. Such a mix reflects ample strength 
to maintain order with a good record of having done so in the past.
Upon the basic domestic combination, the structure of external relations 
fills out the political structure. External interventions (armed or 
not) and diplomatic relations all add important dimensions to political 
structure, although much depends on the precise outside countries 
relations exist with.
As it turned out, these basic reflections provided a good start 
for multivariate testing. The problem with these initial reflections
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is, of course, that they are based upon inspection of zero order 
correlation coefficients which are poor guides to joint, multivariate 
relations. Given our initial expectations, regressions were run 
with these initial variables, dropping insignificant variables and 
replacing them with others. In addition, more arbitrary combinations 
of these nineteen independent variables were used as a starting 
point, again with progressive elimination and substitution. In all 
cases, it soon became apparent that the same five variables turned 
up as the principal explanatory variables no matter what the starting 
point and these were: IS (internal security forces), MM (military 
manpower.) , El (external interventions), DR (diplomats received) and 
AA (armed attacks). The correlation matrix between these five is 
presented on Table V.
Table V
Correlations Between Principal Explanatory Variables
VALGNP IS MM AA
VALGNP 1
IS .2592 1
MM -.2471 -.0471 1
AA .2829 .1828 -.0764 1
El .3522 -.0851 -.1011 .0547
DR -.5572 .0617 .1209 -.0001
El
* Because some data were not available for all countries, seven
countries were usually eliminated in the multivariate testing: Hong 
Kong, Argentina, Rhodesia, Zambia, Mozambique, Singapore and 
Malawi. Differences between these correlation coefficients and 
those presented on earlier tables are due to these slight sample 
differences as earlier figures relied on the maximum number of 
observations possible for the group in which the variable appeared.
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Our initial starting point was the IS-GS-R-IET relations, and 
the investigation was quickly extended to cover MM, AID and other 
variables excluding El, AA and DR whose specification was not as 
complete as desired. In the event, it turned out that we could not 
make much progress without any of these three and the best result 
prior to their exclusion is Equation 1 on Table V. All four variables - 
IS, GS, MM and AID - have the same sign as their zero order correlation 
coefficients but the overall explanation is weak.
Both the partial coefficients and preliminary explorations 
indicated that El and DR would play a large role and, in Equations 2 
and 3, the former is introduced. In 3, the substitution of El for 
AID brings the explanatory power of the independent variables up 
remarkably and both El and IS are now significant. The substitution 
of AID for GS in 2 has little effect other than to reduce the 
significance of IS. In Equation 4, DR is introduced to Equation 3 and 
explanation increases by a third. IS, El and DR are all significant,
GS marginally so and MM somewhat less.
Equations 5 to 10 contain variations of this basic combination 
with the addition of AA as an independent variable. IS remains 
positive and significant, as does El; DR is negative and significant;
MM negative and usually insignificant; AA positive and significant; 
and GS insignificant and of varying sign. In all cases, well over 
452 of the variation in VALGNP is explained by all or some combination 
of these basic six variables.
Throughout this testing, experimentation was made with the 
other variables introduced into the study, but in no case did any of 
them exhibit significant explanatory power. Two examples (IET and PRF)
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are given in Equations 11 and 12. It appears that the basic six 
variables together contribute to a large explanation of VALGNP and, 
in the final section to this chapter, we shall attempt to wrap this 
testing up with some conclusions and assessments of these findings.
(v) Some Conclusions
We have found that about 45% of the variation in VALGNP can be 
jointly explained by the level of internal security forces in the 
host, external interventions and armed attacks, diplomats received, 
military manpower levels and government sanctions, and that no other 
variables make a statistically significant impact at any stage in 
the testing. From one point of view this is a rather good find, 
for we have narrowed our search down from nineteen possible 
independent variables to be left with six of some importance. What 
is more, these six yield a pretty consistent picture of the typically 
attractive host. What is a bit disheartening is that some of the 
external relations are not as completely specified as one would like.
Economies favoured by U.K. multinationals might be characterised 
as follows: such countries have high levels of internal security 
forces and low military manpower per 1000 of the population. They 
are thus police states to some extent, with the important character­
istics that authority and rule is not based upon the military. The 
cause or consequence of such low military manpower is a high level
of external intervention, including armed attacks. Such economies 
are not notable for either instability of government from internal
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forces nor domestic disorder. Low levels of government sanctions 
and high levels of internal security forces together with the absence 
of any significant domestic disorder variables suggest that such 
firms are allowed to maintain an aloofness and an appearance of 
neutrality towards host citizens. There is, of course, instability of 
government in such favoured nations, but the interesting characteristic 
is that it is the result of external intervention. Such economies 
are therefore tightly controlled internally but probably diffident 
and subject to much pressure in external relations with neighbours, 
major powers and the parent country.
Closer inspection of the Tables in Appendix IX yields a few 
insights into the causes of the external variables signs. Eight 
countries of the forty-three receive less than one hundred diplomats: 
the Irish Republic, New Zealand, South Africa, Kenya, Jamaica,
Trinidad, Sierra Leone and Uganda. Of these, the U.K. has large 
stakes in the Irish Republic, New Zealand, and South Africa and 
slightly smaller but still substantial stakes in Kenya. Such a 
pattern suggests the such countries lean diplomatically on the U.K. 
and that the lack of diplomatic representation with the outside is 
of little import to U.K. firms as the parent country will have easy 
access and a large role in affecting internal affairs in these hosts. 
India and Malaysia both have large stocks of U.K. owned assets and 
both are subject to an astonishing number of armed interventions.
The U.S., South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria also host large stocks 
of foreign investment from the U.K. and are subject to armed attacks. 
Few countries are subject to external interventions, but Kenya in 
particular and Rhodesia have both suffered in this regard and in both
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stakes in the Irish Republic, New Zealand, and South Africa and 
slightly smaller but still substantial stakes in Kenya. Such a 
pattern suggests the such countries lean diplomatically on the U.K. 
and that the lack of diplomatic representation with the outside is 
of little import to U.K. firms as the parent country will have easy 
access and a large role in affecting internal affairs in these hosts. 
India and Malaysia both have large stocks of U.K. owned assets and 
both are subject to an astonishing number of armed interventions.
The U.S., South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria also host large stocks 
of foreign investment from the U.K. and are subject to armed attacks. 
Few countries are subject to external interventions, but Kenya in 
particular and Rhodesia have both suffered in this regard and in both
cases it is clear that these are U.K.-initiated to a large extent. 
Thus, with the exception of the U.S. and its surprisingly large 
number of armed attacks (which presumably has little effect on U.K. 
investment decisions), former colonial ties cut across most of the 
findings about external relations. Other countries with high levels 
of external intervention such as Spain, Portugal and Mozambique, with 
high levels of armed attacks such as France, Argentina and Venezuela 
and relatively low levels of diplomatic representation such as Jordan 
Portugal and Venezuela are all shunned (relatively) by U.K. investors 
Thus, outside of internal security forces, government sanction 
and military manpower levels, the important block of explanatory 
variables are those in the external relations class. It appears 
that in the U.K. the close web of colonial ties cuts across these 
variables so that while typical U.K. hosts are subject to large 
external pressures, these pressures are probably initiated by the U.K 
parent government. Other countries subject to such external pressure 
(especially the South American countries) which do not appear to be 
U.K. initiated are shunned and do not host substantial U.K. owned
subsidaries.
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Appendix I
A Survey of Empirical Studies of Foreign Investment
In this appendix, we shall briefly review some of the more 
important empirical studies of investment by multinational firms, 
gathering what insight we can into the problem as well as showing 
(by way of contrast) some alternative approaches to predicting 
investment to our own. Three characteristics stand out in common 
with all the work to be reviewed: they are aggregate studies, they 
ignore uncertainty and none utilizes Industrial Organization theory.
Let us first consider Severn's (1972) study. He commences by 
considering three competing uses for the funds of multinational firms: 
domestic investment, foreign investment and dividends. The 'model' 
proceeds by balancing the marginal efficiency-against the marginal 
cost of funds and this leads to linear equations containing ten, 
eleven and ten independent variables respectively. There is no 
identification of optimal capital stock, adjustment or a detailed 
treatment of sources of funds, and it is consequently difficult to 
evaluate the results. Correcting for size of firm, Severn estimates 
these equations simultaneously on aggregate data consolidating all 
foreign countries into one 'Rest of the World country. A typical 
result is:*
If = .254 dS . + .146Yf - .136L , + .179 P + .122F
(4.699) _1 (1.613) (-2.96)1 (1.572) (1.113)
= .461
* Throughout this appendix, t-values are given in parentheses under 
the estimated co-efficients.
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where: I = foreign investment in fixed assets; dS_^ = lagged 
change in foreign sales; ■ foreign income lagged; L  ^= lagged
debt - equity ratio; P = price of the firm's stock; F = net outflow 
to the Rest of the World*.
He searched for but found very little substitutability between 
foreign and domestic investment, as reflected in an insignificant 
co-efficient on foreign investment in the domestic investment 
equation (not included here), but suggested that domestic investment 
and the use of U.S. controlled funds to finance foreign investment 
may be linked (i.e. the significant co-efficient on L  ^and P in the 
equation shown and in the domestic investment equation). While, on the 
face of it, this latter result suggests an overall financial constraint 
and no interdependencies, one must be careful for the model is not 
explicit enough to be clear about just what is happening. The 
significance of dS  ^in the foreign investment equation indicates 
that, at base, domestic investment models are probably readily 
applicable to foreign investment. Whether Severn's model is the appro­
priate one to use for both foreign and domestic investment is another 
question altogether.
Stevens' first study (1969a) is somewhat more firmly based on an 
explicit model and its similarities with the results of Severn's 
study allow one to go some way towards pinning down the importance 
of finance and financial constraints on global investment. He uses 
a modified Jorgenson-type model (1963) to explain expansionary
* In general, we shall not discuss the empirical specification of the 
variables used in these studies but shall concentrate our attention 
on the 'models' used.
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U.S. investment subject to a financial constraint. The size of 
the financial constraint is given exogenously however. An additional 
curiosity is that the resulting equation uses levels rather than 
first differences of sales as dependent variables (see below).
However, his results are quite good and suggest that direct investment 
is a positive function of demand in the host country, total firm 
financial flow and a negative function of demand elsewhere. This 
second result adds strength to the somewhat incomplete finding of 
Severn on substitutability between plants in countries*.
The second Stevens study (1972) is concerned with the flow of 
direct investment that enters the balance of payments rather than 
direct investment in plant and equipment expenditures. This involves 
extending the direct investment equations to include repatriated 
earnings and foreign borrowing. Commencing with an accounting 
identity - the change in current and net fixe'd assets is’identically 
equal to the flow of direct investment and change in liabilities to 
foreigners - he proceeds to estimate the determinants of each component. 
The first two are determined through simple Jorgenson models while 
the last is determined by the minimization of exchange risk. The 
estimates are then inserted into the identity to estimate the flow 
of direct investment. The final results are not too bad. Ultimately, 
the flow of direct investment is positively related to changes in 
total assets (dA) and negatively related to earnings in the host (E). 
Denoting the flow of direct investment by F, he found:
* It is possible that Severn's earnings variables are picking these 
effects up.
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F = 290.3 + .46 dA - 1.80E
(5.05) (3.61)
—2R = .91
The model is then used to examine the impact of the U.S.
Balance of Payments Programme 1965-68 and his findings suggest that 
the main impact on the programme was not on plant and equipment 
expenditure so much as on financing those expenditures (see also 
Willey, 1970 and Shapiro and Deastlov, 1970).
Kwack's (1973) study of direct investment flows postulates an 
independent subsidiary which determines its optimal capital stock 
subject to an overall financial constraint which is given. There 
are no competing uses of funds, but there are alternate sources and 
the composition between foreign and domestic borrowing is determined by 
the minimization of exchange risks. A rather strange aspect of the 
model is that the real cost of capital at home and abroad is alleged 
to be equalized, but they appear to be independent of the firm's 
decisions and hence equalization appears fortuitous. Furthermore, in 
minimizing risk (over a rather short time horizon) , covariances 
between the cost of funds in the U.S. and the Rest of the World are 
ignored. Adjustment of desired to actual capital is specified in an 
ad hoc manner by inserting a few lags and a domestic cash flow 
variable. In view of the financial interdependencies issues, inter­
pretation of this variable is exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, 
the estimated equation (one of them) is:
I = -.655 + .122C + .023 
(2.267) (3.305) (2.516)
.096A + 2.246DMY + .386VRP 
(2.150) (5.012) (1.10)
863
where I = the flow of U.S. direct investment; C = cash flow of U.S. 
non-financial corporations; r = long term U.S. government bond rate; 
g* = rate of change of U.S. GNP price deflator; VRP = dummy for the 
years of the U.S. Voluntary restraint programme; PQ *» sales; A = 
cumulative value of U.S. direct investment abroad; DMY = dummy 
reflecting direct investment in anticipation of the Voluntary 
Restraint Programme. As can be seen, the results show a positive 
relation between foreign investment and sales, U.S. cash flow and 
a negative relation to the cumulative value of U.S. direct investment 
abroad thus complementing some of the earlier results.
These first four studies are the most satisfactory of those 
which we shall discuss here and it is worth some further discussion 
of their common features before we move on to the rest. All are 
formulated on a U.S.-Rest of the World basis and while some evidence 
on financial constraints and other interdependencies emerges from these, 
they must be considered to rest on somewhat shaky foundations. In 
particular, they implicitly impose a homogeneity on all foreign oper­
ations so that the principal distinction the firm makes is between 
home and all foreign investment; relations amongst the hosts and 
amongst each host and the parent, home corporation are ignored. One 
of the prime determinants of total foreign investment must be the 
proposed allocation amongst foreign hosts of the foreign total for
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this crucially affects the profitability of total foreign investment.
As we have argued in Chapter I, it may only be the small inter­
nationally immature multinational that distinguishes home and all 
foreign investment; the mature, well spread firm must surely consider 
each country on its merits, taking into account the interdependence 
between each of all the rest. This is precisely what our own model 
is aimed at.
The remaining four studies we shall look at here are somewhat 
less satisfactory and I cannot accept that the results support the 
conclusions advanced by the writers. In particular, there appears 
to me to be a strong confusion between new and expansionary investment 
variables and their appropriate uses.
Scaperlanda and Mauer (1969) have produced an ad hoc equation which 
they claim tests and discriminates between various "important" 
hypotheses about foreign investment. Direct investment is asserted 
to be a linear function of host country characteristics, (market size 
in particular), market growth and tariffs. These are represented 
by sales, various change of sales measures and a tariff measure 
(see the exchange between Goldberg, 1972 and Scaperlanda and Mauer, 
1972). In looking at U.S. direct investment in the E.E.C., they 
found that only the size of market variable was significant. The 
argument underlying this variable is that the market must be large 
enough to absorb economies of scale. However, (see also Goldberg,
1972) it is not clear why this should determine the magnitude of 
investment. What this variable really points to is a threshold size 
of market influencing the new investment decision. Only the change 
in sales variable has any meaning in an expansionary investment model
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and two of the three specifications of this variable do not seem to 
be based on any model known to me. Anticipating a discussion below 
on sales levels and changes in levels as dependent variables in 
investment studies, it is hard to accept the Scaperlanda and Mauer 
findings.
Bandera and White's study (1968) is rather similar to the one 
just discussed although it is more comprehensive inasfar as it tests 
a similar model for various sectors (manufacturing, petroleum and 
trade) for each of seven E.E.C. countries. They tried various values 
of U.S. direct investment and GNP in the host country and concluded 
that linear in levels combinations were superior and most stable.
Two other variables, earnings and liquidity, failed to make an 
impact.
Goldberg (1972) attempted an answer to and reworking of 
Scaperlanda and Mauer. He estimated the same equation without size of 
market variables but with changes in sales (first differences) and a 
modified tariff variable. The tariff variable was of no value in 
this study either, but the change in sales variable proved quite 
strong. This conflict of findings is worth a short digression 
because it holds implications for the first four studies we discussed 
as well.
As we have seen, some studies have levels of sales (Stevens and 
Kwack) and some first differences.(Severn) as independent variables 
and separately both perform well. If one considers the full lag 
distribution of an investment model, one can write the resulting 
equation with the independent variables as a sum of lagged sales 
terms with geometrically declining co-efficients or a sum of lagged
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changes in sales terms also with declining co-efficients. Both 
forms result from the simple adjustment mechanism of the simple 
Jorgenson model and the conversion between them is assured by the 
fact that the lag distributions generate an infinite number of terms. 
Since the model does not force a choice between them, choice must 
be made on simple econometric grounds and, because of multicollinearity 
problems in the levels of sales formulation, choice must really fall 
on the changes in sales form. The difference between Scaperlanda 
and Mauer and Goldberg can be looked at in these terms. Scaperlanda 
and Mauer claim to be testing some sort of market size hypothesis 
whereas they are really testing a peculiar mis-specified optimal 
capical stock model with no lags of adjustment. Goldberg sees more 
clearly the optimal capital stock basis of his test but fails to 
perceive that it is on this point that Scaperlanda and Mauer falter.
A final study - that of Krainer (1967) -.is worth mentioning in 
passing. This is, in many ways, a rather curious study which starts 
from the Heckscher-Ohlin premise that the resource endowment of a 
country influences the industry composition of its long term foreign 
investments. Comparing the U.S. with the U.K., he suggests that this 
will ultimately lead to complementarity between domestic and foreign 
operations in the U.K. and the reverse (or no relation) will hold for 
the U.S. He finds support for this proposition (although see Severn, 
1967), finding U.K. home and foreign investment to be complementary.
These expansionary investment studies can, I think, be looked at 
as only a beginning of serious modelling and testing. Evidence is 
accumulating about financial constraints and interdependencies, but 
only in tantalizing form. It can be expected that more attention to
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modelling and the economic content of such models will lead to 
further important contributions.
Let us briefly turn to new investment studies. Recalling our 
discussion of Chapter I, we seek signals to firms which attract their 
attention to profitable market opportunities and may ultimately lead 
to new investment (possibly after a stage of exporting to the market 
has been tried).
Despite clear statements of the distinction between new and 
expansionary investment (e.g. Penrose, 1956, Stevens, 1969, Richardson, 
1971 a and b), little empirical work has been done and there are 
not many reliable clues to go on. Aharoni's book (1966) contains 
probably the best and most comprehensive study of the decision making 
process, stressing the importance of defensive movements when markets 
are threatened and the role of government policy. Some results from 
a number of survey investigations surveyed by Dunning (1973) 
supplement this view. The factors which appear most important to new 
investment are: the host government's attitude to foreign investment, 
political stability, prospects of market growth and marketing factors 
generally. Only a minority of firms surveyed stressed lower costs 
or other traditional economic variables.
Two sets of signals have been investigated in the literature and 
we shall review them here. These are the actions of rivals and 
government policy, principally commercial policy.
One of the principal causes of large industry investment totals 
may be oligopoly (short for mutual awareness and interdependence 
amongst rivals). Evidence to be reviewed shortly shows important 
links between oligopoly and foreign investment and many theoretical
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links explain these findings (see Appendix II). Oligopoly encourages 
two types of movement. On the one hand, oligopolists facing each 
other in different markets may invest in each other's market to 
exchange threats in an effort to achieve market stability. Grahm
(1975) reviewed evidence relating to three particular firms which 
can plausibly be explained by this hypothesis. On the other hand, 
oligopolists in the same market may follow each other into 
new markets both to forestall competitive advantages that rivals may 
develop there, and because movement by rivals generates information 
about market possibilities. This second proposition has been 
extensively tested by Knickerbocker (1973) in an ingenious fashion.
He constructs an entry concentration index as a quantitative measure 
of oligopolistic reaction and compares it with various characteristics 
of the home market such as concentration, industry stability and so on. 
The findings are all quite strong, showing oligopoly to have an 
important impact on new investment.
The principal work on the effects of government policy on new 
investment has been concentrated on calculating the effects of tariffs 
and their changes. This work is not entirely satisfactory, if only 
because of the multiplicity of findings and one must conclude that 
tariffs may only have a secondary impact (Ragazzi, 1973). Findings 
by Bandera and Luchen (1972), Caves (1974a), Scaperlanda and Mauer 
(1969), Goldberg (1972), Orr (1975) and Scaperlanda (1967) all showed 
no impact. Horst's (1972b) findings that nominal tariffs (not 
effective) affect the decision between exporting or producing in 
Canada failed to appear at a more disaggregated level (Orr, 1975) and 
Horst himself (1975) noted that the issue was far from resolved. 
Scaperlanda (1967) found that the formation of the E.E.C. had no 
effect in shifting U.S. direct investment from non-E.E.C. countries
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was challenged by Wallis (1968) who, while showing a dramatic shift 
between 1951-58 and 1959-64 in the share of U.S. investment going 
to the E.E.C., failed to show that this was significantly different 
to a simultaneous shift to E.F.T.A. (Scaperlanda, 1968). D'Arbge
(1969) followed this exchange up with an explicit customs union model 
and found a shift toward E.F.T.A. but not to the E.E.C.'!! Schmitz
(1970) , however, found a significant E.E.C. effect..
Equally important if somewhat less visible are non-tariff 
barriers. Franko (1975) has shown (pp. 83-4) that continental multi­
national enterprises have spread themselves throughout the E.E.C. in 
response to such barriers as preferential buying behaviour. Studies 
by Gillespie (1972) on French, English and German official attitudes 
to direct investment complement what we know about Japan (Hufbauer, 
1975) and emphasize that non-tariff barriers may have an important 
impact on flows.
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Appendix II
Characteristics Analysis
Characteristics analysis, as mentioned in Chapter I, seeks 
conditions for the profitable operation of firms in particular markets 
in particular, it looks at those assets of firms which enable them 
to scale barriers to entry and operate profitably and competitively 
even when they face a number of ongoing disadvantages in the host 
market. Evidently, characteristics analysis is rather closely 
related to the theory of the diversification of the firm. In this 
appendix we shall give a rather fuller sketch of this body of theory 
and discuss some of the empirical results which have been generated 
in a number of studies. In terms of the model presented in the main 
text, this is something of a digression into background material;- one 
might conveniently view it as a cursory discussion of the principal 
determinants of the rate of return actually earned by multinationals 
abroad.
The obvious starting point to make in theorizing about 
diversification is to observe that either firms may be pushed out of 
markets or pulled into markets. A firm can be pushed out of existing 
markets because the market is declining in size or growth or because 
competitors are increasing shares at the expense of the firm. More 
familiarly, diminishing returns (in a static sense) may limit the size 
of the firm. The important point to note is that the firm will not 
be inclined to leave unless aspiration levels are unfulfilled; that is 
neither diminishing returns nor declining market share will force a 
maximizing firm out of a market. This is an important source of
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difficulty in attempts to give a maximization framework to firm 
models of diversification; for a maximizing firm, aspiration levels 
are simply the achievement of the maximum, whatever that level is 
(as long as it exceeds the opportunity cost of operating in that 
market). For maximizers, what is required for diversification is 
pull from other markets which attracts the firm (essentially) by 
raising the opportunity cost of continued operation*.
This suggests that it is the attractions of other markets which 
induces diversification (especially for maximizers). Satisfied or 
not, the firm cannot move without specifying where. However, in 
order to operate in these secondary markets, the firm must scale 
various barriers to entry and compete (on a continuing basis) with 
established or indigenous firms. In these circumstances, the firm 
must have some sort of competitive advantage or special asset which 
enables it to compete with indigenous firms (Caves, 1971; Kindleberger, 
1969; Caves, 1974a; Hymer, 1960). To explain diversification and the 
pull of other markets (net of these barriers) we must thus concentrate 
on these assets, how they enable the firm to scale barriers, how 
firms get then and how the firm matches asset to potential market.
This is the essence of characteristics analysis - it seeks those 
special assets or advantages which enable the firm to diversify. The 
nature of this asset differs slightly between domestically and inter­
* This point can be illustrated by the model of Sutton (1973). His 
diversifying firm has a discretionary fund which deteriorates when­
ever market circumstances (for whatever reason) turn against the 
firm. This sharpens the motive to diversify, for managerial utility 
depends on the level of the fund. It is hard to see a maximizer 
generating this result.
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nationally diversified firms, but its existance (and importance) 
is common to both. The characteristics of this asset are (Caves,
1971; 1974a): (i) it must not be available to indigenous firms
(else it would convey no advantages to the invader); (ii) it must 
be transportable to the new market and partake of the character of 
a public good within the firm in the sense that it can be applied 
in new circumstances at zero or low costs.
Consider domestic diversification first. Such factors as 
marketing ability and technical ability are clear candidates for 
consideration (and have been empirically verified; see Gort, 1962; 
Hassid, 1975 and others); they are in the form of knowledge and 
clearly satisfy both criteria. Similar principles apply to 
management technique (or the existence of a uniquely skilled entre­
preneur within the firm) and access to critical factors of 
production. Indeed, these factors - long familiar as sources of 
barriers to entry in markets - are precisely those needed to scale 
the barriers by firms contemplating diversification (see also 
Caves and Porter, 1977, whose argument is similar in content and 
spirit to some of this argument)*.
International diversification involves similar principles with . 
a slightly different emphasis on various factors. The most important 
barrier to international expansion is lack of information on 
opportunities and the details of operation in host markets.
* The obvious implication is that after entry by a diversified firm, 
barriers to further entry may be higher. It is possible that 
Bain's distinction between 'immediate' and 'general'
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Furthermore, the breadth of operations which international 
operations involves eliminates access to critical factors and 
managerial superiority from the list of candidates. This latter 
is especially true because of the environment of uncertainty and 
unfamiliarity which confronts management. The skills multinationals 
firms rely upon centre on product differentiation and research 
(Caves, 1971; 1974a). In point of fact, this important link with 
technical skill has led to a number of welfare analyses based on the 
premise that the multinationals carry useful technology abroad 
(Johnson, 1970; Magee, 1974; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Casson, 1977).
My own opinion (see also Hymer, 1970) is that while this is true in 
part, it overstates the case. The importance of product differentiation 
or marketing skills has been amply demonstrated (Geroski, 1976; see 
also Horst's fascinating study of the American Food Process Industry 
Abroad, 1974); and the value of much industrial R and D can be doubted 
(Mansfield, 1968). Nevertheless, marketing and technical skills, 
applied to host markets and developed in the course of domestic 
operations (Stopford and Wells, 1974) show that products typically 
are first developed in the home market and are then taken abroad; 
see also Vernon, 1966 and 1971, Chapter 3, for a similar theory 
based on the product life cycle) are the principle tool in the 
arsenal of internationally diversifying firms used to overcome 
barriers to entry and operation in uncertain and unfamiliar environ­
ments.
The origin of these skills are familiar to many students of 
industrial economics and are easily described. In fact, there are 
two interacting threads to the argument. These skills are developed
<9*1
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in the course of domestic competition, particularly in oligopolistic 
markets*. The vulnerability of narrow product lines (see Penrose,
1959, pp. 137-8) as well as the inducement to non-price competition 
encourages firms to develop marketing and technical skills. Indeed, 
the possession of such skills by the management team has often been 
seen as the reason for diversification, arising from internal pressures 
(Penrose, 1959; Sutton, 1973). Furthermore, diversification is a 
tactic which affects competition in the home market leading other 
firms to improve skills and continue diversifying (e.g. Knickerbocker, 
1973; Vernon, 1974).
Thus, to wrap up, we have argued that diversification is taken 
for positive reasons, firms being attracted to possibilities in other 
markets. Perception and ability to enter such markets often go hand 
in hand, relying on certain skills in the firm's possession. This is 
true for both multinational and domestically diversified firms. Such 
skills are the subject matter of what we have called characteristics 
analysis.
Let us turn now to empirical studies of the characteristics of 
multinational firms. The first and perhaps most comprehensive is 
that of Caves (1974c). To measure multinationality, he used shares 
of sales held by foreign firms in Canadian and U.K. markets. To explain: 
"... the substantial intar-industry variance in the prevalence of 
multinational operations" (pp. 279), he considered the following sets 
of variables: 'intangible capital variables', 'multiplant advantages', 
and 'entrepreneurial variables'. Intangible capital variables used
* This accounts for the familiar finding that most multinationals and 
domestically diversified firms come from highly concentrated 
markets; see below.
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were: advertising as a percent of sales (AD), R and D as a percent 
of sales (RD), a size of firm measure (e.g. DS = shipments in the U.S. 
market accounted for by firms with assets of a million dollars or more). 
In addition, various scale measures were used to represent barriers 
to entry. For multiplant enterprise advantages, he used the percent 
of shipments in the U.S. accounted for by raultiplant firms (MP). 
Entrepreneurial resources were proxied by skill ratios within the 
firm and earnings data. Several tariff variables were used, as were 
royalty receipts (NR) and the average value of shipments per plant 
in the U.S. divided by the same for Canada (DS). In all, a compre­
hensive list of possible factors which could enhance foreign 
profitability.
For the Canadian market, RD was always significant and positive,
AD occasionally significant, firm size (DS and DS/EC where EC is 
the average value of shipments per plant of the largest plants account­
ing for 50% of Canadian shipments divided by the total) was positive 
and significant as was MP. DS is occasionally significant but other 
entry barrier variables did not perform well. Entrepreneurial 
resource variables and tariffs also failed to make an impact. A 
typical result is*:
D = -.215 + .642MP + 1.24AD + 8.13RD - .006DS + .311g| + .002RW 
(-1.53) (3.78) (.958) (2.89) (-.065) (.368) (1.20)
R2 = .459
* RW is payroll per worker in the U.S. divided by the same for Canada. 
This variable together with tariffs were used to get at the trade 
offs between investment and exporting, t-values are given in 
parentheses below estimated co-efficients in this appendix.
The U.K. sample produced, in general, similar results. AD and 
RD are both highly significant with the former having more explanatory 
power than in the Canadian sample; NR was relatively insignificant 
and MP generally significant. A typical result was:
D - -.412 + .042MP + .205AD + 6.32RD + .348DS - .025NR 
(-4.81) (.376) (3.78) (4.98) (7.17) (-1.43)
R2 = .895
In conclusion, Caves argued that intangible assets - principally 
advertising and research - are significant determinants of multi­
nationality. Multiplant economies work rather better ¡for Canada than 
the U.K. but entrepreneurial resources fail to make an impact in 
either sample.
The study by Geroski (1976) restricts itself to fewer variables 
but generates slightly different results to Caves' for a sample of 
U.K. multinationals. Measuring multinationality by the flow of U.K. 
net outward investment in 1968 at Order Level, he hypothesised that 
advertising intensity (A), research intensity (R), concentration (H) 
and domestic activity were positively related to multinationality 
after deflating for size of industry. Domestic activity was proxied 
by domestic investment (C) and growth. The principal finding was:
D -.0032 + .069H + .0966C + .0052A - .0003R 
(-4.06) (7.171) (3.96) (19.59) (-3.99)
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Advertising dominates the results, but concentration and 
domestic investment are also significantly and positively related to 
multinationality. Growth failed to make any impact at all. The 
most curious finding is that research is significantly negatively 
related to multinationality (in other tests this variable occasionally 
turned up insignificant but never positive). This set of results 
stands in contrast to the Caves findings and leads to the suggestion 
that there may be differences in the skills used by multinational 
firms of different national origins.
Horst (1972a) considered the size of firm characteristic, 
explicitly seeking to separate out inter-industry from intra-industry 
characteristics. Considering first the differences between investors 
and non-investors within the same industry, he concluded (without 
reporting specific results) that: "... once inter-industry differ­
ences are washed out, the only influence of any separate significance 
is firm size" (pp. 261). Looking then at firms of a given size in 
different industries (and using as a dependent variable a ranking 
reflecting the percentage of firms in an industry which invested 
abroad), he tried to explain multinationality by research intensity (R), 
a dummy reflecting resource extraction (RE), and an estimate of 
minimum efficient scale (MES). A typical result was:
D = .13 + 4.95R - .0058MES + .05RE
(2.1) (-.2) (.5)
R2 - .50
Clearly, both research and minimum efficient scale perform well.
Turning to patterns of foreign control in Canadian industry 
(D* is the share of Canadian industry sales by foreign firms), he 
estimated:
D* = .11 + 13.9R - .38REH + .020MES
(4.7) (-1.7) (4.2)
This suggests that technologically-intensive industries capture 
a larger and resource intensive industries a smaller share of the 
Canadian market. Together, the two estimated equations suggest 
that: "... industries in which economies of scale are important 
tend to have fewer foreign investors controlling a larger share of 
the foreign market" (pp. 264).
A second study by Horst (1972b) extended the subject matter of 
characteristics analysis by considering different forms of diversifi­
cation patterns. In particular, he was interested in the character­
istics of exporting firms and investing firms. He found that technical 
intensity of a U.S. industry is more closely related to the sum of 
that industry's exports and subsidiaries' sales to the Canadian 
market (as a percent of total sales) than it is to either taken 
separately. He also investigated the effects of tariffs, finding 
that they did affect the decision between exporting and investment.
In a somewhat similar vein to the studies just discussed are 
firm level characteristics studies. As a whole, such studies must 
be viewed with some suspicion. They look only at firm characteristics, 
ignoring inter-industry variations. Theoretical arguments can be
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mustered building on Horst's results to suggest that these studies 
are picking up unnecessary noise from such inter-industry variations 
in the independent variables (Geroski, 1976).
By far and away the most comprehensive analysis is that of 
Vernon (1971, Chapter 1) who worked with data for 187 of the 500 U.S. 
firms topping the Fortune list which have six or more subsidiaries. 
They tended to be larger, more profitable, technically more sophisti­
cated, more diversified and more advertising intensive (Vernon does
Table I
Characteristics of U.S. Multinationals
Characteristic 187 firms Other 313 firms U.S. Manufac- All U.S.
in sample in Fortune list turing firms Manufac-
not on Fortune turing
list
Sales per enterprise 
1964 (1000) 927.3 283.2 1
2.4
Employees per enter­
prise 1964 (1000) 35,800 11,500 38 93
Plants per enterprise 
1964 (1000) 76 34 1.5 1 .6
After tax earnings as 
a percent of sales, 
1964
7.2 5.9 3.1 5.2
After tax earnings as 
a percent of invest­
ment, 1964
13.3 1 1 .1 9.1 1 1 .6
Corporate funded R and 
D as percent of sales, 
1964
2.48 1.85 - 1.29
Scientists and Engineers 
as a percent of employ­
ment, 1962
6.72 5.15 - 3.64
Scientists and Engineers 
in R and D as a percent 
of employment, 1962
2.33 1.89 - 1.33
Advertising as a per cent „ „  
of sales, 1965 2.39 - 1.46
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not test these statistically). The table upon which his analysis is 
based is reproduced above as Table I (Source: Vernon (1971), Chapter I).
Dunning (1973) presented evidence generated by Vaupal which 
by and large corroborates these findings (pp. 317). Looking at the 419 
largest U.S. companies, he uses a three-part distinction between 
domestically oriented firms, those which produce fa less than six 
foreign countries, and those which produce in more than six. This 
is something of a minor improvement on the Vernon two-part classi­
fication, but there is still an arbitrariness in these rankings.
Vaupal found, by and large, that the more multinational a firm was, 
the larger were its size, research intensity, advertising, profits, 
export sales ratio, diversification and annual wages. In a study of 
U.S. affiliates in the U.K. (reported in Dunning, 1973, pp. 317-323), 
Dunning found that such affiliates were concentrated in faster growing 
export industries which were technologically advanced and advertising 
intensive.
Finally, Buckley and Casson (1976) looked at the largest 500 
U.S. firms and 300 largest non-U.S. firms on the Fortune list, 
ultimately reducing the numbers to 264 and 170. They noted the 
"paramount" importance of country specific factors and "importance" 
of industry specific factors, but concentrated on firm specific 
factors assuming that variations in these latter will tend to average 
out across countries and industries. They found that in high research 
intensive firms, there was a positive association between multinationality, 
growth and profitability, and that this relation is stronger than in 
lower research intensive firms. This does not, however, affirm that 
multinationals firms are more research intensive than non-multinationals.
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One often finds, in addition to these relatively formal studies, 
hints and short discussions of the characteristics of multinational 
firms in various case studies, host country studies and so on. However, 
all tend to converge to much the same results as the several papers 
examined in more detail here. Industry characteristics relating to 
research and advertising intensity appear to lead the field of 
distinguishing characteristics for multinationals. The minor conflicts 
between various studies in the effects of these variables is, I 
suspect, relatively sensitive to sample specifications; clearly 
research and advertising are (or can be) alternate routes to inter­
national expansion. Comparison of the international spread of the 
Heinz Company and I.B.M. makes this abundantly clear. Other industry 
characteristics that might deserve closer studies are multiplant 
economies and the extent of purely domestic diversification. Behind 
all of these characteristics lie industry structure.
On the firm or intra-industry level, the Horst results stand 
out, clearly indicating the important role played by firm size. , This 
finding really forces us to talk of multinational industries rather 
than firms, for with the exception of firm size, no intra-industry 
effects worthy of mention appear as characteristics of multinational 
firms. Again, this suggests that industry structure and conduct 
patterns may well play a large part in the international expansion of 
these firms.
JAppendix III 
Some Previous Studies
There have, in fact, been a few studies of direct investment 
using the portfolio model and it will prove instructive to review 
them in some detail. We shall argue that lack of attention to 
theoretical specification mitigates their usefulness.
Prachowny's (1972) study is the only published one. In point 
of fact, I cannot find a model which actually predicts his estimating 
equation - he presents none nor pays attention to his specification. 
The estimating equation is linear (with an unjustifed constant); 
the dependent variable is the stock of U.S. corporate stock expressed 
as a percentage of the market value of U.S. corporate stock (D) while 
the independent variables are the ratio of the rate of returns on 
investment abroad to the U.S. rate of return , the ratio of the 
variances of the two , the co-variance between them (Cfh) and the 
U.S. balance of payments of the year before (B)* and the results are
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* The inclusion of the lagged balance of payments term is justified by 
Prachowny as "external risk" (pp. 451 and footnote 11, same page) and 
he hypothesised that repatriation of earnings, devaluation and so 
forth are all 'external risk variables' which influence the dependent 
variable directly, rather than through rates of return and their 
variances. The balance of payments term is meant to cover these 
factors, for it signals tightening or easing of controls likely to 
affect the profitability of the firm's operations. The empirical 
performance of this proxy is poor; nevertheless, it appears unclear 
on a theoretical level where the distinction between "external risk" 
and (as we shall call it) "endogenous risk" which affects investment 
through rates of return, is. For example, restrictions on repatriation 
of earnings does not affect the profitability of serving a market, 
merely the allocation of funds, and should it be a short term 
control (which is what the variable suggests) there are any number of 
ways of getting around the restriction such as transfer pricing.
Continued.....
jpsr
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rather weak. A typical result is (t-statistic in parentheses):
As can be seen, only the return variable is significant and Prachowny 
concludes (pp. 454) that: "... all risk variables fail to pass the 
test... ". In subsequent testing, he tried a composite risk/return 
variable,
and estimated:
the results; with no model and no clear hypothesis, it is hard to
(Footnote continued from previous page) Similarly, devaluation 
has large and systematic effects on returns and inter-firm 
transactions (Levy and Sarnat, 1975 show an empirical simulation 
of this effect, applying it to equity investment). Surely this 
shift will dominate any allocative difficulties involved in 
moving funds. The concept of risk, in short, is difficult to 
measure and use empirically; I suspect that Prachowny's concept 
of external risk does not alleviate the problem much.
D .031 + •032'lpj- + .00l|^ + . OOlCfh + .001B 
(1.55) (1.69) (.23) (.33) (.59)
13
D = .043 + .025RR + .001B
(2.71) (2.46) (.36)
39
While RR turns out to be significant it is hard to evaluate
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determine just what the significance of RR implies about investment 
behaviour, let alone the counter intuitive result that risk does 
not matter suggested by the first equation. Two further difficulties 
must be noted in addition to the lack of a model. It is a 
'portfolio ■model' but there are only two assets or activities to 
invest in (the U.S. and the Rest of the World) which hardly leaves 
room for any diversification at all! And, secondly, the wealth 
variable used is total corporate assets which we have already 
argued is untenable.
My own opinion is that not much can be gained from this 
study. The empirical results are not particularly meaningful in 
the absence of a model. The portfolio model leads to precise 
predictions and functional forms; simply to linearly list the 
relevant variables and to test each one's significance is hardly 
an acceptable or convincing test of the model.
Stevens (1969b)has produced a somewhat more satisfactory study 
utilizing the portfolio model. He used an equation derived by 
Tobin (1958, pp. 8) relating the ratio of the capital stock (K) 
in two countries, i and j , to rates of return (R) and their variances 
(V) precisely.
K. (R. - R*)V.
l  l  j
K. “ (R. - R*)V.J J i
where R* is the riskless rate of interest. The difficulty with 
this is that co-variances are not taken account of; in the empirical 
work i is Latin America and j is Canada and the dubious absence of 
co-variances allows these two countries to be estimated independently
from the rest. Taking logs and estimating, he found:
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-1.41 + .26 log (R£ - R*) - .46 log(R. - R*) 
(4.46) (3.87)
- .24 logV^ + .0017 logV. 
(2.09) (.017)
R2 = .94
All the estimated co-efficients are significantly different 
from zero except that for logVj; however, they are not significantly 
different in absolute value from unity which is what is predicted 
by the equation given above. Thus, the data do not support the model 
under consideration.
As total corporate wealth is being allocated in this model, 
subsequent work by Stevens (quite rightly) was undertaken to allow 
for lags in the adjustment of stock; for a number of technical 
reasons, this proved rather unsatisfactory.
Finally, some work by Paxson (1973) and Mellors (1973; see 
also the discussion in Hufbauer, 1975) needs to be noted in passing. 
Paxson, rather than testing a model, used the portfolio model to 
calculate optimal shares for the geographical distribution of U.S. 
and U.K. total foreign assets and showed reasons to suggest that 
where the difference between actual and optimal shares were 
largest, the percentage growth in assets is highest, the implication 
being that some adjustment from actual to these optimal shares was 
occurring. It appeared from this work that while optimal allocation 
of total corporate wealth was not occurring, diversification by
multinationals did reduce risk and raise returns. Mellors looked
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at the effects of taxes on the location of multinational firms and 
found that firm allocations are more closely related to the predictions 
of a portfolio model using post-tax returns than one using pre-tax 
returns. Both studies are largely illustrative, but unlike the 
Prachowny and Stevens results, do seem to suggest a role for a port­
folio model in the analysis of foreign investment behaviour.
These four studies do not, I think, predispose one towards the 
portfolio model on the face of it. The model fails to find support 
in the data and while interesting exercises and simulations can be 
performed using the model, these exercises lose a good deal of interest 
in the failure of the model to survive direct testing. However, there 
are good reasons to feel that the model has hot yet been given a 
reasonable test. The mis-specification of the dependent variable is one 
point we have already noted. In addition, approximation of ex ante 
variables from ex post data and attention to the crucial role of risk 
are crucial to the performance of the model.
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Appendix IV
An Alternative Estimating Technique*
An alternative estimation procedure may be outlined along the 
following lines. We maximize Z and try to rearrange the resulting 
equations to isolate h as a co-efficient to be estimated in a simple 
linear regression. Denoting the vector of means as P° and the 
various co-variance matrix as P* with I as a vector of unit values 
we have (superscripts T indicates a transpose) :
max: Z = P°TA - hATP*A
. Tsubject to I A = 1
The first order conditions are:
32
3A i|/I
ITA 1
where:
32
3A P° - 2hP*A
Thus:
A - *1)
* This was suggested by Dennis Leech.
from the constraint. Evidently:
_T„ .-l„o T -1I P* P - I P* I - 2h
and:
where:
Writing:
1 . e.:
ITP*yP° - 2h = R _ 2h 
ITP*_1I a
T -1 I^P*- P^°IP* I, R = — ---—7 a
k  p*_1<p° - RI + T- V
•in- p*_1(p° - ri) + - p*-1izn a
we can estimate h from the equation:
A - - P*-1I ■= p*_1 (p° - RI)a Zh
Our own procedure presented in the text is more cumbersome but 
generalizes more easily. In any case, the two techniques are 
equivalent.
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Appendix V 
The Data
Empirical application of the model consists of three studies 
using slightly different samples:
(i) Total foreign investment by all U.K. firms in 1971 for a 
sample of nineteen foreign countries.
(ii) Total foreign investment by all U.S. firms in 1972 for a 
sample of twenty-six foreign countries.
(iii) The same U.S. sample with a slightly different dependent 
variable specification.
For each study essentially two sets of data are required and thus 
two sets of data constraints determined the countries included in 
the samples. In all three cases, roughly 90-95% of total investment 
flows were accounted for by the countries chosen. The data required 
are investment shares and the rate of return on capital used to 
proxy expected returns and variances.
For Study (i) dealing with U.K. miltinational firms, investment 
shares are derived from figures on the net outward flow of investment 
for all U.K. industries excluding oil. To get an idea of the 
composition of this data by industry, shares of total investment to 
all countries in the sample were calculated on an industry basis for 
1971 and 1972 and are shown on Table I.
These are, of course, Order level listings; 'Other Manufacturing' 
includes Textiles, Timber and Paper while the last item includes 
Insurance and Banking. Clearly, manufacturing dominates the shares
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Table I
Shares of Investment to All Countries in the U.K.
Sample by Industry
Industry 1971 Share 1970 Share
Agriculture .0005 .0000
Mining ,0207 .0044
Engineering .0240 .0732
Vehicles .0041 .0183
Other Manufacturing .5532 .4195
Construction .0135 .0647
Distribution .1880 .1636
Transportation .0147 .0568
Shipping .0090 .0004
Other .1717 .1986
(3rd, 4th, 5th and 9th items) but nonetheless, services (especially 
Distribution) do constitute an important component of the total*.
This inter-industry breakdown is of course the subject matter of 
characteristics analysis and these inter-industry variations have 
been explained quite well, primarily by inter-industry variations 
in advertising (Geroski, 1976). One point which emerges more 
clearly with a longer inspection of the data series is that while 
most direct investment is accounted for by the same few large industries, 
there is considerable variation in precise share values year by 
year and rankings amongst the smaller industries do change.
The data for U.K. investment was collected from appropriate 
issues of the Business Monitor M4 Series and is net outward 
investment expressed in sterling. This is defined as the sum of 
unremitted profits, the change in intra-company indebtedness and net
* Franks (1976) has observed the importance of non-manufacturing 
direct investment by Continental firms as well.
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acquisitions by the parent of share and loan capital from the 
subsidiary. A breakdown of the components of net outward investment 
by all U.K. firms to all countries (including several not in the 
sample) is given on Table II.
Table II
The Breakdown of U.K. Net Outward Investment into Three Components
Item 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966
Unremitted
Profits 49% 59% 58% 68% 68% 66%
Change in 
indebted- 17% 5% 33% 18% 16% 15%
ness
Net
Acquisitions 34% 36% 19% 14% 16% 19%
Unremitted profits clearly dominate these flows, accounting for 
about two-thirds on average, with the other two items fluctuating 
somewhat between themselves in accounting for the last third. As 
these profits are those reported for tax reasons and given to share­
holders in annual reports, they can be considered as net of any 
deductions which might be allocated to managerial goals such as 
staff and emoluments; hence, they are clearly earmarked for invest­
ment in the particular country. The remitted portion of such profits 
comprise those funds allocated to shareholders through dividends or 
sent to other countries in which the firm operates, being transmitted 
thence through share acquisition, loan capital or trade credit.
These net capital outflows are not, of course, the same as 
plant and equipment expenditures (which were unavailable) for they do
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not include the important component of local borrowings. While it 
is hard to get a precise idea of the role of local borrowing in 
financing plant and equipment expenditure, it is probably rather 
important in a number of (primarily developed) countries (one would 
suspect)*, especially in times of exchange controls (which do 
exist on U.K. outward investment). However, unremitted profits and 
the other items are large and important intra-firm flows of funds and 
can be expected to be allocated as we have hypothesised.
Investment shares were obtained by summing the total investment 
flows to each country included in the sample and dividing each flow 
by this sum; i.e. they were calculated so as to fulfil the constraint 
that they sum to unity. This is not a serious distortion as the 
nineteen countries included accounted for about 95% of total net 
outward investment by all U.K. firms barring the oil companies.
Several shares turned out to be negative and this reflects a net 
outflow from the host, presumably in accord with a policy of non­
expansion or very marginal expansion in that country.
At a later stage in the testing, we shall include domestic (i.e. 
U.K. home) investment, figures for which were obtained from the 1973 
Blue Book. This data is manufacturing plant and equipment expenditures 
for all (multinational or not) U.K. firms. Being plant and equipment 
expenditures for all U.K. firms, it does not match the data on foreign 
investment. One might suspect that the firms in our foreign investment
* Again, I refer the reader to the studies of the U.S. Voluntary
Exchange Restrictions; e.g. Stevens (1972); Brimmer (1966); Willey 
(1970) and Shapiro and Deastlov (1970).
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sample account for between 50-60% of the home investment figure 
used (see Vernon, 1971, Chapter One), but it is almost impossible 
to be exactly sure what the correct figure is. While we have almost 
certainly over-estimated the share of home investment, it will soon 
be apparent the precise magnitude of the home investment share is 
not too big a problem. A stylized argument that rationalizes the 
data choice might be that the risk of foreign operations is considered 
too great by all those firms who do not invest abroad, and their 
allocation of all funds to purely domestic activities represents a 
choice consistent with the basic workings of the model.
Profits data for the U.K. sample was also culled from the 
Business Monitor and is a yearly average aggregate post-tax rate of 
return on capital assets. For each country there are eight observations 
seven mid-year observations from 1965 to 1971, with an end year 1964. 
These will be used to predict 1971 investment shares. Mid-year profits 
for 1971 were included in the prediction of 1971 shares on the 
principle that much of the information contained in mid-year returns 
would be available for the firm to use in making investment allocations 
throughout the year. Rates of return for U.K. ("home") investment 
were calculated by dividing net profits by gross capital stock at 
replacement cost, figures being obtained from the 1973 Blue Book 
once again. The particular choice of this set of data will be 
discussed more fully in Appendix VII.
For the two U.S. samples, data from the Survey of Current 
Business provided both net capital outflows data and data on plant 
and equipment expenditures. Each of these two sets of dependent 
variables forms the basis of a separate sample, henceforth referred
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to as the NKO and PE samples respectively. These two sets of data 
are rather a bonus and were an important factor in running a test 
on U.S. data to compare with the U.K. sample. By comparing the 
performance of both samples (which will use the same rate of return 
data) we can check on the possible bias due to the exclusion of 
local borrowing. (The U.K. sample is retained because this bias 
does not appear particularly strong, but that is getting ahead of 
the story). The breakdown of plant and equipment expenditures by 
various U.S. industries for the twenty-six foreign countries in 
both the U.S. samples is given in Table III and may be compared with 
Table I, illustrating the greater importance of manufacturing direct 
investment in U.S. totals.
Table III
Shares of U.S. Plant and Equipment Expenditures for all
countries in both U.S. Samples by Industry
Industry 1972 Share 1971 Share
Mining .0976 .1186
Petroleum .2370 .2351
Food .0322 .0297
Paper .0493 .0482
Chemicals .12 11 .1216
Rubber .0307 .0130
Metals .0665 .0771
Machinery .1104 .1006
Electrical Machinery .0477 .0397
Transportation .0634 .0741
Other Manufacturing .0491 .0552
Others .0945 .0889
Profits data for foreign countries in both U.S. samples were 
calculated by summing undistributed earnings (U.S. share), interest,
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dividends and branch earnings and dividing by the book value of total 
assets. For home, (i.e. the U.S.) data, investment data from the 
Census of Production (suffering from the same deficiencies as before) 
comprising plant and equipment expenditure by all manufacturing 
establishments were used. Rates of return on home investment were 
obtained from the Survey of Current Business. For both U.S. samples, 
1972 investment shares were predicted from the same sets of rates 
of return, figures for the latter ranging from 1965 to 1971.
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Appendix VI
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this study, investment shares, will 
be predicted by the model on a 'cross-section' basis; i. e. we predict 
the allocation of shares for one particular year across a number of 
countries. Some historical or 'time series' perspective is needed be 
before we can tackle this problem, if only to ensure that our choice 
of year is not too 'untypical'.
Table I presents allocated shares of U.K. net capital outflows 
for the years, 1966-1971, together with the mean share for each 
country and the coefficient of variation of that host's share over the 
time period. The share changes are, on the whole, not terribly large 
from year to year (although for global investment totals on the order 
of £500 million, these share variations do involve substantial 
variations in investment flows). Nevertheless, a few exceptionally 
large allocative shifts do occur - Australia, 1970, South Africa,
1971, West Indies, 1971, U.S., 1969 and Germany, 1971. While several 
of these large shifts do occur in 1971, there does not appear to be 
any reason to single 1971 out as an exceptional year. South Africa 
is low by historical standards and there is evidence of only a weak 
decline before this. Both Switzerland and the West Indies are 
negative in that year, and Canada is about half its mean. These 
historically low shares are compensated for by relatively higher 
shares for Belgium, Italy and Germany.
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Table I
Shares of U.K. Investment in Nineteen
Foreign Countries, 1966-71
Country 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 MEAN C.O.V
Australia .2064 .2017 .2090 .2230 .0957 .1971 .1888 .2245
Irish Republic -.0125 .0252 .0062 .0387 .0248 .0349 .0195 .9025
New Zealand .0314 .0089 .0154 .0166 .0206 .0031 .0160 .0839
South Africa .1456 .1731 .112 2 .1384 .1058 .0367 .1186 .3608
Africa .0180 .0018 .0356 .1041 .0556 .0417 .0428 .7546
West Indies .0507 .0234 .0201 .0281 .0657 -.0541 .0223 1.695
Hong Kong .0138 .0003 .0144 .0134 .0173 .0031 .0104 .6057
India .0083 .0393 .0238 .0180 .0215 .0151 .0210 .4523
Malaysia .0130 .0468 .0018 -.0003 .0219 .0155 .0164 .9512
Canada .0814 .1244 .0776 .0682 .1004 .0458 .0830 .2963
United States .1749 .1913 .2208 .1026 .2675 .2152 .1954 .2579
Denmark -.0004 .0059 .0028 .0015 .0031 .0056 .0031 .7096
Switzerland .0100 .0148 .0230 .0061 .0266 -.0191 .0102 1.460
Belgium .0243 .0200 .0653 .0431 .0252 .0958 .0436 .5942
France .0692 .0416 .0222 .0345 .0504 .0553 .0455 .3296
Italy .0096 .0089 .0068 .0170 .0153 .0218 .0132 .3939
Netherlands .0390 .0364 .0382 .0268 .0171 .0837 .0402 .5199
Germany .0696 .0044 .0582 .0786 .0382 .1633 .0687 .8006
South/Central
America .0469 .0308 .0456 .0408 .0264 .0389 .0382 .1937
The most variable shares are those of the Irish Republic, the West 
Indies, Malaysia, Denmark and Switzerland, all of which have, 
coincidentally, low mean shares. Notwithstanding these yearly share 
variations, the distribution of these shares shows the same skewness 
year after year reflecting marked preferences by U.K. investors. On 
average, about 50% of U.K. net capital outflows go to Australia, the 
U.S. and South Africa with the remainder more evenly distributed 
amongst the rest with some such as Canda and Germany getting rather 
more and others such as Hong Kong and Denmark rather less. In 
general, within a broad pattern of concentrating the majority of their 
efforts in a few countries, year to year share variations in the
05
99
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various hosts is noticeable. Our argument is, of course, that 
such variations are neither random nor a result of rules of thumb.
Table II contains PE shares allocated by U.S. multinational 
firms to the twenty-six countries in our sample from 1966-1972. In 
broad outline, the pattern is similar to the U.K. although there 
are fewer large share changes (Mexico 1970 and the noticeable 
deterioration in the Chilean shares in the early 1970's). U.S. 
investment appears somewhat more evenly spread over a larger sample 
of countries than the U.K.; preferences of U.S. investors for, 
Canada, Germany and the U.K. account for slightly over 50% of
total on average.
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Appendix VII
The Independent Variables
Tables I and II show the variance-covariance matrices for the 
U.K. and U.S. samples calculated from past observations on the rate 
of return in the various hosts for each of the two investing 
countries. One point worth noting is that covariances are far from 
trivial. The information in these tables is difficult to assimilate 
and on Tables III and IV, expected returns and risk for all countries 
in each sample are tabulated. On Table V, the expected return and 
risk figures for the thirteen countries common to both the U.K. and 
U.S. samples are collected and presented for direct comparison.
Expected returns are simply the arithmetic means for each 
country over the rate of return series. Risk(i) is the standard 
deviation over the same series, this being the most common measure 
of risk. However, it has been long known (e.g. Markowitz, 1959) 
that standard deviations are not appropriate measures of risk when 
choice pertains to several options whose covariances do not vanish; 
the measure, Risk(ii) reflects this. Formally, Risk(ii) is:
that is, it is the risk of an allocation of N pounds equally over all 
host nations so that each get a share N This is merely an index
RISK(ii) ^ = lN
and does not correspond to an optimal policy which is likely to 
involve unbalanced investment. The ith element of Risk(ii) bears the
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following interpretation: it is the contribution to total portfolio 
risk by the ith country resulting from a policy of allocating funds 
equally between countries. Total risk is the sum of the elements of 
Risk(ii) .
Table III
Expected Return and Risk of U.K. Investment in Nineteen
Foreign Countries and the U.K.
Country Expected Return Risk(i) Risk(ii)
Australia 7.437(13) .5699(18) .0117(14)
Irish Republic 9.237(10) 1.103(14) .0254(12)
New Zealand 6.987(15) 1.026(15) -.0002(16)
South Africa 12.06 (5) .5475(19) -.0244(17)
Africa 9.637(8) 1.373(11) .0770(8)
West Indies 5.100(19) .4000(20) .0026(15)
Hong Kong 18.85(1) 2.8526(5) .0712(9)
India 7.362(14) .8230(16) .0253(13)
Malaysia 14.86(2) 2.585(7) .1070(7)
Canada 5.775(16) .5910(17) -.0308(18)
United States 11.00(6) 1.443(10) -.0676(20)
Denmark .5256(20) 2.273(9) .0308(11)
Switzerland 14.57(3) 3.548(3) .1907(3)
Belgium 7.612(12) 4.956(2) .2098(2)
France 5.262(18) 2.402(8) .1318(6)
Italy 5.525(17) 2.710(6) .1412(5)
Netherlands 8.325(11) 5.061(1) .2939(1)
Germany 12.47(4) 3.437(4) .1840(4)
South/Central
America 10.36(7) 1.312(12) .0456(10)
United Kingdom 10 (9) 1.298 (13) ,0056(19)
Expected Return: arithmetic average of rate of return on capital assets 
for eight years preceding 1971.
Risk(i): standard deviation of rates of return in previous eight years.
Risk(ii): weighted sum of variance and covariances for each country; 
weights = (20)"2.
Numbers in parentheses are rankings.
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Table IV
Expected Return and Risk of Total U.S. Investment
in Twenty-Six Foreign Countries and the U.S.
Country Expected Return Risk(i) Risk(ii)
Canada 8.127(14) .3846(27) -.0058(22)
Mexico 8.350(13) .8463(24) .0160(9)
Panama 11.44(7) .6353(26) .0121(11)
Argentina 10.19(8) 2.555(8) .0548(4)
Brazil 9.628(10) .8791(23) -.0057(21)
Chile 11.54(6) 6.402(2) .1251(2)
Columbia 5.077(22) 2.042(14) -.0124(26)
Peru 14.85(5) 5.086(3) .1037(3)
Venezuela 17.82(2) .9836(22) -.0114(24)
Belgium 9.041(11) 2.088(13) -.0009(19)
France 6.598(21) 2.848(5) .0053(17)
Germany 9.055(12) 2.680(7) .0079(13)
Italy 3.580(25) 1.881(18) .0058(15)
Netherlands 7.765(16) 2.487(9) -.0431(27)
Denmark 2.397(26) 2.432(10) .0532(5)
Norway 1.577(27) 1.933(15) .0326(7)
Spain 5.067(23) 2.179(12) .0156(10)
Sweden 4.082(24) .8359(25) -.0028(20)
Switzerland 15.74(4) 1'. 582 (19) .0054(18)
United Kingdom 7.682(17) 1.231(20) -.0057(23)
Liberia 9.780(9) 1.045(21) .0104(12)
Libya 62.51(1) 1.285(1) .2615(1)
South Africa 15.85(3) 2.690(6) .0444(6)
India 6.725(20) 3.725(4) -.0220(25)
Philippines 7.258(18) 2.378(11) .0215(8)
Australia 7.849(15) 1.911(17) .0054(16)
United States 7.242(19) 1.931(15) .0067(14)
Expected Return: arithmetic average of rate of return on capital
assets for seven years preceding 1971.
Risk(i): standard deviation of rates of return over past seven
years.
Risk(ii): weighted sum of variances and covariances for each country;
weights + (27)"2.
Numbers in parentheses are rankings
It is apparent that Risk(i) and Risk(ii) are similar but they 
do produce different rankings of countries. Indeed, the rank 
correlation coefficient between them for the two (U.K. and U.S.) 
samples are R = .8241 and R = .4243 respectively. Clearly, the 
contribution of covariances under the weighting scheme underlying 
Risk(ii) is greater for the U.S. than the U.K. The fact that Risk(ii) 
is everywhere lower than Risk(i) reflects of course the advantages 
of diversification - should all investment have occurred in country i, 
total risk would be the square of Risk(i).
Scanning Tables III and IV, it is intuitively apparent that 
Risk(ii) is somewhat doubtful as a measure of risk. On Table III, 
South Africa is ranked 19th and 17th least risky (in terms of Risk(i) 
and Risk(ii) respectively) and the West Indies 20th and 15th while 
the U.S. is 10th and 20th and Australia is 18th and 14th. But, this 
does not accord at all with common sense; the former two countries 
cannot be considered less risky than the U.S. or Australia if only 
because they are in the process of important political change. One 
might find particular firms or industries which might find such 
ranking 'correct' because of unusual circumstances, but not the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. On Table IV, Germany is ranked 
7th and 13th, U.K. 20th and 23rd, Canada 27th and 22nd, France 5th 
and 17th, while Panama is 26th and 11th least risky and India 4th 
and 25th. That Panama is considered to be safer to U.S. investors 
than Germany, and France more risky than India is a little hard to 
believe. Finally, notice that in both tables the home countries 
(i.e. the U.K. and the U.S. respectively) are not ranked least risky
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What these observations suggest is, I think, that these 
measures of risk must be viewed with extreme caution and that the 
amount of information conveyed in the variance-covariance matrices 
on Tables I and II on the risk of investment is limited. That is, 
they reflect risk in limited ways. This arises because past returns, 
however manipulated, cannot be expected to fully predict future risk 
and problems. The course that this study will take reflects the 
belief engendered earlier and confirmed here that the approximation 
of ex ante variables from ex poste data is the most serious problem 
facing studies of this kind.
Turning to expected returns, there appears to be a weak 
tendency for expected returns to be higher in less developed than in 
developed countries. This accords with one's feeling that the power of 
multinationals to exploit these markets and bargain favourably with 
such host governments is greater in these countries and that high 
returns must be within their grasp if they are to invest (ceteris 
paribus with respect to our measured risk). Compare on Table X, for 
example, Hong Kong, Malaysia and South/Central America to Australia and 
the Netherlands. However, observations such as Germany and the West 
Indies obscure the relation and suggest weaknesses in such casual 
reasonings*. This weak tendency for less developed countries to 
have higher expected returns is coupled with a weak tendency for their 
risk to be higher. Thus, Hong Kong is 5th and 9th most risky and 
Malaysia is 7th and 7th; however, the West Indies, the Netherlands and
* Moran (1974) presents a dynamic bargaining model with more appeal 
than this casual argument which relies on the asymmetry between 
'developed' and 'less developed' countries. See also Gilpin (1975) 
and Spero (1977) on these matters.
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Germany all provide exceptions to the pattern. Indeed, for the 
sample as a whole, the rank correlation between expected return and 
Risk(ii) is R = .1474 showing a weak tendency for higher expected 
return to be associated with higher risk (N.B. Risk(ii) is ranked 
in order of descending risk)*.
On Table IV, the situation is slightly different. The 
tendency for developing countries to have high expected returns is 
somewhat more evident: Panama 7th, Argentina 8th, Chile 6th, Peru 5th, 
Venezuela 2nd and Libya 1st. As far as risk is concerned, the pattern 
observed earlier is also stronger: Mexico 9th risky, Argentina 4th 
risky, Chile 2nd, Peru 3rd, Libya 1st and so on. For all countries, 
the rank correlation is R = .2424, slightly stronger than before.
One final set of observations is worth making. On Table V, we 
have tabulated risk and return in the thirteen countries common to 
both samples. It is worth noting that, bar India, they are all 
developed countries and reference to the two preceding tables show 
that colonial ties and economic domination of proximate countries 
has played a large role in the spread of U.S. and U.K. multinationals 
to less developed countries (see also Reuber, 1973, Appendix A).
From Table V, it is apparent that the risk and return to U.S. and U.K. 
multinationals operating in these countries is quite different and 
this should come as no surprise. Even in equity investment models 
return streams and hence optimal portfolios for investors in different
* This does not conflict with the literature underlying the portfolio 
model (e.g. Mossin, 1966) for the shares used here to calculate 
Risk(ii) are not equilibrium shares. Note also that these risk 
return combinations will lie well within the 'investment 
opportunity curve' (Sharpe, 1964), for combinations of them will 
dominate.
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Table V
U.S. and U.K. Risk and Return in Countries
common to both Samples
Country U.S. U.S. U.K. U.K.
Expected Risk Expected Risk
Return Return
Belgium 9.041 -.0009 7.612 .2098
France 6.598 .0053 5.262 .1318
Germany 9.055 .0079 . 12.47 .1840
Italy 3.580 .0058 5.525 .1412
Netherlands 7.765 -.0431 8.352 .2939
Denmark 2.397 .0532 .525 .0308
Canada 8.127 -.0058 5.775 -.0308
Switzerland 15.74 .0054 14.57 .1907
United Kingdom 7.682 -.0057 9.362 -.0510
South Africa 15.85 .0444 12.06 -.0244
India 6.725 -.0220 7.362 .0253
Australia 7.894 .0054 7.437 .0117
United States 7.242 .0067 11.00 -.0676
countries investing in a given host capital market can differ, most 
prominently from differences in exchange rate movements and exchange 
risk (Levy and Samat, 1975). There can be no doubting that this 
factor plays an important role in what is occurring here. More 
importantly, it is the special advantages or assets which a firm 
takes abroad which are of crucial importance. There is, of course, 
no reason to believe that these assets are the same for both the 
D.S. and the U.K. (in fact, the empirical evidence seems against it; 
see Geroski, 1976), not that they are exploited with equal success. 
One would even expect returns to differ between similar firms in the 
same industry from the same investing country in the same host.
Nevertheless, the pattern shows that U.S. and D.K. investors 
find these developed countries relatively similar when ranked in
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terms of expected profits; R = .7967. One suspects that similar 
environments in the hosts call forth similar skills and that 
competition works to reduce profitability differences within a host 
to some extent. Turning to risk, however, we find a different 
pattern. Here the rank correlation between the two investing 
countries is R = -.1209 which is weakly negative. That is, there 
appears to be a weak tendency for U.K. firms to find countries 
risky which rank as relatively riskless from the point of view of 
the U.S. As the rank correlation between Risk(i) for the two 
investing countries is R = .0440 one suspects that it is the 
differences in covariances which account for these results. Thus, 
while the risk U.S. and U.K. firms face bear a weakly negatively 
relation, both agree on a ranking based on expected returns.
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Appendix VIII 
A Firm Study
Our empirical work has concentrated the prediction of investment 
flows by all U.K. (or U.S.) firms to a set of host countries. This, 
of course, was forced upon us by data constraints,. The data available 
for the aggregate study had some drawbacks but was good enough to 
support a first effort; very little published data exists on industry 
let alone firm level and we had to make do with what we could get. 
Recall that one advantage of such aggregate data was that it gave rise 
to some hopes that data errors and distortions would cancel; in 
particular, some reasons were suggested for believing that transfer 
pricing, which distorts ex poste profits data, might have only 
moderate effects on our data. This is because many of the determinants 
of such prices are firm or industry specific and might easily cancel 
out at the country level. The principal disadvantages of the aggregate 
testing is that one is not quite sure what to make of a given set of 
results. On the one hand, we have the famous aggregation problem 
which is that even if every firm behaved in the manner hypothesised, 
the aggregate may not so behave. The other side of this coin is 
that should the aggregate behave as we have hypothesised firms behave, 
that gives no guarantee that the firms did behave in that manner; 
the aggregate results might be quite fortuitous.
This aggregation problem was considered serious enough to 
justify efforts to obtain firm level data from particular U.K. multi­
national firms. Prior information revealed a number of such firms
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(about twenty-five) who have, in the past, proved co-operative and 
data requests were dispatched to them. Only one firm was willing to 
supply the data required; everyone else held that the data was too 
sensitive to release. This firm, Firm X, is a large, well-known 
U.K. firm producing a mix of consumers and producers goods with quite 
an extensive world wide set of operations. Data on the two variables 
were supplied for five geographical regions of the world - the U.K., 
Europe, North America, Africa, and Australasia. The investment data 
were plant and equipment expenditures for 1976. Rates of return for 
three prior years were supplied, defined as the ratio of "Operating 
Profit to Net Funds Employed".
Three particular problems are opened up by this data: transfer 
pricing, the small sample size, and new investment. The extent of 
bias arising from transfer pricing is not clear. The executive in 
question emphatically denied (several times) the possibility; 
however, the firm engages in extensive intra-firm trade and some 
arbitrary element is bound to enter pricing (e.g. through allocation 
cf fixed costs between plants or divisions). The general levels and 
recent profits trends were discussed freely and the explanations 
given appeared convincing and to that extent one might be willing to 
give the benefit of the doubt.
The small sample size cuts two ways. On the one hand, one 
/ might really hope to predict allocations to each of the individual
plants all over the world and certainly hope to at least consider 
investment with more diversification possibilities. A sample of 
five is quite small for these purposes. On the other hand, the firm 
may well make such decisions on such a basis, leaving each of the
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five divisions to allocate the funds allocated to them amongst their 
plants and/or smaller divisions. Thus, top executives may really 
think in terms of these five and the optimization procedure proceeds 
thus through a number of stages.
The final problem is new investment. In aggregate testing one 
can reasonably expect new investment to be a small percentage of the 
total and so one can apply an essentially expansionary investment 
model without much worry on this count. However, this cannot be true 
at the firm level. New projects abound in our sample and this leaves 
one in the rather uncomfortable position of applying to new investment 
a model not really capable of handling it.
Thus, the adoption of a new,, firm level sample has some draw­
backs and some advantages vis-a-vis the aggregate testing done earlier. 
One can, I think, have more confidence in the firm level test in the 
absence of clear knowledge of the aggregation bias; the data short­
comings appear to be secondary.
It is worth noting a few points which came up in the course of 
the interview with the executive who supplied the data; in particular, 
two points of interest arose about the investment decision process. 
First, while plant and equipment decisions were decentralized to the 
extent that specific suggestions for expansion travelled upwards from 
plant to division to top management, the centralisation of financial 
decisions constrained autonomy. The financial controls emanating 
from the top decision making body appeared in the form of levying 
dividends from divisions to the parent and setting gearing limits. 
However, while this controls divisions in an essentially negative way, 
some flexibility did remain insofar as dividend and gearing decisions 
were imposed upon divisions and not plants.
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Second, one got the impression from our discussions that the 
general model proposed here would have been disowned by Firm X on 
the grounds that it was too analytical and required too much inform­
ation and processing. The general principle, however, met with warm 
support. Indeed, the findings of Chapters III and IV were quoted 
and received a favourable reaction and it was suggested that they 
made a certain amount of sense. The importance of risk was repeatedly 
emphasised but it was clear that no single risk index was used although 
rules of thumb, executive experience and some partial indices were 
relied upon.
Thus, this last test is something of a check. Should the model 
perform better or, at least no worse than before, there would 
appear to be no reason to question the results obtained earlier. This 
in fact turns out to be the case.
Table I contains the estimated shares of Firm X to the five 
host 'countries'. The first column shows actual shares; the following 
six are the estimated shares calculated with the following proxies for 
expected values: MEAN, M76, MEAN+DP, M76+DP, M76+DP76 and MEAN+DP76. 
Because of the shortness of the sample length no formal significance 
tests were attempted.
Several interesting features of these estimates are worth noting. 
The first is that home investment is consistently over-estimated, a 
result rather different from those we are used to. U.K. investment 
accounts for 37% of Firm X's global investment and while it is the 
largest individual share, it is closely followed by the European 
total. Two points are worth conmenting on in this regard. First, 
unlike our earlier data, the home investment figures are fully compatible
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with the foreign investment figures; the earlier samples included 
non-multinationals in the home investment totals. The second point 
is that Firm X is a large, long established multinational; it has, 
no doubt, gone native in many of its foreign environments. Con­
sequently, its home preferences have weakened. The consistent 
over-estimation of the home investment figure suggests that the model 
is marginally more sanguine about home investment than Firm X is.
The model also appears to be roughly correct in its assessment of 
Asia and Australia, assessing them to be risky in much the same 
manner as Firm X itself. The problems for the model appear in Europe, 
North America and Africa. The model under-estimates Europe, over­
estimates North America and somewhat more accurately, but nevertheless 
incorrectly, under-estimates Africa.
As with our earlier findings, we suspect that the important 
driving force is risk. Table II presents correlations between the 
various proxies of expected and the various estimates of shares from 
Table I. The pattern here conforms to that observed in Chapter III. 
The various proxies for expected values are closely related but the 
shares estimated using each are virtually indistinguishable. Expected 
returns appear to be playing very little role in the allocation 
process. Of the various proxies, the share estimates using M76+DP76 
appear to produce the closest relation to actual shares, but the 
differences are, as noted, small.
We can easily extend the model for this sample as we have done 
in Chapter IV but there is, I think, little point. We can proceed to 
compute the five h^'s needed to make the model work and reapproach 
the firm for figures on VALDI which ultimately determine these h.'s
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Table II
Correlations between Proxies of Expected Returns
MEAN M76 MEAN+DP M76+DP M76+DP76 MEAN+DP76
MEAN 1
M76 .9308 1
MEAN+DP .9660 .9905 1
M76+DP .8005 .9617 .9269 1
M76+DP76 .6113 .8556 .7824 .9464 1
MEAN+DP76 .8272 .9709 .9287 .9783 .9437 1
Correlations between Shares estimated using 
various Proxies for Expected Returns
Actual
Share MEAN M76 MEAN+DP M76+DP M76+DP76 MEAN+DP76
Actual
Share 1
-
MEAN .5931 1
M76 .6490 .9956 1
MEAN+DP .6912 .9915 .9974 1
M76+DP .6831 .9926 .9984 .9992 1
M76+DP76 .7560 .9002 .9347 .9339 .9330 1
MEAN+DP76 .6540 .9900 .9982 .9937 .9956 .9506 1
but the gain in knowledge would be small. This little exercise we 
have performed here has yielded interesting information on aggregation 
problems with our earlier samples. The model appears to perform 
marginally better (but only just so) than with the full aggregate
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samples and is thus 
were those studies, 
only one firm level
as consistent with the evidence available as 
One cannot, of course, generalize this after 
study, but it does allow some relaxation.
I
1
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Appendix IX
Some Political Determinants of Risk
All the data used in this study are from Taylor and Hudson 
(1972). The variables are described in Table 7. and the data presented 
in Table II. All quotes in variable description are from this source 
as well. Some data was apparently not available in the same year 
for each country, hence the references to time intervals, e.g. "early 
1960's". This difference of years is probably unimportant as the 
variables in question are rather sluggish and probably not subject 
to appreciable yearly variation.
Table I 
Variables
VALDI: Book value of net assets of all U.K. firms in
the host country as of year end, 1970.
Included are all countries with a figure 
exceeding £10 million. Data for this variable 
obtained from Business Monitor M4 series.
IS: Internal security forces per 1000 of working
age population for either 1964, 1965 or 1966. 
This data includes "police forces at all 
levels of government and such paramilitary 
internal security forces such as gendarmeries, 
active militias and active national guards".
MM: Military manpower per 1000 of the working age
/ population. This includes "military personnel
actually on duty, including paramilitary 
forces where significant ... reserve forces 
are excluded".
PF: An index of party fractionalization. This
index reflects the likelihood that two 
randomly selected members of the legislature 
will belong to different political parties, 
based on the number of seats (rather than 
votes) received by the ith party.
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Table 1 Continued
Index of press freedom "designed to measure 
the freedom of a country's broadcasting and 
press systems to criticise their own 
national and local governments". The range 
of the index is + 4.
Political demonstration 1948-1967. A 
political demonstration is defined as a 
"non-violent gathering of people organized 
to protest the policies, ideaology or actions 
of a regine, a government or political 
leaders".
Number of riots 1948-1967. A riot is defined 
as "a violent demonstration involving a large 
number of people and characterised by 
material damage or bloodshed".
Number of armed attacks on host country, 1948- 
1967. An armed attack is defined as "an act 
of violent political conflict carried out by 
an organized group with the object of 
weakening or destroying the power exerted by 
another organized group".
Number of deaths from domestic violence, 1948- 
1967. A government sanction is defined as 
"an action taken by the authorities to 
neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived 
threat to the security of the government, the 
regime or the state itself”.
Number of external interventions, 1948-1967. 
"An external intervention is an attempt by 
an actor, whether another nation state or a 
rebel group operating outside the country, 
to engage in military activity within the 
target country with the intent of influenc­
ing the authority structure of that country. 
The data are listed by target, not inter­
vening, country".
Number of regular executive transfers, 1948- 
1967. "A regular executive transfer is a 
change in the office of national executive 
from one leader or ruling group to another 
that is accomplished through conventional 
legal or customary procedures and unaccom­
panied by actual or directly threatened 
physical violence".
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Table I Continued
IET: Irregular executive transfers 1948-1967. An
irregular executive transfer is defined as 
"a change in the office of national executive 
from one leader or ruling group to another 
that is accomplished outside the conventional 
legal or customary procedures for transferring 
formal power in effect at the time of the 
event and accompanied by actual or directly 
threatened violence".
GNP: Gross national product in millions of
dollars, 1965.
DS: Number of diplomats sent to other countries,
1963-1964.
DR: Number of diplomats received from foreign
powers, 1963-1964.
TSA: Total Soviet aid in millions of dollars,
1955-1965.
TUSA: Total U.S. Economic and Military Aid, 1958- 
1965 in millions of dollars.
- 235 -
Table II
Data
Country GS El RET IET
1. Australia 39 0 3 0
2. Irish Republic 27 0 9 0
3. New Zealand 4 0 4 0
4. South Africa 843 0 8 0
5. Ceylon 131 0 10 0
6. Hong Kong 98 4 0 0
7. India 518 0 7 0
8. Malaysia 182 6 15 0
9. Pakistan 277 0 12 1
10. Kenya 299 62 12 0
11. Ghana 164 0 6 1
12. Nigeria 193 8 4 1
13. United States 946 0 3 0
14. Canada 74 0 3 0
15. Switzerland 78 0 20 0
16. Belgium 47 0 12 0
17. France 439 0 21 1
18. Italy 307 0 16 0
19. Netherlands 39 0 7 0
20. West Germany 801 0 15 0
21. Spain 411 14 0 0
22. Argentina 1000 0 10 5
23. Brazil 323 0 12 3
24. Mexico 119 1 3 0
25. Rhodesia 318 22 10 1
26. Jamaica 42 0 10 0
27. Trinidad/Tobago 6 0 4 0
28. Zambia 86 4 9 0
29. Sierra Leone 33 0 4 1
30. Denmark 29 0 8 0
31. Portugal 173 14 3 0
32. Sweden 55 0 4 0
33. Mozambique 31 16 3 0
34. Jordan 221 4 30 0
35. Singapore 142 0 10 0
36. Malawi 108 2 9 0
37. Tanzania 90 6 8 0
38. Uganda 113 7 9 1
39. Austria 160 0 10 0
40. Japan 264 0 14 0
41. Chile 150 0 6 0
42. Venezuela 430 4 10 3
43. Thailand 153 10 7 3
Continued
Table II Continued
Country GNP PS DR TSA TUSA
1. Australia 22739 280 190 0 5
2. Irish Republic 2814 46 57 0 0
3. New Zealand 5227 91 88 0 186
4. South Africa 10911 163 98 0 272
5. Ceylon 1622 66 158 30 74
6. Hong Kong 1600 NA NA NA NA
7. India 49220 467 530 1022 4893
8. Malaysia 2875 65 140 0 36
9. Pakistan 11160 188 321 94 2360
10. Kenya 846 2 75 44 31
11. Ghana 2207 212 242 89 164
12. Nigeria 4852 151 223 0 158
13. United States 695500 2782 1419 0 0
14. Canada 48473 388 383 0 O
15. Switzerland 13869 240 315 0 0
16. Belgium 17071 279 473 0 186
17. France 94125 1152 716 0 84
18. Italy 56947 511 707 0 1233
19. Netherlands 19106 352 258 0 449
20. West Germany 112232 671 778 0 399
21. Spain 17743 306 342 0 1053
22. Argentina 17204 301 NA 115 414
23. Brazil 21970 300 431 0 1648
24. Mexico 19432 186 315 0 661
25. Rhodesia 1021 NA NA 0 2
26. Jamaica 889 25 50 0 35
27. Trinidad/Tobago 630 18 44 0 43
28. Zambia 792 NA NA 0 3
29. Sierra Leone 353 35 50 28 27
30. Denmark 10088 201 231 0 0
31. Portugal 3731 137 175 0 197
32. Sweden 19714 237 287 0 0
33. Mozambique 515 NA NA NA NA
34. Jordan 505 82 165 0 447
35. Singapore 933 NA NA NA NA
36. Malawi 185 NA NA 0 8
37. Tanzania 751 9 104 0 44
38. Uganda 658 6 52 16 17
3*>. Austria 9336 162 420 0 70
40. Japan 84347 638 494 0 1061
41. Chile 4842 161 214 0 905
42. Venezuela 7692 133 174 0 341
43. Thailand 3930 191 286 0 278
Continued
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Table II Continued
Country VALDI IS MM PF PRF PD R AA DV
1. Australia 1114.8 2.5 8.5 .625 2.53 20 3 8 0
2. IrishRepublic 142.4 4.0 7.9 .624 2.37 13 7 42 1
3. New Zealand 159.3 1.7 8.3 .512 2.24 12 0 2 0
4. South Africa 626.7 8 2.7 .397 1.07 145 226 342 1000
5. Ceylon 48.3 1.6 1.5 .725 1.14 22 60 27 339
6. Hong Kong 54.3 5.6 NA .900 NA 16 57 199 243
7. India 297.4 2.1 3.7 .682 .98 201 558 1700 5100
8. Malaysia 182.8 4.6 5.8 .589 1.66 22 89 8300 13000
9. Pakistan 56.4 2.6 4.9 .337 -0.01 108 145 67 2900
10. Kenya 60.7 2.6 0.6 .101 1.20 17 93 439 14000
11. Ghana 69.9 4.0 2.5 NA 0.34 7 43 34 98
12. Nigeria 129.7 0.7 0.3 NA 0.45 17 177 393 9400
13. United 762.2 3.5 25.9 .491 2.72 1200 683 779 320
14. Canada 715.9 0.6 10.3 .616 2.78 27 29 113 8
15. Switzerland 53.7 2.1 177.3 .815 3.06 NA 4 7 0
16. Belgium 156.2 2.1 16.6 .725 2.53 67 58 34 10
17. France 220.7 4.7 17.9 .668 1.92 223 127 550 112
18. Italy 76.7 4.6 11.5 .734 1.98 109 310 249 109
19. Netherlands 119 2.3 17 .830 3.02 8 4 10 0
20. West Germany 235.4 3.6 11.6 .582 2.43 193 98 96 10
21. Spain 80.7 3.5 12.4 0 -0.99 86 65 76 55
22. Argentina 72.5 1.2 9.3 NA 0.92 99 99 388 6800
23. Brazil 82.7 2.6 4.5 .438 1.25 28 95 117 143
24. Mexico 49.9 NA 3.2 .303 1.46 32 131 82 446
25. Rhodesia 79.5 2.8 2.3 .385 1.16 79 114 134 361
26. Jamaica 27.3 5.3 2.1 .479 2.16 NA 21 31 15
27. Trinidad/Tobago
Zambia
37.9 4.5 1.9 .457 NA 2 13 3 2
28. 32.2 3.7 1.5 .402 1.05 17 74 149 1300
29. SierraLeone 24.6 1.5 1.5 NA NA NA 6 6 21
30. Denmark 29.7 2.1 16.2 .752 2.65 31 6 5 14
31. Portugal 34.2 2.5 25.7 0 -1.42 17 36 15 26
32. Sweden 39.1 2.0 35.2 .693 2.83 1 10 1 0
33. Mozambique 18.2 1.3 NA NA NA NA 5 91 1600
34. Jordan 17.1 5.1 40.6 NA -0.51 80 67 23 72
35. Singapore 11.5 8.3 NA .416 1.81 17 49 30 179
36. Malawi 11.7 1.5 0.5 0 0.52 15 119 55 106
37. Tanzania 10.8 0.2 0.2 0 0.87 4 13 26 91
38. Uganda 10.5 1.3 0.5 .414 0.77 8 104 79 3300
39. Austria 10.2 NA 5.4 .535 2.10 22 36 25 6
40. Japan 15.5 2.3 3.7 .586 2.44 173 159 35 28
41. Chile 15.9 4.6 9.4 .704 1.19 31 64 41 62
42. Venezuela 13.3 2.2 6.7 .760 2.54 40 170 509 1700
43. Thailand 12.4 3.3 8.0 NA 0.70 3 8 76 235
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